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Abstract
A large body of the literature on finance and economic
growth has been devoted to the impact of financial shocks
and credit market imperfections on the real economy. On the
one hand, financial frictions facilitate the propagation of busi-
ness cycles, amplifying the effect of shocks that originate in
the real economy. On the other hand, exogenous financial
shocks may be also the primitive trigger of wide fluctuations
in relevant real variables.
Whatever the channel, access to bank credit constitutes for
sure an essential source through which finance supports a
sustainable growth. Accordingly, we should expect that na-
tional GDP and bank credit to the private sector move always
in the same direction, even in cases of short term fluctuations
of the business cycle. However, empirical evidence shows
that this is not always true. Many cases exist in which reces-
sions were followed by a recovery in national GDP without a
corresponding recovery in domestic and external credit to the
private sector. These episodes have been treated in the liter-
ature under the name of creditless recoveries. The dissertation
takes both a theoretical and an empirical approach to inves-
tigate the determinants and consequences of these puzzling
phenomena.
Chapter 2
In chapter 2 we introduce the seminal work of Calvo et al
(2006a,b) on creditless recoveries. We also present the differ-
ent view of Biggs et al (2009, 2010), according to which these
phenomena are only observable when considering changes
xviii
in the annual stocks of private credit rather than changes in
its flows. Recurring to macro level data, we find that both the
two approaches can actually lead to the evidence of creditless
recoveries and that this even occurred in several European
countries after the global financial crisis. Therefore, creditless
recoveries in the Calvo and the Biggs sense should be consid-
ered as complementary rather than contradictory.
After the global financial crisis, creditless recoveries have
been mainly characterized by a significant rebound in mea-
sured TFP, which captures not only technological changes but
also sudden reversals in capacity utilization. In addition, firm
level data show that different trends in bank credit and na-
tional GDP are due to both a behavioral effect and a composition
effect. The latter reveals redistributive effects among firms, ac-
cording to the degree of their indebtedness before the crisis.
The former implies a generalized deleveraging at the enter-
prise level.
Chapter 3
In chapter 3 we set up a theoretical framework to justify the
relevance of financial markets for the real economy and, at the
same time, to better comprehend the mechanisms behind the
occurrence of creditless recoveries. In this conceptual back-
ground, it is of primary importance the interaction between
one exogenous factor, representing the health of the financial
sector, and one endogenous component, which is the value
of capital goods that can be used as collateral. Two different
kinds of collateral constraints are considered. Constraints on
short-term credit limit the available working capital, i.e. the
firms’ ability to sustain current expenditures for their activity.
By contrast, collateral constraints on long-term credit mainly
affect the new investments in tangible and intangible fixed
assets, which are relevant for both current aggregate demand
xix
and future potential growth.
In the same chapter we also introduce an accounting ap-
proach to analyse firm-level data, creating a bridge with the
model presented. Such an approach shows several channels
through which creditless recoveries may be possible at the
enterprise level. In this context, the notion of production ca-
pacity is referred not only to fixed assets, but also to the gross
working capital which is available to finance operating ex-
penditures within a certain period. In a recession phase, the
underutilization of production capacity not only implies that
the fixed capital is partially unused, but also that the turnover
of current assets is particularly slow. Therefore, at the begin-
ning of the recovery phase, companies can increase their out-
put levels by taking advantage of unused plants and equip-
ment and by increasing the gross working capital turnover.
Consequently, this early stage of the recovery does not re-
quire new bank credit neither for capital expenditure nor for
increasing working capital.
Chapter 4
In chapter 4, we test empirically the hypothesis that credit-
less recoveries imply redistributional effects among indus-
tries with a different dependence on external finance for their
capital expenditures. This analysis is useful to better exam-
ine the cause-effect relationship between credit and output
during creditless recoveries. Indeed, if creditless recoveries
are the result of impaired financial intermediation, the more
the recovery is creditless the worse is the performance of in-
dustries that are heavily reliant on bank credit. Chapter 4 is
composed by two main parts.
Part I (section 4.2, co-authored with Fabrizio Coricelli) fo-
cuses on industry-level data for a large sample of peak-to-
recovery episodes at the country level between 1963 and 2003.
xx
Based on this data, we actually find that industries more de-
pendent on external finance recover more slowly when recov-
eries are classified as creditless, although this result is notice-
able in emerging markets only and, especially, during credit-
less recoveries in the Biggs sense.
Tangibility and Capital Intensity are also relevant character-
istics that induce a reallocation of growth among different
sectors during creditless recoveries, signaling the importance
of intrinsic collateral to face impaired financial markets. Fi-
nally, industries more dependent on trade credit relative to
bank credit are less vulnerable during the peak-to-recovery
episode (substitution effect). By contrast, at the country level,
a lower relative dependence on trade credit leads to more ro-
bust recoveries (contagion effect). This suggests the existence
of a propagation of financial distress and bankruptcy through
trade credit chains during crisis episodes.
In part II (section 4.3), we analyze data available at the en-
terprise level for the European countries during the period
2003-2011, so capturing the global financial crisis. This study
confirms that dependence on external finance is not the only
characteristic that induces a reallocation of growth during
creditless recoveries. In this context, in particular, we high-
lights that firms’ reliance on credit can be of two types. On
the one hand, reliance on bank credit is due to technological
characteristics that make some firms more vulnerable in their
productive capacity when credit is not available (supply chan-
nel of transmission). On the other hand, this reliance is due to
lower demand of goods that are typically purchased with the
help of external financing, such as investment or intermedi-
ate goods (demand channel of transmission). Finally, it is further
demonstrated that both a substitution and a contagion effect
descend from firms’ dependence on trade credit as opposed
to bank credit during the last crisis, especially in CEE coun-
tries.
xxi
Appendix A
The Appendix is a concise methodological note on the
AMADEUS database that is used for our analyses at the en-
terprise level. AMADEUS is a dataset collected via national
sources by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), providing a collection of
accounts from companies balance sheets and income state-
ments across 41 countries in both Western and Eastern Eu-
rope. The chapter describes the sample selection and the es-
sential cleansing procedures to be adopted in order to im-
prove data quality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 has generated renewed
interest in the role of credit in shaping economic recoveries and in par-
ticular on creditless recoveries. The current dissertation tries to uncover
the main channels at work during creditless recoveries, through original
work on three dimensions: macro, sectoral and firm-level.
Content of the dissertation
Chapter 2 is an introductory chapter presenting two main arguments
suggested in the literature on creditless recoveries, respectively referring
to Calvo et al (2006a,b) and Biggs et al (2009, 2010). By offering a thor-
ough analysis of the macro data, the chapter discusses the role of compo-
sition effects, associated to the reallocation of resources to activities less
intensive in the use of credit, and the deleveraging effect, associated to
a reduction in the use of credit per unit of output. The latter is related
to the dynamics of capacity utilization during the various phases of a
recession-recovery cycle.
Chapter 3 lays out a theoretical model extending a model by Quadrini
(2011). Two main channels are identified through which credit affects the
operation of a firm: an investment and a working capital channel. The in-
vestment channel is the one that dominates the analysis on the relation-
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ship between credit and growth. The working capital channel is gaining
importance in the recent literature on credit shocks and business cycle.
The chapter is supplemented by some useful firm-level evidence docu-
menting the theoretical arguments.
Finally, in chapter 4 we extend the well-known identification scheme
of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and use both sectoral and firm-level data to
document the role of alternative sources of financing as an explanation of
creditless recoveries. In addition, we introduce an interesting and rele-
vant distinction between a supply and a demand channel underlying cred-
itless recoveries. The supply channel works through the effect that the
contraction of credit exerts on firms that are more dependent on credit
for their operations. The demand channel works through the reduction
in demand of goods that are typically purchased with the help of exter-
nal financing. The interesting aspect is that both supply and demand
channels are linked to the credit shock.
Research questions
To summarize, the current dissertation aims at dealing with the follow-
ing research questions:
1. Is it possible to observe any kind of creditless recovery in Europe
after the Great Recession? (Chapter 2)
2. Is the approach of Biggs et al (2009, 2010) really in contradiction
with the existence of creditless recoveries? (Chapter 2)
3. Which different mechanisms play an essential role in the occur-
rence of creditless recoveries? (Chapter 3)
4. What is the role of working capital in the occurrence of recoveries
without credit? (Chapter 3)
5. Are creditless recoveries a consequence of credit impairment?
What are the effects on productive reallocation among industries?
(Chapter 4)
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6. What is the role of trade credit during creditless recoveries? (Chap-
ter 4)
Main results
The main results related to the set of research questions above can be
summarized as follows.
Chapter 2
The chapter provides some important descriptive statistics. It concen-
trates on macro data to identify episodes of creditless recovery and ac-
tually observes that many European countries have experienced nega-
tive (or weak) credit growth during the recovery phase. By recurring
to enterprise-level it also disentangles two types of creditless recoveries.
The first one (in the Calvo sense) is characterized as the output recov-
ery without an increase in the stock of bank credit, while the second one
(in the Biggs sense) is characterized as the output recovery without an
increase in the flows of bank credit. Evidences show that the two appro-
aches should be considered as complementary rather than contradictory.
Chapter 3
In chapter 3 it is shown through an original theoretical framework that,
during the recovery from a credit shock, firms can recover without credit
for two reasons. First, they increase capacity utilization that typically
drops in the downturn of economic activity. Second, firms increase the
rotation of working capital, which allows them to save on the use of ex-
ternal funds. Therefore, output recovers without an increase in credit
both for financing investment and working capital. The main ambition
of this chapter is to pinpoint the mechanisms of how various financial
constraints translate into weak economic activity and how they can be
circumvented during creditless recoveries. To do this, we also introduce
an innovative accounting approach to analyse firm-level data.
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Chapter 4
During creditless recoveries, we find significant productive reallocation
away from sectors more dependent on external finance. But this is so
only in emerging markets. We also find evidence of the relevance of col-
lateral constraints, as sectors with higher asset tangibility and more cap-
ital intensive production fares better in terms of output growth during
creditless recoveries. Finally, we find a significant role of trade credit.
At the industry level, indeed, a lower dependence on bank credit rel-
ative to trade credit is associated with a better output performance of
firms during the peak-to-recovery episode, especially when the recovery
is creditless (substitution effect). At the country level, by contrast, a lower
dependence on bank credit relative to trade credit appears to have a neg-
ative impact on growth during recoveries. This suggests the existence
of a propagation of financial distress through trade credit chains during
crisis episodes (contagion effect). In our opinion, Chapter 4 represents a
very useful empirical contribution, starting from a relevant job in creat-
ing large datasets at the sectoral and firm-levels.
4
Chapter 2
Creditless Recoveries
After the Great Recession:
A European Perspective
2.1 Introduction
A large body of the literature on finance and economic growth has been
devoted to the impact of financial shocks and credit market imperfec-
tions on the real economy. On the one hand, financial frictions have an
important role in the propagation of business cycles, amplifying the ef-
fect of shocks that originate in the real economy. On the other hand,
financial shocks may also be the primitive trigger of wide fluctuations in
relevant real variables. This is the case, for example, of high borrowing
costs and low availability of credit unleashed by the initial deterioration
of bank capital. Whatever the channel, access to bank credit constitutes
for sure an essential source through which finance supports a sustain-
able growth. Accordingly, we should expect that national GDP and bank
credit to the private sector move always in the same direction, even in
cases of short term fluctuations of the business cycle. However, empiri-
cal evidence shows that this is not always true. Many cases exist in which
recessions were followed by a recovery in national output without a cor-
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responding recovery in bank credit.
The phenomenon of creditless recoveries has been recognized for the
first time in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006a,b), henceforth cited as
CIT. According to the authors, these episodes manifest themselves just
as periods in which national GDP comes back to positive growth af-
ter systemic output collapses, while domestic and external credit to the
private sector remains weaker than in pre-crisis years. Following CIT,
several other papers focused on the existence and the characteristics of
these episodes. In this chapter, in particular, we compare the seminal
work of CIT and an analysis made in Biggs, Mayer, and Pick (2009,
2010), henceforth cited as BMP. As we will see, the approach followed by
BMP conflicts with the idea of creditless recoveries. Indeed, according to
the authors’ view, the identification of these phenomena would be only
due to an incorrect measurement of credit developments, i.e. considering
changes in the annual stocks of private credit rather than changes in its
flows. However, in our opinion, the CIT and the BMP approaches should
be possibly considered as complementary. Indeed, we highlight in this
chapter that creditless recoveries can actually occur according to both the
CIT and the BMP assumptions on credit.
After introducing these topics, we want to test whether creditless re-
coveries occurred in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008
and 2009. In particular, we concentrate our analysis on a large number on
European countries, for which we have data not only at the macro level
but also at the firm level, thanks to the AMADEUS database. AMADEUS
is a dataset collected via national sources by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), an
electronic publishing firm providing company information. Based on
this data, we can make a useful comparison between what happened at
the macro level and what happened at the enterprise level during and
after the crisis in a panel of heterogeneous countries.
According to the macro level, we actually prove that creditless recov-
eries characterized several European countries in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis. Moreover, we show that the components of aggre-
gate demand that are potentially more dependent on external financing,
and in particular investments in gross fixed capital formation, are those
6
suffering the most during the crisis. On the supply side, the recovery
phase 2009-2011 is characterized by weak growth in capital formation,
a negative contribution of employment and a relatively faster rebound
in total factor productivity (TFP). As in CIT, changes in measured TFP
explain the most part of variations in national GDP during both the re-
cession and the recovery period. In short run fluctuations, this is likely
to be due to sudden reversals in capacity utilization at the firm level
rather than to technological changes. This draws attention on the im-
portance of distinguishing among true TFP and measured TFP, since the
last is strongly affected by liquidity crunches and the consequent move-
ments in working capital at the micro level.
At the same time, analyses on the AMADEUS dataset show that the
different trends in credit and GDP observed at the aggregate level are
due to both a behavioral effect and a composition effect. The former implies a
generalized reduction in the debt-to-output ratios at the enterprise level.
By contrast, the composition effect is due to redistributive effects among
firms, according to the degree of their indebtedness before the crisis. We
also reveal that the composition effect, in turn, may have different moti-
vations when moving from one country to the other. In some regions, a
negative composition effect may be due to difficulties of high-leveraged
firms in further increasing their long-term debt and, consequently, their
physical capital and their productive capacity. In other regions, it may
rather signal cases of liquidity crunch in the CIT sense, mainly affecting
firms with higher dependence on short-term financing.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we briefly in-
troduce the existing literature on the relationship between finance and
the real economy and, in particular, we present the main mechanisms
through which bank credit may generate or amplify fluctuations in na-
tional GDP. In section 2.3, we introduce the puzzling phenomenon of
creditless recoveries, by focusing on the contrasting approaches of CIT
and BMP. Section 2.4 shows that some European countries actually con-
stitute valid examples of creditless recoveries in the aftermath of the last
global financial crisis. In light of this, section 2.5 looks at demand and
factor input contributions to GDP growth in order to understand which
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components suffer the most in front of persisting financial frictions. Sec-
tions 2.6 and 2.7 are dedicated to the analysis of data at the firm level. The
former introduces the differences between behavioral and composition
effects, while the latter deepens our knowledge of changes in balance
sheet items of the private non-financial sector during the global finan-
cial crisis and, in particular, in cases of creditless recoveries.1 Finally, in
section 2.8 we state the conclusions.
2.2 Relevant literature on the importance of the
financial channel and of bank credit for the
real economy
Bank credit to the private sector plays a crucial role in supporting pro-
ductive activities. It is needed for investment and working capital, and
also for specific consumption purposes. Actually, the level of financial
development and the stability of bank credit matter both from a long-
term structural perspective (i.e. ten or more years) and a short-term busi-
ness cycle perspective.
From the long-run perspective, abundant academic research has been
devoted to modeling credit market imperfections and explaining the im-
pact of financial development on potential growth. The basic argument
is that the information asymmetries that typically characterize financial
relations may severely limit the access of the private sector (households
and enterprises) to bank credit. In this sense, financial development just
measures how much the credit market in a country is imperfect. By re-
ducing financial market imperfections, financial development cuts down
the cost of raising funds and the reliance of credit supply on firms’ and
households’ net worth and collateral, thus enabling them to obtain the
desired amounts of external funds, in line with their specific technologi-
cal needs and preferences. The lower the imperfections are, the better are
the solutions and the alternatives in the hands of potential borrowers to
get external financing.
1Such an accounting approach will be further developed in chapter 3.
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Financial development has also a beneficial impact on the selection
of promising investment projects to the detriment of unproductive ac-
tivities, thus promoting technological innovation and affecting the mar-
ket structure. According to Schumpeter (1934), for example, banks pro-
mote growth by identifying entrepreneurs with innovative projects and
reallocating capital to high return uses, thus accompanying the process
of creative destruction. Abundant academic research introduces models
where financial development directly influences the goodness of invest-
ment made within a country or the costs incurred by potential borrowers
to raise external fund.2 Other papers empirically analyze industry-level
and firm-level data in order to demonstrate that causality effectively goes
from financial development to long-run output growth. Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), in particular, do this by evidencing how the comparative ad-
vantage of sectors that are more dependent on external finance increases
with the level of financial development.3
However, just as financial development significantly contributes to
growth, so in crisis years the fragility of the financial sector contributes
to instability. From a short-run perspective, there is a long tradition in
macroeconomics, dating back at least to the debt deflation formulation pre-
sented in Fisher (1933), to model the impact of financial shocks and credit
market imperfections on the real economy and, also, to explain how they
may amplify and prolong the fluctuations within business cycle frequen-
cies. The existing literature on these topics4 typically brings them under
the heading of financial accelerator.
Moreover, a large body of literature also described how frictions in
the credit markets may amplify the effects of monetary policy on the
real economy, a mechanism known as the credit channel of monetary pol-
icy transmission.5 Quadrini (2011) clearly shows that the assumption
2See, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).
3See Levine (1997) for a general review of the topic. Interesting contributions are also
to be found, among the others, in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996), Levine and Zervos (1998).
4See, for instance, Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Bernanke et al (1999).
5As shown in Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the credit channel, in turn, can be broken
down into two mechanisms that explain the link between monetary policy and the cost
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that financial markets are imperfect is central to explain the mechanisms
mentioned above. Indeed, accepting the existence of information asym-
metries implies recognizing issues (such as moral hazard or contract de-
sign problems) that are not considered in standard neoclassical economic
models. First of all, because of limited enforceability of debt contracts,
potential borrowers are subject to collateral constraints (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997). In this framework, durable assets not only serve as pro-
ductive inputs, but also to secure loans from banks. Second, because of
imperfect information, financial arrangements between borrowers and
lenders involve significant agency costs (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) as
also shown in the costly state verification problem of Townsend (1979).
The interaction between financial factors and the real economy is just
based on the fact that both collateral constraints and agency costs depend
on the borrower’s liquidity and net worth, i.e. on the quality of its bal-
ance sheet. By altering the net worth of potential borrowers, current and
future sales as well as asset prices may thus increase (or decrease) the
cost of external funds and, consequently, reduce (or enhance) their abil-
ity to borrow, invest and consume. Therefore, in a general equilibrium
framework, this mechanisms ultimately contribute to amplify (and, pos-
sibly, even generate) output fluctuations at business cycle frequencies.
This process is self-reinforcing and, in favorable periods, may even in-
crease vulnerabilities in the financial system and lead to bubbles where
assets prices are no more in line with economic fundamentals.
However, several events can intervene to interrupt the cyclical per-
sistence induced by financial accelerator mechanisms and reverse the
trend of economic expansion. On the one hand, bank credit may ini-
tially decrease because of primitive negative shocks (e.g. bank runs) di-
rectly affecting financial intermediaries, which consequently constrain
lending to protect their liquidity. On the other hand, bank credit may
decrease because of declining ability of borrowers to post collateral. This
can be motivated alternatively by falling asset prices, failed investments,
bankruptcies, primitive shocks in demand or productivity. All of them,
faced by the private sector to raise funds externally: the balance-sheet channel and the bank-
lending channel.
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indeed, may affect the balance sheets of households and firms, thus in-
ducing an initial deterioration of their financial position. This, in turn, in-
creases the cost of credit and the amount of collateral required by banks
and, consequently, reduces the resources for investment in fixed assets
and the provision of liquidity, with a potentially adverse impact on the
real economy. Indeed, since external and internal funds are not perfectly
substitutable, as well as bank credit and alternative forms of external
financing (e.g. many firms do not have access to equity capital), then im-
paired credit markets often constitute an impressive constraint on output
growth. Finally, output collapses at the firm level imply further deteri-
oration of net worth and additional reduction in the access to financial
services, thus perpetuating the consequences of the initial shocks, as ac-
tually happened after the global financial crisis of 2008.
It is relevant to notice that a large body of academic research recurs
to the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external finance dependence as
the relevant industry characteristic to explain not only the heterogeneous
effects of financial development on long-run output growth, but also the
effects of financial shocks on short-run fluctuations.6 However, we stress
the fact that additional industry characteristics may potentially give sim-
ilar, or even superior results, especially when considering business cycle
frequencies. This is the case, for example, of liquidity needs, which is the
amount of working capital that is necessary to finance firms’ day-by-day
operations.
In fact, while the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external de-
pendence is designed to quantify how much external funds are needed
to invest in fixed capital assets, liquidity needs are more likely to cap-
ture the reliance of each sector on supportive financial conditions in the
short run. Actually, since physical capital investment is discontinuous
and lumpy at the microeconomic level,7 working capital investment is
possibly more relevant for the short-term productive capacity. Raddatz
(2006), for example, shows that the role of financial markets in providing
liquidity is essential for reducing output volatility of industries that use
6See, for example, Braun and Larrain (2005).
7See Caballero et al (1995).
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large amounts of working capital. Furthermore, it also provides evidence
that banks play an even more essential role in liquidity provision than eq-
uity markets, especially in developing countries, where bank overdrafts
are much more important than alternative sources of funds, such as com-
mercial papers.8
2.3 Open questions in the literature on credit-
less recoveries
In this section, we focus our attention on the phenomenon of creditless
recoveries. According to what we outlined in the previous section, we
should expect that national GDP and private credit tend to go hand
in hand even in cases of short term fluctuations of the business cycle.
Episodes of creditless recoveries show that it is not always so. The puz-
zling occurrence of recoveries without credit has been documented for
the first time by CIT, although with a specific reference to emerging mar-
kets only. Indeed, CIT identifies two stylized facts that characterize sev-
eral crisis episodes in developing countries, i.e. sudden stops and creditless
recoveries. Systemic sudden stops are defined as severe drops in capital
inflows, accompanied by unusually large bond spreads and also, typi-
cally, by severe output collapses. Creditless recoveries, instead, are de-
fined as episodes in which output returns to pre-crisis levels after reces-
sion phases while no resumption occurs in external or domestic credit.
Although CIT concentrate their analysis on creditless recoveries that fol-
low systemic sudden stops, these phenomena are not necessarily a spe-
cific feature of these collapses. Indeed, while sudden stops tend to be
concentrated in short periods of time and are generally limited to emerg-
ing economies, creditless recoveries take place also in developed coun-
tries, as clearly shown in Claessens et al (2009). It is nevertheless true,
as also stated in Darvas (2014), that the frequency of these phenomena is
higher in emerging markets, which are in their financial early life, than
in countries with more developed financial systems.
8See also Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck et al (2000).
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CIT also define creditless recoveries as Phoenix Miracles, just refer-
ring to the bird of Greek mythology that obtains new life by arising from
the ashes of its predecessor:
“The existence of phoenix-like recoveries suggests that financial
frictions play a key role in pushing economies to the abyss from
which, in some way or another, they can crawl back to safe ground
by means less than apparent to the conventional observer looking
for standard ‘fundamentals’ and, thus, may appear miraculous”.
According to CIT this apparent paradox may be explained by the
fact that, following systemic sudden stops (and in the face of financial
frictions that continue to affect the economy), firms may finance their
working capital and get back to their pre-crisis production by finding al-
ternative sources to support their short-term needs and by cutting back
on long-term investments in physical capital. However, further inves-
tigations are needed to better comprehend the determinants and conse-
quences of creditless recoveries. This is just the main objective of anal-
yses that will be developed later, in chapters 3 and 4. For the moment,
we just want to dwell on which are the essential aspects to be taken in
consideration to better examine the phenomenon of creditless recoveries.
The first aspect to consider is what creditless exactly means. In par-
ticular, we wonder whether we should refer to the outstanding stocks of
credit or to the flows of credit itself when examining the credit changes
during recovery years. Should we compare the GDP level with the
amount of bank credit to the private sector or with its annual variation?
These questions prompt us to compare two essential research works on
creditless recoveries, which are just CIT and BMP. The two works fol-
low two contrasting approaches to describe these phenomena but, in our
opinion, they should be possibly considered as complementary. In the
following paragraphs, we just provide a brief explanation of the two dif-
ferent perspectives of CIT and BMP as regards the existence of creditless
recoveries.
In the partial equilibrium model presented by CIT, bank credit is
identified with intra-period loans that are only used to maintain the work-
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ing capital, i.e. to sustain cash or liquid assets typically needed for day-
by-day operations (e.g. inventory accumulation and salaries). Since bank
credit is entirely repaid within one single year, from this perspective it
makes sense to base the definition of creditless recovery on the annual
change of credit stocks rather than of credit flows. In CIT, the collapse
of bank credit is the equivalent of a liquidity crunch. Investments in
fixed assets do not rely on external financing, since they are self-financed
through retained earnings as it typically happens in emerging countries.
However, during episodes of creditless recovery, the most part of avail-
able funds is not devoted to physical capital and, consequently, invest-
ments remain very weak. A large part of retained earnings, indeed, is
dedicated to working capital, thus substituting the impaired bank credit.
This also explains the behavior of Total Factor Productivity (hereafter TFP)
that, in the episodes analyzed by CIT, accounts for the most part of the
changes in aggregate production during both the recession and the re-
covery periods. According to the authors, fluctuations in TFP are due to
the fact that in growth accounting the measured TFP growth is obtained as
a residual and may diverge significantly from the true TFP. Indeed, true
TFP is assumed to be closely linked to technological progress and not
highly volatile in the short term. By contrast, measured TFP is affected
in the short term by additional factors, that are likely to comprehend the
impact of significant financial constraints. This is the case, for example,
of a temporary underutilization of production capacity, which has noth-
ing to do with the true TFP but negatively affects the measured TFP. We
point out that the reason for capacity underutilization in CIT is not low
aggregate demand, but the credit and working capital constraints. As
such, capacity underutilization is the result of a liquidity crunch. From
this perspective, firms do not fully use their productive capacity during
recessions because significant disruptions in the credit market impose a
constraint on the optimum level of day-by-day operations.
BMP, on the contrary, present a closed-economy model where credit is
mainly needed to buy investment goods, since they cannot be financed
through retained earnings. This implies the existence of a very strong
link between credit and real domestic demand. However, in BMP mo-
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del the accumulated stock of bank credit is not entirely repaid within
one single year. On the contrary, it manifests itself in the form of inter-
temporal loans, so that only its annual increase can be associated with the
financing of new investments in the current period. Thus, what mat-
ters for aggregate demand (and GDP growth) are mainly the flows of
new credit. If credit flows are constant, their contribution to investment
growth is zero. If they have a steady growth, then the same occurs to the
gross fixed capital formation. Therefore, from this perspective, it is rea-
sonable to base the definition of creditless recovery on the annual change
in credit flows, dubbed credit impulse in BMP, rather than on growth of
the outstanding credit stocks. However, in BMP there is no investment
without new credit and there is a very low probability of real growth
without investment. This leads the authors to state that the puzzle of
creditless recoveries does not exist or it is very unlikely to occur once we
refer to the credit impulse as a measure of weakness in bank lending.
As we shall see, the reasoning of BMP has both merits and shortcom-
ings. Actually, behind the choice to take in account the flows of new
credit there is a shareable justification. The debt incurred for capital ex-
penditures cannot be repaid within a single accounting period. There-
fore, the new credit financing any investment in fixed assets adds up to
the outstanding amount of debt. So it makes sense to assume that in-
vestments in the current year are more correlated with annual changes
in debt than with the stock of debt accumulated over time.
However, borrowing can provide funds not only for capital invest-
ment but also for day-by-day financial operations and ongoing expenses,
such as labor costs and the purchase of intermediate goods, which are
necessary to support production cycles. A company, for example, may
need to resort to intra-period loans for the sustenance of current expenses
just because the produced goods are sold with a certain delay compared
to the time when firms have to bear the costs of production. These credit
lines do not involve an increase in the stock of debt, because they are re-
newed from period to period and entirely repaid at the end of each pro-
duction cycle by recurring to the corresponding cash flows. If production
remains stable over time, amounts due to banks are renewed perpetu-
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ally at each production cycle, so that the flows of new intra-period credit
perfectly overlap with the outstanding stock. From this perspective, the
variable we are most interested in is just the stock of credit, as indicated
by CIT.
To highlight the inconsistencies in the reasoning of BMP, it is neces-
sary to point out that in their model there cannot be capacity underuti-
lization due to a liquidity crunch as in CIT. Thus, we reasonably suspect
that the puzzle of creditless recoveries is negated by BMP simply be-
cause they deny one of the most likely drivers of creditless recovery, i.e.
the return to a full utilization of the existing production capacity after a
financial crisis. In BMP, output is only affected by shocks to aggregate
demand and, at the same time, there are no alternatives to credit in order
to stimulate the demand itself. By contrast, according to CIT view, in-
vestments give an insignificant contribution to recovery during phoenix
miracles and, then, it is still perfectly possible to justify a situation where
credit flows and GDP move in opposite directions.
Actually, both approaches are useful and offer complementary in-
sights into the determinants of output growth. Moreover, they also help
to make clear that even the definition of recovery is absolutely not trivial
and, indeed, makes the difference. Actually, a full recovery would neces-
sarily require (i) the return to the pre-crisis peak or, according to an even
narrower view, (ii) the return to the pre-crisis trend. The former is more
easily observable and, as we will see, it is what actually occurred in sev-
eral European countries in the period 2009-2011. In a peak-to-recovery
approach a` la CIT, the recovery is evaluated by comparing GDP levels
with their pre-crisis peak, as in definition (i). As mentioned above, for a
full recovery of this type it may be sufficient a rebound in the financing
of working capital while investments remain flat and the capital stock
remains constant. By contrast, a resumption of type (ii), i.e. a reversion
to pre-crisis trend, would require that the stock of capital and the invest-
ment growth return in line with the trend. The same goes for the role
of TFP, which typically tends to explain most of the long-run growth in
output. Therefore, a recovery in the utilization of existing production ca-
pacity without a parallel recovery in investments is not enough to pursue
16
full recovery according to definition (ii).
Empirical evidences confirm that financial crises and creditless recov-
eries are generally characterized by an output resumption of type (i).
Cerra and Saxena (2008), for example, show that after financial crises we
have a permanent loss in output with respect to its pre-crisis trend and
lower growth in the long-run. GDP restarts, though at lower levels, with
accumulated gaps resulting impossible to fill. As stated above, one pos-
sible reason for this permanent loss is the significant drop in investments
during the financial crisis. Even if the financial market wakes up, it is of-
ten impossible to fill the gap in the stock of capital accumulated during
the crisis. To make things worse, if credit supply remains weak, firms
even struggle to get back to the pre-crisis growth rate of investments
and the permanent loss becomes even more pronounced. One additional
reason for the lower long-run growth is a stagnation of true TFP after
financial crises, which is not an implausible occurrence. Indeed, as also
noted in CIT, in the face of financial frictions that persist after the crisis,
firms necessarily focus on working capital management and are likely to
assign a lower priority to increasing their long-term productivity. How-
ever, the extent to which the true TFP growth is actually influenced by
the availability of bank credit remains to be better clarified and would be
an interesting avenue for further research.
One final aspect to consider when examining creditless recoveries is
the necessity to distinguish among demand- and supply-side explana-
tions for the weakness of bank lending. Low credit can be due to low
demand of external financing or, on the contrary, to constraints on the
supply-side of bank credit markets. Only the latter would require pol-
icy actions aimed to solve problems at the banking system level. Indeed,
tight credit constraints may induce the private non-financial sector to de-
lay their capital and current expenditures or, alternatively, to recur to
more expensive financing sources. The lack of bank credit may also neg-
atively affect the quality of the market structure, by favoring industries
that are less dependent on external finance because they contribute less
to the capital endowment and the technological innovation of a coun-
try. By contrast, policy actions should not concern the banking system
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if credit weakness descends by the fact that firms are obtaining cheap
financing by other means, or banks are reducing the credit granted to ob-
solete industries in favor of more productive and less credit-dependent
sectors. In these cases, output recovery without a pick-up in bank credit
would be not a major source of concern.
2.4 The recovery of the European economies af-
ter the global financial crisis: credit-less or
credit-with?
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 resulted in se-
vere declines in economic activity among the European countries. This
global episode provides a unique case study to explore the impact of fi-
nancial constraints on the macroeconomy. The initial shock takes root
in global capital markets and dramatically erodes liquidity from banks.
Therefore, output collapses all around the global economy at the about
the same time. However, even if the credit crunch seems to have a ma-
jor impact on the crisis, some economies are able to recover without a
resumption in bank lending.
In the next paragraphs we identify concrete examples of creditless re-
coveries among the European countries in this period. In addition, the
availability of data at both the macro and firm level for the European re-
gion enables us to analyze these episodes from different angles. Indeed,
as clearly evidenced in Sugawara and Zalduendo (2013), the distinction
among creditless and credit-with recoveries can be tested on three dif-
ferent levels: country-level, industry-level and firm-level data. In this
section we start from country-level data to examine the early years of
recovery in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. On the one side,
we have to analyze the fluctuations in real macro variables during the fi-
nancial crisis and the following recovery period 2009-2011. On the other
hand, we have to explore the evolution of credit during the same peri-
ods, by testing both the two approaches of BMP and CIT, just to establish
whether some recovery episodes that took place in Europe can be char-
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Figure 1: Output gaps in the Eurozone
acterized as creditless recoveries and, if so, in which countries they did
effectively occur.
First and foremost, within each country of our dataset we identify
the years and the magnitude of the recession phase, together with the
years and the extent of the subsequent recovery. We do this by measur-
ing the lost ground with respect to the pre-crisis peak in real GDP9 and
with respect to its trend. Trend (smoothed) GDP is computed by using
the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, hereinafter HP filter. We set the
smoothing parameter λ to 6.25, the value suggested by Ravn and Uhlig
(2002). Higher values of λ (e.g. the standard 100 value for annual data)
attach larger weight to smoothing rates of change in the trend and there-
fore produce smaller fluctuations in estimates of potential growth. In
particular, the trend real GDP that we consider is obtained by applying
the HP filter until year 2007 and then by extending the 2007 trend growth
9The real Gross Domestic Product, expressed in constant local currency units, is ob-
tained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary
Fund. Some missing data and forecasts until 2014 are obtained from the IMF’s October 2013
World Economic Outlook (WEO). The time span ranges from 1965 to 2014, although data
availability reduces it for many countries.
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Figure 2: Output gaps in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
rate to the remaining years.10 Figures 1-3 provide an overview of the ac-
tual real GDP and its pre-crisis trend in three country groups that are rel-
evant for our later analysis: the Eurozone (figure 1); the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) (figure 2); the Central Eastern Europe (CEE)
(figure 3).11 Trends obtained with the alternative standard 100 value of λ
are also shown in the graphs. Real GDP in 2005 is set equal to 100.
European economies have enjoyed a period of solid growth before the
financial crisis, which hit the region during the second half of 2008. Most
of them experienced large losses in their output in 2008-2009, and for
10Indeed, if we applied the HP filter until 2014, by considering current data and WEO
forecasts, we would obtain a much lower level of trend real GDP, since large shocks tend
to distort the estimates of the underlying trends, both before and after the shock.
11According to IMF definitions, the Euro area is composed of 17 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain. The CIS is composed
of 12 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Georgia, which is
not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is included in this group for
reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure. The CEE is composed of 14
countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia,
Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey.
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Figure 3: Output gaps in Central Eastern Europe (CEE)
some, losses are still continuing in 2013. On average, economic activity
in the three regions started to grow again from 2010. However, as we can
see in the figures, there appears to be a permanent and considerable loss
of potential output. Notwithstanding the recovery, in 2011 there was still
a difference of about 8 percent between the trend fitted before the crisis
and the level of actual GDP in both the Eurozone and the CEE, and about
16 percent in the CIS. In addition, according to IMF forecasts, the sharp
fall in the output level seems also to be accompanied by a significant
flattening in the post-crisis growth trend.
In our following analysis, post-crisis troughs are identified as years
with the lowest level of real GDP starting from 2008, while the reces-
sion period starts from the first year which follows the previous peak of
real GDP. Therefore, the natural way to gauge the following recovery is
to measure, country by country, how much of the lost ground has been
regained, comparing real GDP to both its pre-crisis peak and pre-crisis
trend. The 39 countries analyzed (see table 1) are the same as those avail-
able in the AMADEUS database, for consistency with the subsequent
analysis at the micro level. We focus on 2011 as the last year of our anal-
21
Table 1: Pre-Crisis Peaks, Post-Crisis Troughs and ‘lost ground’ in Real GDP
Gap (%) with respect to Lost Gap (%) with respect to
Pre- Trough Peak Year ground Pre-crisis Trend
Crisis Year in: regained in:
Peak before Trough (%) up to Trough
Country Year 2011 Year 2011 2011 Year 2011
Austria 2008 2009 -3.8 0.8 122.2 -7.4 -8.6
Belgium 2008 2009 -2.7 1.4 151.4 -6.1 -6.7
Bosnia 2008 2009 -2.9 -1.0 66.6 -7.3 -15.7
Bulgaria 2008 2009 -5.5 -3.4 38.7 -12.2 -22.7
Croatia (*) 2008 ... ... -8.3 ... ... -25.1
Cyprus 2008 2009 -1.9 0.0 97.8 -6.0 -11.8
Czech Republic 2008 2009 -4.5 -0.4 91.8 -12.7 -20.2
Denmark 2007 2009 -6.4 -3.9 39.4 -10.9 -12.6
Estonia 2007 2009 -17.4 -7.8 54.9 -35.9 -41.7
Finland 2008 2009 -8.5 -2.9 65.9 -15.3 -17.1
France 2007 2009 -3.2 0.0 98.5 -7.2 -8.1
Germany 2008 2009 -5.1 1.8 135.6 -7.4 -4.7
Greece (*) 2007 ... ... -14.6 ... ... -33.3
Hungary 2008 2009 -6.8 -4.0 41.1 -13.9 -17.0
Iceland 2008 2010 -10.3 -8.0 22.2 -26.0 -29.0
Ireland 2007 2010 -8.2 -6.8 16.1 -23.1 -26.6
Italy 2007 2009 -6.6 -4.6 30.9 -9.5 -10.2
Latvia 2007 2010 -21.2 -16.9 20.4 -51.7 -55.9
Lithuania 2008 2009 -14.8 -8.5 42.9 -28.9 -38.1
Luxembourg 2007 2009 -4.8 -0.4 91.6 -13.5 -18.7
Macedonia 2008 2009 -0.9 5.1 656.2 -4.1 -7.6
Malta 2008 2009 -2.4 2.1 186.8 -0.6 -1.3
Moldova 2008 2009 -6.0 7.5 225.5 -11.9 -9.8
Montenegro 2008 2009 -5.7 -0.3 95.2 -9.5 -17.4
Netherlands 2008 2009 -3.7 -1.2 66.1 -6.1 -8.9
Norway 2008 2009 -1.6 0.0 102.4 -6.4 -9.8
Poland (**) ... ... ... ... ... ... -4.5
Portugal 2007 2009 -2.9 -2.6 11.7 -4.7 -6.8
Romania 2008 2010 -7.7 -5.7 25.9 -20.0 -24.4
Russian Fed. 2008 2009 -7.8 0.3 104.5 -17.4 -23.9
Serbia 2008 2009 -3.5 -1.0 71.3 -10.5 -18.5
Slovakia 2008 2009 -5.1 2.3 145.6 -12.0 -19.7
Slovenia 2008 2009 -7.9 -6.1 22.9 -13.8 -22.0
Spain 2008 2010 -4.1 -3.7 9.9 -13.6 -16.7
Sweden 2007 2009 -5.6 3.5 162.9 -12.6 -10.4
Switzerland 2008 2009 -1.9 2.8 242.8 -4.6 -5.8
Turkey 2008 2009 -4.8 13.0 369.4 -18.3 -14.7
Ukraine 2008 2009 -14.8 -6.6 55.2 -27.8 -32.5
United Kingdom 2007 2009 -4.9 -2.2 54.5 -10.7 -13.9
Source: own calculations on IFS (IMF) and WEO (IMF) data.
(*) No post-crisis recoveries (GDP still declining) in Croatia and Greece up to 2011
(**) No recession in Poland up to 2011
ysis for several reasons. First, this is the year up to which we have data at
the enterprise level. Second, many economies experienced a double-dip
recession starting from the end of 2011, thus complicating the identifica-
tion of creditless recoveries after this year. As we can see in table 1, as a
consequence of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, real GDP has contracted by
more than 10 percent in Greece, Iceland and the Baltics, while Poland re-
mained the only country to avoid a recession. Many economies already
exhibit a positive growth rate as of 2010, while some of them have to
wait until 2011. By contrast, Greece and Croatia are the only two coun-
tries with no hint of recovery in 2010-2011. In the years following the
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trough up to 2011, about half of the countries regained more than 90 per-
cent of the ground lost, while eight regained less than 25 percent, thus
highlighting a marked heterogeneity in the speed of recovery.
As expected, the picture is even less rosy if we look at gap compared
to the pre-crisis trend. In this respect, there has been no sign of recov-
ery in almost all countries of our sample since their average growth rate
remained steadily below the pre-crisis growth trend. In 2011, this gap
was higher than 25 percent in Ireland, Iceland, Croatia, Greece, Ukraine
and the Baltics. It is important to note that for some of these economies
the gap remained high notwithstanding positive GDP growth rates in
2011, even higher than 5 percent for Ukraine and the Baltics. We there-
fore need to specify which is the definition of recovery we want to stick
to. For our purposes, we will consider recovery simply as a return to pos-
itive growth after the trough. This is a wider definition than the one of
full recovery, which would necessarily require a return to the pre-crisis
trend or, at least, to the pre-crisis peak. For the time being, however, we
simply identify the years in which individual countries came back to pos-
itive growth after the crisis. This choice is justified by the fact that many
European countries experienced double-dip recessions and had not yet
fully recovered to pre-recession peaks by 2011.
Finally, we have to focus on the behavior of bank credit to the pri-
vate non-financial sector during the global financial crisis and the early
recovery years. Credit measures are obtained as the sum of domestic
and cross-border bank credit. As for credit to private non-financial sec-
tors by domestic banks, we focus on Claims on the Private Sector by
Depository Corporations other than Central Banks from the IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS, line 22d). For countries where this item
is not available we recur to the Claims on Other Sectors (IFS, line 22s),12
which may sometimes include credit to state-owned or partially state-
owned enterprises. Depository Corporations do not include non-bank
financial intermediaries, but there are no alternatives that guarantee the
12For Norway, these items are not available, so we refer to the Outstanding Loans item
published in the IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS). This item reports the amount of loans
of resident nonfinancial (public and private) corporations and households with depository
corporations other than monetary authorities.
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Figure 4: GDP and credit stocks - 3S collapse episodes in Calvo et al (2006a)
same cross-country coverage. Anyway, this should not be a major issue
in our sample of countries. As for cross-border bank credit, on the other
side, this measure captures credit extended by banks located abroad. We
derive it from banking statistics collected by the Bank for International
Settlement (BIS). The volume of cross-border bank credit to the private
non-financial sector is obtained from both the locational and the consoli-
dated statistics.13
We want to compare real GDP and real private credit (i.e., credit to
the private sector divided by the GDP deflator14) in order to understand
whether recoveries after 2008-2009 have some analogy with episodes de-
scribed in CIT. Figure 4 reproduces the path of real GDP and real credit
stocks presented in CIT, averaging data across 22 Systemic Sudden Stop
13We prefer locational by residence statistics, since creditors and debtors are allocated ge-
ographically according to their residence. However, the locational statistics only allow for
a breakdown of banks’ claims between banks and non-banks. Therefore, the share of the
private non-financial sector in the latter category is obtained from the consolidated statistics.
By doing so, cross-border credit to the non-financial sector may be partially overestimated
because the non-banks sector includes non-bank financial corporations. Note also that all
data are collected in national currency, although exchange rate movements may affect re-
ported levels of credit since cross-border claims, at least in part, can be denominated in
foreign currencies.
14For all countries, GDP deflator data are from the IMF IFS (line 99), with integrations
from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO).
24
Figure 5: GDP and credit stocks - Global financial crisis in 36 European
countries
episodes (3S collapses). The graph covers a five-year window centered
on year t, which denotes the trough of each respective episode. As we
can see, credit to the private sector falls down together with output, but
fails to recover as output goes back to pre-crisis levels.
We similarly analyze the 2008-09 financial crisis looking at our sam-
ple of countries. Croatia and Greece are excluded because of the lack of
recovery before 2011, while Poland is excluded for the lack of recession.
GDP Index (Y I) and Credit Stock Index (CSI) are constructed according
to the following formulas:
Y Is =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y ri,s
Y ri,t−3
(2.1)
and:
CSIs =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Dri,s
Dri,t−3
(2.2)
where Y ri,s and D
r
i,s are respectively real GDP and real private credit for
country i at time s, with s = t − 2, t − 1, ..., t + 2 , and i = 1, 2, ..., N for
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Figure 6: GDP and credit stocks - Global financial crisis in 20 European
countries (creditless subsample)
N = 36 countries. Y I and CSI are both set equal to 100 in the trough
year t. Figure 5 shows that even in this case the stock of private credit
falls down at the trough year and stays flat during the following two
years of output recovery.
Moreover, we find high heterogeneity across countries during the
global financial crisis. Indeed, by examining individual country
episodes, we find that there are 13 countries with three consecutive years
of negative annual real credit growth starting from t, i.e. including the
trough year: United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Romania, Hungary, Montenegro, Ukraine and the three Baltics. To
these, we can also add one country, Spain, with two consecutive years
of negative annual real credit growth starting from t+ 1. In additional 5
countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Slovenia) the level
of real credit is higher in the trough year t than in t + 2. Figure 6 clearly
shows that in a subsample comprehensive of these 19 countries the re-
covery actually took place notwithstanding negative (and not simply
flat) growth in private credit. Therefore, macro data confirm that credit-
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Figure 7: GDP and credit flows - Global financial crisis in 36 European coun-
tries
less recovery episodes actually characterized several European countries
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
Even more interesting is the picture that emerges from figure 7, where
we replicate the previous analysis looking at real private credit flows
rather than stocks. The Credit Flows Index (CFI) is proxied here by
changes in the Credit Stock Index between two following years, CFIs =
CSIs − CSIs−1. Indeed, once we look at credit flows, evidences are still
consistent with the analysis presented in Calvo et al (2006a).
In particular, if we look at the previous sub-sample of 19 countries,
(figure 8), average credit flows turn negative in t (i.e., repayments are
higher than new credit) and give no sign of significant pick up in the fol-
lowing years. Therefore, while output and credit flows collapse together,
output recovers to pre-crisis levels without a similar recovery in credit.
This gives rise to what we could call a flow-based creditless recovery,
since here the evidence regards credit flows instead of credit stocks. We
can define them as Phoenix Miracles a` la BMP, although we need to re-
call that, according to the BMP model, credit flows would be supposed
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Figure 8: GDP and credit flows - Global financial crisis in 20 European coun-
tries (creditless subsample)
to pick-up when output recovers. Indeed, these figures clearly contrast
with the BMP thesis that there would be no evidence of creditless recov-
eries once we refer to the credit impulse rather than to the credit stock.
BMP consider a situation where the credit stock falls down during the
crisis and then stabilizes during the recovery phase. As a consequence,
credit flows are negative in the first period and null in the second period.
In the transition from negative to null values, flows are increasing and,
therefore, consistent with a GDP recovery. By contrast, our data reveal
that in many countries the flows of bank credit continue to decline even
after the trough in real GDP and do not accompany the output recovery.
We must be careful in interpreting the path of credit flows. Changes
in stock data provide only approximate measures of credit transactions
(i.e. the amount of new credit less credit repayments). Indeed, some an-
nual changes in the stock of credit could be not a result of transactions,
but the effect of revaluations or of other changes in the volume of as-
sets/liabilities (e.g. write off of debts by the creditors or accumulation
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of bad loans).15 However, alternative data sources suggest that we can
be quite comfortable with results shown above. Actual transactions in
domestic loans of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) toward the rest
of the economy are available in the European sector accounts provided
by the ECB. Although these data are available for only 21 countries of
our sample and do not include cross-border claims, they lead to results
fully in line with our previous findings. On average, credit transactions
remain very weak after the trough, resulting nearly ten times lower in
t+ 2 than in t− 2, notwithstanding the output recovery. As stated above,
this evidence seriously questions the absence of miracles a` la BMP.
In section 2.3 we showed that a narrow definition of recovery may
also require a return to the pre-crisis trend. Therefore, it is also useful
to compare respectively the deviations of real GDP and real credit stock
from their respective trends, before and after the recent crisis. We get the
trend of private domestic credit in an indirect way, by estimating first
the trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio. This approach specification has a
number of advantages. Being expressed as a ratio to GDP, the indicator
variable is normalized by the size of the economy. This means it is not
influenced by the normal cyclical patterns of credit demand. Moreover,
being measured as a deviation from its long-term trend, the credit-to-
GDP gap allows for the secular financial deepening trend. Therefore, the
credit-to-GDP trend can be seen as a sustainable path of the credit-to-
GDP ratio based on the historical experience of a given economy.16
To establish the long-term trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio, we adopt
the HP filter with a high smoothing parameter, since fluctuations in fi-
nancial cycles have a lower frequency than those of output. Episodes
of financial distress, in particular, are quite rare and reflect longer and
15Bank credit series can also be affected by securitisation. Under traditional accounting
rules, derecognised securitised loans did not sit on banks balance sheets and they were
not reported in monetary statistics, even though banks often support their securitised loan
portfolios with off-balance sheet commitments. However, under the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), traditional securitisations are being progressively included in
banks balance sheets.
16Indeed, the credit-to-GDP gap is just the countercyclical capital buffer guide set out by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as a useful reference point for the build-up
of system-wide risk. See BIS (2010).
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Figure 9: GDP and private credit gaps in Germany
larger cycles in credit and asset prices. Since the technical literature sug-
gests that λ is set according to the expected duration of the average cycle
and the frequency of observation, we set it to 1600, which is in line with
the assumption in Drehmann et al (2010) that credit cycles are four times
as long as business cycles.17 We consider only the domestic component
of private credit because the time series of cross-border claims are not
long enough. Once we obtain the credit-to-GDP trend, it is sufficient to
multiply it by the pre-crisis trend of real GDP previously estimated in
order to get the trend of real private credit that we could expect with no
financial crisis. Figures 9 and 10 show two examples at the country level.
In Germany (figure 9) the trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio gradually
decreases from 119.6 percent in 1999 to 104 percent in 2012. Therefore,
17λ = 1600 is the standard value for quarterly data in business cycle analysis. Ravn and
Uhlig (2002) analyze how this standard value has to be adjusted if data frequency changes.
They show that it is optimal to multiply this value by the forth power of the observation
frequency ratio, p, so that λ = 1600×(p4). Since we assume that credit cycles are four times
as long as business cycles, but at the same time we use annual data instead of quarterly
data, then p = 1 and λ = 1600. Alternatively, we also tried to use the Baxter and King
(1999) band pass filter instead of HP filtering. Since our main conclusions are insensitive to
the chosen approach, then we can safely use the HP filter.
30
Figure 10: GDP and private credit gaps in Slovenia
the line representing the trend of private credit stands above the line
representing the trend of GDP, but the two trends come close over the
years.
In many other cases, and especially in the emerging markets of
Central-Eastern Europe, the trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio has been
growing strongly in recent decades, although generally starting from
much smaller values. In Slovenia (figure 10), for example, the trend of
the ratio increases from 38.6 percent in 1999 to 92 percent in 2012. Even
in this case the two trends tend to approach over the years, but now it is
private credit to start from levels well below the GDP, the ratio being less
than 100 percent. Despite different evolutions in the credit-to-GDP ra-
tios, the European countries share a positive cyclical component of credit
in the years preceding the crisis, followed by a strongly negative gap that
resembles the permanent loss in output after the crisis itself. Germany
and Slovenia are no exception to this evidence.
Figure 11 shows the average values of the cyclical components of
credit (histograms in the figure) and GDP (lines in the figure), both in the
whole sample of 36 countries considered above and in the sub-sample of
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Figure 11: Cyclical components of GDP and credit
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19 countries where it has been found some evidence of a creditless recov-
ery. In the whole sample, average credit gap is strongly positive (+10.6
percent) until 2008 and then turns increasingly negative up to -21.2 per-
cent in 2012. Output gap has a similar trend, though characterized by
lower positive values before the crisis and more pronounced negative
values starting from 2008. These evidences are even more pronounced
in the subsample of creditless recoveries. Here, the average credit gap
is even more positive before the crisis, but also more negative following
it. Even the fall of the average output gap is greater than in the whole
sample.
In summary, the comovements of credit stock and GDP are relatively
more evident when considering their cyclical components, i.e. their de-
viations with respect to the long-term trend. However, we cannot ignore
that creditless recoveries in both the CIT and the BMP sense have their
own importance even in the context of the recent global crisis. Therefore,
we believe that a better comprehension of the determinants and conse-
quences of creditless recoveries is also useful to broaden our understand-
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ing of the financial crisis and also of the negative repercussions that still
plague many European countries.
2.5 Demand and Factor Input Contributions to
GDP growth
Before proceeding with the analysis at the firm level, we can further
study available macro data, by looking at demand and factor input con-
tributions to GDP growth within European countries in connection with
the recent financial crisis. Empirical evidence will help us to better dis-
cern the weight of the various factor inputs on the fall and subsequent
recovery of GDP, as well as the potential link between each of these fac-
tors and the current credit growth. The source of data used in tables 2-3
is the Penn World Table, version 8.0 (PWT 8.0), a database with infor-
mation of output, inputs and productivity, covering a large number of
countries until 2011.
In table 2, we decompose aggregate growth in its demand compo-
nents. Contributions of changes in inventories are derived as a residual
to GDP growth and include a statistical discrepancy.18 In the collapse
phase 2007-2009, the components of aggregate demand that are poten-
tially more dependent on credit contribute the most to the drop of real
GDP. This is especially true in countries with subsequent creditless re-
coveries. Based on simple averages over countries in the sample, the
contributions of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF ) and of changes in
inventories (Z) are respectively -4.7 percent and -2.5 percent (-6.4 and -2.6
in the creditless sample). The contribution of consumption is -1.5 percent
(-3.9 in the creditless subsample). Net exports contribute positively to
output, but only thanks to the collapse of imports. In the recovery phase
2009-2011, GDP grows back thanks to consumption, changes in inven-
tories and net exports while investments remain flat, or even negative
in the creditless subsample. Since investment is assumed to be a credit-
18When the volume series are not expressed at constant prices of a fixed base year, but
are derived from chain-linking data at previous year’s prices, components may not add up
exactly to GDP growth and contributions can only be considered as approximations.
33
Ta
bl
e
2:
A
ve
ra
ge
D
em
an
d
co
nt
ri
bu
ti
on
s
to
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
du
ri
ng
th
e
gl
ob
al
fin
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
G
ro
w
th
of
:
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
of
:
of
G
D
P
w
hi
ch
:
G
ro
w
th
C
G
I
G
FC
F
EX
P
IM
P
C
G
G
FC
F
Z
EX
P
IM
P
W
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e
20
07
-2
00
9
-3
.6
-2
.2
4.
1
-2
5.
3
-1
7.
6
-9
.4
-1
5.
3
-1
.5
0.
8
-4
.7
-2
.5
-5
.0
9.
3
(3
9
co
un
tr
ie
s)
20
09
-2
01
1
4.
3
3.
1
-0
.9
11
.1
1.
3
18
.7
16
.8
2.
1
-0
.2
0.
0
1.
6
9.
5
-8
.8
Ex
cl
.P
ol
an
d,
20
07
-2
00
9
-3
.9
-2
.5
4.
1
-2
5.
9
-1
8.
6
-9
.3
-1
5.
4
-1
.7
0.
8
-5
.0
-2
.5
-5
.2
9.
6
G
re
ec
e
an
d
C
ro
at
ia
(3
6
co
un
tr
ie
s)
20
09
-2
01
1
4.
8
3.
5
-0
.5
12
.5
2.
7
19
.4
18
.0
2.
4
-0
.1
0.
3
1.
6
10
.0
-9
.5
C
re
di
tl
es
s
20
07
-2
00
9
-5
.9
-6
.0
2.
9
-3
0.
4
-2
2.
7
-8
.5
-1
7.
8
-3
.9
0.
6
-6
.4
-2
.6
-4
.9
11
.3
su
b-
sa
m
pl
e
(1
9
co
un
tr
ie
s)
20
09
-2
01
1
3.
7
2.
7
-1
.8
10
.2
-2
.5
19
.2
17
.8
1.
9
-0
.4
-0
.9
2.
2
10
.7
-9
.7
D
at
a
ex
pr
es
se
d
as
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s.
Ta
bl
e
3:
A
ve
ra
ge
Fa
ct
or
In
pu
tc
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
to
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
du
ri
ng
th
e
gl
ob
al
fin
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
G
D
P
G
ro
w
th
of
:
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
of
:
G
ro
w
th
E
H
C
K
T
FP
E
H
C
K
T
FP
W
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e
20
07
-2
00
9
-4
.4
-0
.8
0.
8
5.
8
-6
.8
-0
.5
0.
4
2.
5
-6
.8
(3
6
co
un
tr
ie
s)
(*
)
20
09
-2
01
1
4.
1
-0
.8
0.
4
3.
7
2.
9
-0
.6
0.
2
1.
6
2.
9
Ex
cl
.P
ol
an
d,
20
07
-2
00
9
-4
.7
-1
.0
0.
7
5.
6
-6
.9
-0
.6
0.
4
2.
4
-6
.9
G
re
ec
e
an
d
C
ro
at
ia
(3
3
co
un
tr
ie
s)
(*
)
20
09
-2
01
1
4.
6
-0
.4
0.
4
3.
6
3.
2
-0
.3
0.
2
1.
6
3.
2
C
re
di
tl
es
s
20
07
-2
00
9
-6
.6
-2
.2
0.
7
6.
3
-8
.2
-1
.7
0.
4
2.
6
-8
.0
su
b-
sa
m
pl
e
(1
8
co
un
tr
ie
s)
(*
)
20
09
-2
01
1
3.
6
-1
.0
0.
3
3.
3
2.
5
-0
.8
0.
2
1.
3
2.
8
D
at
a
ex
pr
es
se
d
as
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s;
gr
ow
th
ra
te
s
in
lo
g
di
ff
er
en
ce
s.
(*
)D
at
a
fo
r
Fa
ct
or
In
pu
tC
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
ar
e
no
ta
va
ila
bl
e
fo
r
th
re
e
co
un
tr
ie
s
of
ou
r
w
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e:
Bo
sn
ia
,M
on
te
ne
gr
o
an
d
M
ac
ed
on
ia
.
34
intensive activity, lack of investment during the recovery may partially
explain why the recovery appears creditless. However, it is still unclear
whether the failure of investment to recover in tandem with GDP is due
to demand factors (low investment demand results in low demand for
credit) or supply factors (prolonged credit market disruptions constrain
firms’ access to external finance).
In addition, growth accounting can be used to decompose differences
in growth of GDP into the contribution from growth of physical capital,
human capital, employment and TFP. This type of analysis goes back
longer to Solow (1957) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) for the US,
and Jorgenson and Vu (2010) covering a global sample. These studies
estimate the contribution of each input factor to changes in real GDP at
constant national prices, by making use of a general production function
combining capital (K) and labor input (L) with a determined level of TFP
(A) to produce output (Y ):
Y = A ·Kα · L1−α (2.3)
where labor input is defined as the product of the number of workers
in the economy (E) times their average human capital (H). The mea-
sure K of capital input takes into account the differences in investment
composition across countries and over time, which gives more accurate
comparative capital levels. Accordingly, the depreciation rate is not con-
stant over time and across countries, but varies with asset composition
(buildings, transport equipment, machinery, computers, etc.).
The production function imposes constant returns to scale and intro-
duces α as the output elasticity of capital. To approximate output elastic-
ities, α is obtained from national accounts data as the share of GDP that
is not earned by labor, an assumption that imposes perfect competition
in factors and goods markets.19
After log-transformation, GDP growth can be decomposed into the
19The exact calculation of the share of labor income in GDP as well as the measurement
of capital stock, labor input, human capital and TFP is given in Inklaar and Timmer (2013)
and in Feenstra et al (2013).
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following sources of growth:
∆lnY = (1− α¯) ·∆lnE + (1− α¯) ·∆lnH + α¯ ·∆lnK + ∆lnA (2.4)
where α¯ is the arithmetic average of α for the period considered. As
usual, TFP is estimated as the residual.
To illustrate the results from our sample of countries (excluding
Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro, whose data are not available in
PWT 8.0) we compute a simple average for each element in the equation
over each of the sub-periods considered.
In table 3, growth rates are represented using log-differences to en-
sure adding up. The table shows that growth in capital stock results
weaker in the recovery phase 2009-2011 then in the collapse phase 2007-
2009, consistently with growth in investment remaining low or even neg-
ative by the time output starts to recover. In addition, despite a signifi-
cant negative contribution of employment (-1.7 percent) detected during
the crisis in the creditless subsample, employment and human capital
are more stable than other inputs during both the collapse and the recov-
ery phase. As in demand decomposition, this result is consistent with the
statement that more credit dependent components are those suffering the
most during financial crises. Finally, average measured TFP mimics the
behavior of output throughout the collapse-recovery process. Indeed,
about 70 percent of the increase in output from trough to recovery is ex-
plained by increases in measured TFP. TFP falls sharply by 6.8 percent
from 2007 to 2009 and then recovers quite swiftly in the following two
years, filling only about 40 percent of the initial gap.
Recall that the revival in measured TFP growth does not necessarily
mean that output recovery is due to technological change. It may also
signal a partial recovery in capacity utilization at the firm level. Indeed,
the measure K comprehends fixed tangible assets only, so that changes
in working capital may enhance the measured TFP contribution. This
would be consistent with the CIT thesis according to which firms may
partially recover after a liquidity crunch thanks to a partial revival in
working capital. However, there is a large scope for further research on
how to improve this kind of growth-accounting framework, giving more
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emphasis to the distinction among true TFP and measured TFP and imple-
menting adjustments for variations in factor utilization. A good starting
point is the analysis made by Fernald (2012), which describes a new real-
time, quarterly growth-accounting database for the U.S. business sector.
2.6 Evolution of the Debt-to-GDP ratio: behav-
ioral effect vs. composition effect
As outlined in previous sections, evidences and stylized facts from data
at the macro-aggregate level (and in particular the occurrence of credit-
less recoveries) may have several explanations once we look at industry-
level and firm-level data. We will recur to industry-level data for some
empirical regressions introduced in chapter 4. In this section, instead, we
want to extract some useful information from data at the enterprise level.
Let’s start by identifying the different channels that may imply a reduc-
tion of the debt-to-GDP ratio, i.e. the ratio between credit extended to the
private non-financial sector and GDP at the country level. A reduction
of the ratio signals a more than proportional GDP growth with respect
to the total stock of debt, which is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for the occurrence of creditless recoveries. These latter, in fact, are
more precisely characterized by a positive GDP growth and a negative
growth of debt. We start, however, from a more general analysis of the
debt-to-GDP ratio to explain some evidences that go beyond the actual
occurrence of creditless recoveries.
A reduction of the ratio at the aggregate country-level may reflect
two types of changes at the firm level. First, it can be the result of a
behavioral effect, a generalized reduction that characterizes a large number
of companies, involved in a deleveraging process. In this sense, a lower
debt-to-GDP level reflects a generalized lower degree of indebtedness at
the enterprise level, captured via the ratio of firms’ debt to value added.
Secondly, the ratio reduction can result from a composition effect. In this
case, the different trends in credit and GDP observed at the aggregate
level are not due to a behavior that involves different groups of firms,
but to redistributive effects among them.
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In particular, if firms with a low degree of indebtedness before the
crisis grow more (or drop less) than others during the peak-to-recovery
period, then their weight in the entire population grows in terms of value
added, contributing to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. In principle, rele-
vance of the composition effect would be somehow in line with a rea-
soning a` la Rajan and Zingales (1998) (RZ), reflecting heterogeneous ef-
fects of the crisis with respect to specific characteristics of industries and
firms. For example, in the pre-crisis period, industries with high exter-
nal finance dependence and liquidity needs are likely to be characterized
by higher ratios of debt to value added. If these industries are really
the most affected by the credit crunch, then they end up constituting
a smaller fraction of national GDP. By contrast, the behavioral effect re-
veals changes affecting firms’ balance sheets rather than different growth
rates.
Let’s analyze observations at the firm level listed by AMADEUS in
order to figure out the importance of these different channels in Europe
during the global financial crisis.20 In fact, aggregate data do not reveal
which one contributes more to regularities highlighted at the country
level. Since value added is available for only a small number of firms,
we use Total Operating Revenues (Turnover) as our proxy for firms’ out-
put. As a proxy of bank debt we build a specific measure of Total Fi-
nancial Debt (TFD), which is obtained as the sum of Current Liabilities:
Loans and Non Current Liabilities: Long Term Debt, available in the dataset.
Hereinafter, we will dub these two terms respectively Short Term Finan-
cial Debts (STFD) and Long Term Financial Debts (LTFD). We consider
only firms with available data in the whole five-year window 2007-2011,
i.e. two years preceding the trough of the global output collapse to two
years after the trough. The sample that we obtain consists of nearly one
million (986,377) firms in 39 European countries.
We split the sample in groups based on percentiles of our measure
of indebtedness at the firm level. Percentiles are obtained at the end of
the pre-crisis year 2007. Then, we can measure the debt-to-turnover ra-
20Refer to the Appendix A for further details on the AMADEUS dataset and on available
firm-level data.
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tios within both the individual groups and the aggregate sample. The
aggregated debt-to-turnover ratio can be represented as follows:
D
Y
=
∑
i
di
Y
=
∑
i
di
yi
yi
Y
=
∑
i
riwi (2.5)
where i identifies the groups based on percentiles, while di and yi are
respectively the TFD and the output of each group. D and Y represent
the same aggregates in the whole sample. Finally, ri = di/yi and wi =
yi/Y are the debt-to-turnover ratio and the weight in total turnover of
each group i.
Therefore, by first-order Taylor-series approximation, we have that :
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wi∆ri (2.6)
where the first term on the right-hand side represents the composition ef-
fect and the second term the behavioral effect, i.e. the effect of changes in
ratios within percentiles. We may apply the same computations directly
to individual firms, without recurring to percentiles. However, indebt-
edness at the firm level presents very large fluctuations, generating too
high residuals with respect to our approximations.
We then start from analyzing the period 2007-2009. All data are
converted into dollars based on exchange rates at 2007 and deflated by
GDP deflator. This is strictly necessary to prevent disturbing elements in
our following computation of the composition and the behavioral effect,
since changes in exchange rates or different rates of inflation would en-
tail variations that are not due to firm characteristics. In our sample, the
aggregated ratio of Total Financial Debt over Total Operating Revenues
shows an increase of 4.7 percentage points, from 30.6 percent in 2007 to
35.3 percent in 2009. According to the approximations reported above,
about 52.2 percent of this increase can be attributed to a behavioral ef-
fect, while the remaining part is due to a composition effect. Therefore,
the two components are equally important for the increase of aggregate
indebtedness during the recession years.
The composition effect is positive because low leveraged firms grow
less then high leveraged firms during the peak-to-trough period. This
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may seem counter-intuitive, but low percentiles are likely to include
small and young firms that have less access to external finance and are
even more constrained by financial frictions during the crisis, thus re-
porting the larger drops. However, the behavioral effect is equally im-
portant, indicating that a general increase of the ratio characterizes all the
enterprises, independently from their pre-crisis indebtedness. The large
fall in real output (-7.2 percentage points at the aggregate level within
the period 2007-2009), which is the denominator of the ratio, have a ma-
jor impact on the increase of the ratio itself. Interestingly, the composi-
tion effect is almost zero (+0.31 percentage points) once we consider the
short-term financial debt only. Therefore, high-leveraged firms are rela-
tively more resilient to the crisis only when considering long-term debt,
i.e. debt that does not need to be repaid within the current fiscal year.
We then proceed with exactly the same analysis for the period 2009-
2011, though percentiles are still based on the firms’ indebtedness in
2007. Interestingly, in the 2009-2011 period, turnover aggregated over the
whole sample grows by around 12 percent in real terms, while real aggre-
gate borrowing remains broadly constant (+0.3 percent), thus suggesting
some evidence of a ‘phoenix miracle’ at the micro level. The aggregated
ratio returns to decline by about 3.7 percentage points from 2009 to 2011.
According to our computations, only a 30 percent of this decline is due
to the composition effect during this period. Therefore, the most part of
the correction in the debt-to-output ratio is due to deleveraging at the
firm level. The contribution of the composition effect is negative because
low-leveraged firms that dropped the most during the recession years
have also a partially greater rebound in the early recovery years. As in
the recession period, even after the trough the composition effect is al-
most zero (-0.17 percentage points) when we limit our analysis to the
short-term financial debt, excluding inter-temporal financing.
One potential shortfall of this technique concerns the lower weight of
small and poorer countries in terms of total output, once we aggregate
data within the whole sample. The same analysis repeated by macrore-
gions (see the Appendix A for countries within each group) shows that
some cross-country heterogeneity actually exists. Indeed, there are a cou-
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Figure 12: Behavioral and composition effects in the decline of the debt-to-
turnover ratio during the recovery phase
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ple of regions where the contribution of the composition effect to varia-
tions of the debt-to-output ratio during the crisis prevails on the behav-
ioral effect. This is the case of Northern and South-Eastern Europe as we
can observe in figure 12, which refers to the recovery period 2009-2011.
In these country groups the composition effects account respectively for
about 57 and 53 percent of the reduction in the leverage ratio.
However, if we separate short-term debt from long-term debt, we re-
alize that these results have different motivations. In Northern Europe,
the composition effect is more negative than the behavioral effect only
when considering long-term financial debt. In South-Eastern Europe it is
more negative when considering short-term financial debt. This differ-
ence suggests that growth reallocation among high-leveraged and low-
leveraged firms is not necessarily due to the same reasons when moving
from one country to the other. Intuitively, long-term debt is more im-
portant for investments in fixed asset, while short-term debt is needed
for liquidity purposes and day-by-day operations. In the first case, the
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negative composition effect may be due to difficulties of high-leveraged
firms in further increasing their productive capacity. In the second case,
it may rather signal cases of liquidity crunch in the CIT sense.
These evidences leave a large scope for further research on the dif-
ferent channels through which deleveraging may take place in different
countries during recovery periods. In the next paragraph and in the sec-
ond part of chapter 3 we especially concentrate on the behavioral effect,
i.e. on the possible explanations for deleveraging at the firm level. How-
ever, in chapter 4 we also introduce econometric analyses regarding the
redistributional effects of creditless recoveries. By looking at the hetero-
geneous effects of low bank credit on output fluctuations at the industry
level, these analyses not only reveal the existence of disruptions on the
supply-side of the credit market, but they also provide possible explana-
tions for the relevance of the composition effect.
2.7 Evolution of balance-sheet items during
creditless recoveries
In this section we further deepen our analysis of the AMADEUS dataset
in order to figure out which changes characterized balance sheet items
in the private non-financial sector during the global financial crisis and,
in particular, in cases of creditless recoveries at the firm level. This sec-
tion focuses on three groups of companies, which are subsets one of the
other. The first group comprehends the whole sample of firms, indepen-
dently from their annual performances. The second group includes only
firms characterized by falls and subsequent recoveries in their output as
a consequence of the crisis. To this end, we select only those companies
that have seen their Total Operating Revenues (Turnover) falling down in
2007-2009 and growing again in 2009-2011. Finally, in the third group
we consider cases of creditless recoveries at the firm level, by selecting
those firms in the second group who have seen their financial exposure
(the TFD measure of section 2.6) declining in both the two periods. By
analyzing changes in the balance sheet items of companies within these
groups we can get an idea of their general behavior during the crisis
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period, as well as in the puzzling cases of creditless recoveries at the en-
terprise level. As we will see, there are relatively few cases (around 15
percent of the total) which fall in the third group of creditless recover-
ies at the firm level, but they are very interesting to consider, since they
give a clear and extreme idea of behavioral metamorphoses that may
contribute to the occurrence of creditless recoveries at the macro level.
First of all, we focus on the variations of Operating Capital (OC) and
of its main sub-components, the Operating Fixed Assets (OFA) and the
Gross Operating Working Capital (GOWC). We define OFA as the sum
of Tangible Fixed Assets and Intangible Fixed Assets in AMADEUS dataset,
thus including research and formation expenses, plants, land, machin-
ery and all other operational assets with a long term effect. GOWC, on
the contrary, measures the operational liquidity of a firm, i.e. the amount
of funds that an organization has at hand to finance the components of
a day-by-day operating cycle (e.g. compensations of employees and in-
termediate goods purchased), as well as to ensure its smooth functioning
and the optimum use of productive capacity. As production grows, firms
generally need larger investments in working capital. From a financing
perspective, working capital refers to the firms’ investment in short-term
assets needed to operate over a normal business cycle. Therefore, in this
definition, GOWC equals to current assets and it can be decomposed
into inventories, accounts receivable, cash and other current assets (re-
spectively named Stocks, Debtors and Other Current Assets in AMADEUS
dataset).
Secondly, we focus on the potential sources of financing for the vari-
ations in operating capital. Sources of financing include not only the
already mentioned Short Term Financial Debts (STFD) and Long Term
Financial Debts (LTFD) but also Shareholders’ Funds, Accounts Payable
(Creditors in AMADEUS dataset) and Other Net Liabilities. The latter
incorporate all current and non-current liabilities not included in items
above, net of all other non-operating (financial) assets.
All the balance sheet figures so reclassified are converted into dol-
lars and deflated by GDP deflator. Finally, each item is summed over
all firms within the three groups identified above. The first group, i.e.
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the whole sample, is a balanced panel of 742,530 firms whose balance
sheet figures are available for all these items in the three years 2007, 2009
and 2011, representing respectively the pre-crisis peak, the trough and
the last available year for the recovery period. The second group and
the third group contain respectively 204,309 and 110,359 firms, i.e. about
27.5 percent and 14.9 percent of the whole sample. Figures 13 and 14
show which major changes affected firms according respectively to an
asset approach and a sources of financing approach. The former looks at the
components of operating capital, while the latter looks at the sources fi-
nancing it. In figure 13, changes in Operating Capital (∆OC) in both
the crisis period 2007-2009 and the recovery period 2009-2011 are broken
down into the sum of contributions from its various components. In fig-
ure 14 the same changes in Operating Capital are broken down into the
sum of contributions from its sources of financing. The two figures also
show the rate of real growth of Total Operating Revenues (Turnover), for a
comparison with the simultaneous trend of operating capital.
In the first group on the left of figures 13 and 14, which represents
the whole sample, the aggregate output drops by 6.2 percent during the
recession period 2007-2009, while Operating Capital falls by only 1.3 per-
cent. The OC decline is due to a negative contribution of all the com-
ponents of the Gross Operating Working Capital, while the permanent
component (Operating Fixed Assets) continues to grow notwithstanding
the recession. The negative change in working capital means that fewer
financial resources are tied up to finance current operations in the pro-
ductive process. We should expect that the more permanent needs (fixed
assets) are financed by fairly permanent sources (e.g. equity and long-
term debt) while the operating working capital is mainly supported by
short-term sources, which have to be repaid at short notice. In fact, fig-
ure 14 shows that banking debt (and in particular LTFD) remains on
a positive path and that the OC decrease in 2007-2009 is mainly related
to a decline in trade debt and in other net liabilities. The latter can be
partly attributed, among the other things, to the utilization of provisions
for risks and charges and of provisions for employee severance indem-
nities and pensions. During the following upturn in 2009-2011, output
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Figure 13: Decomposition of Operating Capital growth - Asset approach
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increases by 12.3 percent and the Operating Capital also returns to a pos-
itive trend (+5.5 percent), which is driven by a revival in the compo-
nents of the Gross Operating Working Capital. This recovery is mainly
financed by positive growth in trade debt and by a significant increase
of shareholders’ funds, which may have been achieved through either
retained earnings or recapitalizations. Total Financial Debt, on the con-
trary, remains flat after the trough year 2009. This actually constitutes
a potential signal of financial frictions still affecting the economy and of
creditless recoveries characterizing some European countries.
The whole sample includes firms with very heterogeneous behavior
and resilience with respect to the crisis. In the second group (the one to
the center of figures 13 and 14), we limit our attention to firms with a neg-
ative output growth in 2007-2009 and a resumption in 2009-2011. Here,
real output falls by 22.8 percent and then recovers by 31.8 percent, with
fluctuations that are necessarily wider than in the whole sample. Even
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Figure 14: Decomposition of Operating Capital growth - Sources of financ-
ing approach
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the initial drop of Operating Capital (-10.7 percent) is greater than in the
whole sample, as well as its subsequent rebound (+13.5 percent), while
the contributions of the individual components remain proportionally
similar according to both the two approaches. In particular, the com-
ponents of Gross Operating Working Capital return to positive growth
in the recovery phase thanks to a sharp increase of Shareholders’ Funds
and Accounts Payable, while bank credit (STFD and LTFD) still seems
to have a weaker relationship with working capital movements. How-
ever, the revival in financing resources appear sufficient to stimulate also
a partial revival in Operating Fixed Assets.
Finally, in the third group of companies (those to the right of figures
13 and 14) we further restrict the focus on cases of creditless recover-
ies at the firm level. The initial drop in turnover is even greater (-26.6
percent) than in previous cases and the resumption is weaker (+29.2 per-
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cent). A distinctive feature of this subsample is that variations of fixed
assets are negative in both the two periods, thus suggesting a major cor-
relation with the trend of bank credit. The negative change of Operating
Capital in 2007-2009 (-12.3 percent) is followed by only a partial recov-
ery in the following period (+5.1 percent), which is made possible again
by Shareholders’ Funds and Accounts Payable. With decreasing bank
credit, these funding resources are devoted to foster a rebound in work-
ing capital, while Operating Fixed Assets remain on a negative path. The
positive growth of Net Other Liabilities in 2009-2011 and their greater
resilience in 2007-2009 could also signal an attempt by companies to re-
place at least part of the traditional forms of credit with alternative chan-
nels of funding or even with a reduction in non-operating activities, such
as financial assets and available-for-sale investments.
To sum up, data show that after the crisis the Gross Operating Work-
ing Capital comes back to growth together with output even in cases
of creditless recoveries at the firm level. After all, the only possible ex-
planation for a different evidence would be that firms have been able
to change their production processes in a relatively short time, produc-
ing greater quantities of goods (or providing more services) while using
less working capital. In theory, for example, some firms could adopt a
just-in-time production strategy, reducing the inventory of raw materi-
als and semi-finished goods and minimizing the relative carrying costs.
Efficiency improvements in production processes and a better manage-
ment of working capital would thus reduce the financial requirements of
a company while still allowing uninterrupted production.
However, available data show that working capital and turnover
move exactly in the same direction, both in the recession and the re-
covery period. This suggests that when the bank credit remains weak,
then the revival in economic activity is just made possible by a different
structure of operating capital (i.e. a resurgence of working capital at the
expenses of fixed assets) or by alternative sources of financing. Indeed,
lower bank credit tends to be replaced by an increasing contribution of
accounts payable and shareholders’ funds, which in turn can be due to
either recapitalizations or retained earnings within the company.
47
Finally, we devote a separate discussion to the behavior of Net Trade
Credit, which is given by the difference between Accounts Receivable
and Accounts Payable. In all the groups of firms identified above, the
difference between receivables and payables tends to remain roughly un-
changed in both the recession and the recovery phase, since trade credit
and debt always move in the same direction. Interestingly, in creditless
recoveries, Net Trade Credit shows a slight negative variation in both
the two periods due to a lower drop and a stronger revival of accounts
payables with respect to accounts receivables. Recall that in our defini-
tions we consider receivables as a component of operating capital and
payables as a component of external financing. However, we could also
adopt alternative approaches. In Rajan and Zingales (1998), for example,
inter-firms trade debt is entirely treated as part of operations, assuming
it as mainly used to reduce transactions costs rather than for financing.
In this sense, the slight fall in net trade credit should be interpreted as a
lower absorption of financial resources for investments in working capi-
tal. On the contrary, if we wanted to treat the trade credit entirely as an
alternative source of finance, then we should read the fall in net trade
credit as a larger use of debt to suppliers (and a smaller use of credit to
customers) to compensate for the reduction of bank credit. Firms could
pay bills slowly and collect receivables quickly just to help the recovery
in production without the help of banks. Whatever the interpretative ap-
proach that we adopt, changes in net trade credit do not seem sufficient
by themselves to justify a revival of economic activity in the absence of
bank credit, but for sure they still result in a positive contribution to out-
put growth.
2.8 Concluding remarks
This chapter has been dedicated to the puzzling phenomenon of credit-
less recoveries, where national GDP comes back to positive growth af-
ter systemic output collapses, while domestic and external credit to the
private sector remains weaker than in pre-crisis years. Following the
seminal paper of Calvo et al (2006a,b), several other papers focused on
48
the existence and the characteristics of these episodes. The stagnation
of bank credit is not without consequences for the long-run resilience
of the economy. Indeed, countries where private lending remains slug-
gish are typically characterized by a less sustained resumption in terms
of real GDP on the long term. Therefore, if recoveries are weak because
of disruptions in the credit market, then economic activity may signifi-
cantly benefit from policy actions aimed at supporting a revival of bank
lending. The weakness of bank credit can be originated by stress on the
capitalization of banks, but also by the low quality of balance sheets of
non-financial players in the private sector. On the one hand, banks facing
a deteriorating loan portfolio or pressing requirements for higher capital
ratios struggle to generate new credit supply. On the other hand, firms
and households continue to have limited access to finance until the qual-
ity of their balance sheets remain poor. Distinguishing the different con-
straints on credit is essential in order to identify the best rescue measures
that the authorities should adopt to sustain faster recoveries. This is par-
ticularly true in most European countries where firms, and in particular
small ones, still heavily depend on bank loans for their survival and their
sustainable growth.
In this chapter we just highlight the occurrence of creditless recover-
ies in Europe in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. We also show
that many of these episodes can be actually defined as creditless not only
when considering the outstanding stock of bank credit at the national
level, but also when considering its flows over time. This result contra-
dicts the results in Biggs et al (2009, 2010), according to which the iden-
tification of recoveries without credit would be only due to an incorrect
measure of credit developments. Growth accounting at the macro level
reveals that changes in measured TFP explains the most part of fluctua-
tions in national GDP during both the recession and the recovery period.
The large variations of measured TFP in the short run are likely to be
due to sudden reversals in capacity utilization at the firm level. This, in
turn, is the result not only of swings in aggregate demand but also of
the working capital management of firms that are dealing with liquidity
crunches.
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Different trends in credit and GDP observed at the aggregate level
can be partly attributed to higher growth of low-leveraged firms in the
recovery period. However, an important finding of this chapter is the
evidence that this composition effect is not sufficient to explain the di-
verging trends. For the most part, in fact, creditless recoveries are just
the consequence of deleveraging, i.e. of a generalized reduction in the
debt-to-output ratios at the firm level. This result is relevant in itself, but
it also suggests and outlines future work. In this chapter we already in-
troduce a preliminary analysis of firms’ balance sheets in Europe during
the global financial crisis. This analysis show the importance of share-
holders’ funds and trade credit for the management of working capital
within the companies, when bank credit remains weak. As expected,
creditless recoveries are characterized by a rebound in working capital,
while the growth of operating fixed assets remain negative. In our opin-
ion, this accounting approach is particularly promising to explain the
mechanisms through which financial frictions can affect the real econ-
omy and, consequently, it will be further developed in the second part of
chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Financial Constraints and
the Shape of Recovery:
Demand and Supply
Channels
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, we highlighted to ways in which finance interacts with
economic fluctuations. On the one hand, financial frictions facilitate the
propagation of real shocks that do not originate in the financial sector,
amplifying their impact. On the other hand, exogenous financial shocks
can directly affect the economy, even in the absence of additional per-
turbations in other sectors of the economy. Once we support the the-
sis that financial markets significantly affect the real aggregate output, it
is necessary to explore how it is possible that creditless recoveries take
place. Therefore, beyond the empirical analysis, we also need a theoreti-
cal background and a set of assumptions for justifying both the relevance
of financial markets and the occurrence of creditless recoveries. In this
chapter we just set up a stylized model that can serve as a conceptual
framework for identifying the mechanisms behind these stylized facts.
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We start by developing a model with standard neo-classical features
and then, in a second step, we introduce financial frictions due to lim-
ited enforcement of debt repayment. In our setting, it is of primary im-
portance the interaction between one exogenous factor, representing the
health of the financial sector, and one endogenous component, which is
the value of capital goods that can be used as collateral. The model con-
siders two different kinds of collateral constraints. Collateral constraints
insisting on intertemporal (long-term) credit directly affect the new in-
vestments in fixed tangible assets and in R&D. By contrast, collateral
constraints insisting on intra-period (short-term) credit limit the work-
ing capital and, consequently, the firms’ ability to sustain their current
operating expenses.
This framework makes direct reference to the standard models of
output fluctuations under financial constraints presented in Quadrini
(2011).1 However, we add complexity to these models in order to con-
sider the effects of financial frictions on the different sectors of the econ-
omy. In particular, in the model that we are going to present, goods (and
the corresponding industries) are categorized according to their end use:
consumption, intermediate and investment goods. By incorporating a cat-
egorization of sectors in the model, we are able to identify the channels
through which financial frictions affect production, not only at the ag-
gregate level, but also at the industry level. Even more important, this
setting also emphasizes that capital expenditures affect the economy in
two ways. On the one hand, investments impact the productive capac-
ity of companies by changing their stock of fixed capital. On the other
hand, they have an immediate influence on the current production lev-
els of companies that manufacture investment goods and, consequently,
on satellite activities. A similar reasoning concerns the purchase of inter-
mediate goods and the accumulation of current assets. We believe that
this approach has a very important role when exploring the potential
determinants of creditless recoveries.
Indeed, the theoretical model introduced in this chapter facilitates
1Additional references are also given in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Kocherlakota
(2000).
52
better comprehension of the empirical evidences that typically character-
ize the puzzling phenomenon of creditless recoveries. In the second part
of this chapter we just introduce an accounting approach to analyse data
at the enterprise level and to create a bridge with the models presented
in the first part. This expedient allows to analyze output fluctuations
concurrently with changes in firms’ balance sheet items. We believe that
such an analysis may provide a useful tool, on the one hand, to explore
the importance of the financial channel for output growth and, on the
other hand, to identify the potential determinants for the occurrence of
creditless recoveries. It will be shown that these determinants are not
necessarily the same across different crisis episodes and they can also
depend on country characteristics. Therefore, the innovative approach
adopted in this chapter could be functional to exciting future research on
the characteristics of individual financial crises and on the specific evo-
lution of recoveries at the firm level.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we introduce a
two-period economic model with standard neo-classical features, pre-
senting similarities and differences with respect to the model of Quadrini
(2011). Section 3.3 characterizes the competitive market equilibria for this
frictionless economy. Then restrictions are introduced on the lender’s
ability to enforce the contractual obligations. Section 3.4 presents a col-
lateral enforcement model where entrepreneurs cannot borrow on the
long term to the desired levels, while section 3.5 extends the analysis to
a collateral constraint on working capital. In section 3.6 we state that the
equilibrium configuration derived from the collateral enforcement mo-
del has important implications for outlining the potential determinants
of a creditless recovery. These implications will be also useful for devel-
oping an appropriate empirical analysis of creditless recoveries based on
firm level data. In light of this, we dedicate section 3.7 to explaining how
accounts and ratios within the financial statement of a company can in-
teract with output fluctuations at the enterprise level. Section 3.8 is just
dedicated to the analysis of firm level data of European countries during
the global financial crisis. We base our firm-level analyses on the same
AMADEUS dataset introduced in chapter 2. Finally, in section 3.9 we
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state the conclusions and discuss avenues for further research.
3.2 A model of general economic equilibrium
Quadrini (2011) introduces a formal model that helps to explain how fi-
nancial shocks may generate output fluctuations and how financial fric-
tions may amplify real shocks. In this model, firms have to face a bind-
ing constraint on their ability to raise external financing (e.g. borrowing
from banks), because of market incompleteness. Through this constraint,
financial markets affect the firms’ capability to support current and cap-
ital expenditures and, consequently, play an essential role in business
cycle fluctuations. As in the model proposed by Quadrini (2011), in our
setting we have only two periods, period 1 and period 2. Similarly, we as-
sume the existence of a unit mass of workers, who also act as lenders for
the entrepreneurs in period 1. Workers-Lenders are denoted by subscript
l. Differently from the original framework, however, representative en-
trepreneurs will be divided in three different sectors: the Consumption
Goods sector, denoted by subscript c, the Intermediate Goods sector, z, and
the Investment Goods sector, i. The behavior of the four types of agents is
briefly described in the following paragraphs.
Intermediate Goods sector. Entrepreneurs z enter the system with a
given level K of capital and with a given amount B of debt owed to
workers-lenders l. Intermediate goods are produced with available cap-
ital K and inputs h of labor hired from workers, according to the follow-
ing production function:
Z = AKθh1−θ (3.1)
where A is the aggregate level of productivity.
The amount of capital available in period 2 depends on investment in
period 1, so that:
K ′z = K + iz (3.2)
where, from now on, the prime superscript indicates variables referring
to period 2. We are implicitly assuming complete capital irreversibility,
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i.e. the impossibility of negative investments, and the absence of depre-
ciation. In period 2, entrepreneurs z utilize available capital for directly
producing consumption goods, based on the following production func-
tion:
C ′z = A
′K ′z = A
′ (K + iz) (3.3)
There is no aggregate uncertainty, so we assume A′ is perfectly antic-
ipated in period 1.
The net income from the first stage of production is available at end
of period 1. In addition, within the same period, entrepreneurs z raise
new external funds B′/R in the form of financial lending provided by
workers-lenders2 and, at the same time, repay the initial debt B. The
residual resources have to be allocated between current consumption
and the expenditure on investment goods. In the end, the representa-
tive entrepreneur z producing intermediate goods chooses cz , c′z , h, B′,
iz to maximize its lifetime utility:
max {u[cz] + βu[c′z]} (3.4)
subject to:
pAKθh1−θ − wh+ B
′
R
−B = cz + qiz (3.5)
A′(K + iz)−B′ = c′z (3.6)
where the price of consumption goods is normalized to unity, the price of
intermediate goods is equal to p, the price of investment goods is equal
to q and the cost of each unit of labor, i.e. the wage rate, is equal to w.
Differently from the model in Quadrini (2011), entrepreneurs’ utility
is not linear in consumption. Indeed, we assume the instantaneous util-
ity function u to be increasing in c but concave (uc[.] > 0 and ucc[.] < 0),
thus implying diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Moreover,
we take for granted that u[0] = 0 and that Inada conditions are satisfied.
2Accordingly, B′ is the amount of debt to be repaid in period 2, while R is the gross
interest rate.
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Workers-Lenders. In period 1, workers-lenders receive wages wh for
their work, obtain back the amount B of money and provide the new fi-
nancial lending B′/R. Apart from buying consumption goods, workers
can decide to purchase investment goods il in order to operate as a resid-
ual productive sector in period 2. Capital available to them in the second
stage is exactly equal to the investment made:
K ′l = il (3.7)
If workers decide to operate as a residual productive sector, they will
directly produce additional units of consumption goods, according to the
following technology:
C ′l = A
′H[K ′l ] = A
′H[il] (3.8)
Function H[.] is strictly increasing and concave and satisfies HK [0] =
1. This implies HK [K ′l ] < 1 for K
′
l > 0, so that residual sector l is less
productive than the entrepreneurial sector for any positive level of cap-
ital. As we will see later, a direct implication of this assumption is that
only the entrepreneur z will purchase investment goods, unless financial
frictions restrict its ability to borrow.
The representative worker-lender l chooses cl, c′l, h,B
′, il to maximize
its lifetime utility:
max
{
v[cl]− h
2
l
2
+ βv[c′l]
}
(3.9)
subject to:
wh+B − B
′
R
= cl + qil (3.10)
A′H[il] +B′ = c′l (3.11)
Consumption Goods and Investment Goods. Entrepreneurs in the re-
maining sectors produce their goods according to the following produc-
tion functions:
C = F [zc] (3.12)
I = G[zi] (3.13)
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where zc and zi are the amounts of intermediate goods that are used in
the two sectors. Market clearing imposes that the total production of
intermediate goods, Z, must be equal to the amount employed as factor
of production, so that Z = zc + zi.
The production functions F and G are continuous and twice differ-
entiable in their arguments. Marginal products are positive (Fz[.] > 0
and Gz[.] > 0) but diminishing (Fzz[.] < 0 and Gzz[.] < 0), so that more
inputs of intermediate goods increase C and I by less and less. Again,
we assume that F [0] = 0 and G[0] = 0 and that Inada conditions are sat-
isfied, thus ensuring the existence of interior equilibria with positive and
finite values of zc and zi.
We assume that entrepreneurs c and i limit their activity to period
1. Therefore, the representative entrepreneur c producing consumption
goods chooses cc and zc to solve:
max{cc} (3.14)
subject to:
F (zc)− pzc = cc (3.15)
while the representative entrepreneur i producing investment goods
chooses ci and zi to solve:
max{ci} (3.16)
subject to:
qG[zi]− pzi = ci (3.17)
Since their activity is limited to the first stage of production, en-
trepreneurs c and i simply maximize their instantaneous consumption
without looking at the second stage.3
To sum up, in period 1 consumption goods are purchased by all the
four representative agents, so that C = cc+ cz + ci+ cl, while investment
goods are only purchased by agents z and l, so that I = iz+il . As a result,
by aggregating the four budget constraints that refer to the first stage of
3Note, however, that our model would lead to the same results even if we assumed that
a single representative entrepreneur operates in all the three sectors (c, i and z) although
requiring that sectors c and i separately maximize their current profits.
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production [(3.5), (3.10), (3.15) and (3.17)], we obtain that total output in
period 1 can be represented by Y = C+qI , i.e. the money value of all final
goods produced in the economy. By contrast, in period 2 consumption
goods are purchased only by agents z and l, so that C ′ = c′z + c′l. By
aggregating the two budget constraints that refer to the second stage of
production [(3.6) and (3.11)], we obtain that total output in period 2 can
be simply represented by Y ′ = C ′.
3.3 Frictionless equilibrium
Let’s start from the maximization problem solved by workers-lenders l
in a frictionless economy. Thanks to assumptions on v[.], we do not need
to impose non-negativity constraints on c and c′. Therefore, given w,
q and R, first order necessary conditions for the representative lender’s
problem are given by:
w =
h
vc[cl]
=
h
vc[wh+B − B′R − qil]
(3.18)
q =
βvc[c
′
l]
vc[cl]
·A′HK [il] = βvc[A
′H(il) +B′]
vc[wh+B − B′R − qil]
·A′HK [il] (3.19)
R =
vc[cl]
βvc[c′l]
=
vc[wh+B − B′R − qil]
βvc[A′H(il) +B′]
(3.20)
Our restrictions on preferences guarantee that equations (3.18) to
(3.20) characterize a local optimum.
Equation (3.18) states that workers adjust their labor effort until
marginal benefit in units of consumption goods, i.e. the real wage w,
equals the marginal disutility in units of consumption goods, i.e. the
marginal cost of labor effort, h, normalized by the marginal utility of
consumption, vc[cl]. As we can see from the equation, wages affect la-
bor supply in two ways. First, a rise in w increases the marginal benefit
of working and, consequently, generates a positive substitution effect on
labor supply, hS . Second, it increases the marginal disutility of work-
ing by reducing the marginal utility of consumption and, consequently,
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generates a negative income effect on hS . We will assume preferences
such that the substitution effect dominates.4 Standard parametrizations
of utility functions satisfy this assumption, thus implying that the labor
supply curve slopes upward. Equation (3.19) states that workers, in their
role of residual productive sector, adjust demand of investment goods
until marginal cost of investment, q, equals the marginal benefit, i.e. the
marginal product of fixed capital times the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution. Again, a shift in q generates both a wealth effect and a
substitution effect on investment demand. However, in this case, both of
them induce an inverse relationship between q and il, thus implying that
the investment demand curve slopes downward. Finally, equation (3.20)
is the standard consumption Euler equation, which equalizes benefits
and costs from saving a unit of consumption today. Given the concavity
of v[.], this equation implies that individuals tend to smooth consump-
tion over time. The saving supply curve slopes upward as usual.
According to our assumptions on preferences and parametrizations
of utility functions, we outlined a framework where the supply and de-
mand curves assume the following configurations:
hs = h
(
w(+)|qs(−), qm(+), Rs(+), Rm(−), A′(+)
)
(3.21)
idl = i
(
q(−)|w(+), Rs(−), Rm(+), A′(+)
)
(3.22)
B′s = B′
(
R(+)|w(+), qs(+), qm(−), A′(−)
)
(3.23)
where the signs in parenthesis indicate the curve inclination [upward (+)
vs. downward (-)] or the curve shift [to the right (+) or to the left (-)] rela-
tive to marginal increases of the corresponding variables, as shown in the
example illustration of figure 15. Superscripts m and s in the equations
above serve to distinguish income effects (m) from substitution effects
(s). Indeed, cross effects due to changes in q andR are indeterminate and
depend on whether income effects (qm andRm) offset substitution effects
4This comes down to limit the concavity of the utility function.
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Figure 15: Savings Supply Curve
R 
B' 
w or qs or A' or qm  
B'S 
(qs and Rs).5 The reported effects of changes in A′ are based on standard
parametrizations such that in equation (3.19) the wealth effect, implied
by changes of vc[c′l], is always offset by the substitution effect, implied by
changes in the marginal productivity of fixed capital. Therefore, work-
ers increase their demand for investment goods when A′ increases and,
consequently, they also increase labor supply and decrease credit supply.
Similarly, taking as given w, q and R, the problem solved by the rep-
resentative entrepreneur z, who produces intermediate goods, leads to
the following first order conditions:
w = p(1− θ)AKθh−θ (3.24)
q =
βuc[c
′
z]
uc[cz]
·A′ + ρ
uc[cz]
=
βA′uc[A′(K + iz)−B′] + ρ
uc[pAKθh1−θ − wh+ B′R −B − qiz]
(3.25)
5Thinks, for example, of an increase in q that brings down idl . When the income effect
prevails, qil goes up, thus raising the marginal benefit of alternative sources of current con-
sumption for workers. As a consequence, the raise in q affects labor supply hs positively
and savings b′s negatively. Just the opposite happens when the substitution effect prevails
and qil goes down.
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R =
uc[cz]
βuc[c′z]
=
uc[pAK
θh1−θ − wh+ B′R −B − qiz]
βuc[A′(K + iz)−B′] (3.26)
where ρ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity
constraint on investment iz . Equation (3.24) states that entrepreneur z
adjusts labor demand to the point where the marginal cost, given by the
real wage w, equals the marginal product of labour. Unless the non-
negativity constraint on investment iz is binding and ρ > 0, the interpre-
tation of equation (3.25) is comparable with that of equation (3.19). Simi-
larly, equation (3.26) has the same interpretation than the Euler equation
(3.20) for agents l. Again, restrictions on the utility functions ensure that
the first order conditions characterize an optimum.
Demand curves of entrepreneur z assume the following forms:
hd = h
(
w(−)|p(+), A(+)
)
(3.27)
idz = i
(
q(−)|w(−), R(−), p(+), A(+), A′(+)
)
(3.28)
B′d = B′
(
R(−)|w(+), qs(−), qm(+), p(−), A(−), A′(+)
)
(3.29)
An increase in the wage rate reduces the labor demand. Therefore,
current production and resources available for current consumption go
down. This also reduces demand for investment goods and increases
lending demand. When current productivity A and the price p of inter-
mediate goods increase, exactly the opposite happens. Positive shocks
in future productivity A′ raise demand for both lending and investment
goods, while an increase in R tends to reduce both. Finally, an increase
in price q of investment goods reduces the demand of investments but,
again, will have indeterminate cross effects on the demand for lending.
In addition, since Z = AKθh1−θ, the supply curve for the intermedi-
ate goods assumes the following form:
Zs = Z
(
p(+)|w(−), A(+)
)
(3.30)
while aggregate demand for investment goods Id depends on both (3.22)
and (3.28) since I = iz + il.
Similar solutions to the problems of individual optimization im-
ply that the representative entrepreneur c, who produces consumption
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goods, adjusts demand for intermediate goods and supply of consump-
tion goods to the point where the marginal cost of a unit of intermediate
good, i.e. price p, equals the marginal product, i.e. Fz[zc]:
p = Fz[zc] (3.31)
Since Fz[.] is decreasing in zc, then the demand curve slopes down-
ward:
zdc = z
(
p(−)
)
(3.32)
Similarly, the representative entrepreneur i, who produces invest-
ment goods, adjusts demand for intermediate goods and supply of in-
vestment goods to the point where:
p = qGz[zi] (3.33)
The demand curve slopes downward and is positively affected by q:
zdi = z
(
p(−)|q(+)
)
(3.34)
Finally, since I = G[zi] and Z = zc + zi, we also have:
Is = I
(
q(+)|p(−)
)
(3.35)
Zd = Z
(
p(−)|q(+)
)
(3.36)
where (3.36) is derived by aggregating (3.32) and (3.34).
To sum up, from decision problems of workers-lenders and
entrepreneurs-borrowers we obtained supply and demand curves for la-
bor h, investment I , intermediate goods Z, and credit B′. Now we have
to determine the competitive market equilibria for this frictionless econ-
omy, imposing market-clearing conditions.
Equations (3.20) and (3.26), combined with (3.19) and (3.25), imply
the following condition:
q =
A′HK(il)
R
=
A′
R
+
ρ
uc[cz]
(3.37)
Now, recall that HK [il] ≤ 1 and that HK [il] = 1 if and only if il = 0.
In addition we know that ρ ≥ 0 and uc[cz] > 0. Therefore, (3.37) is only
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satisfied for il = 0 and ρ = 0, so that q = A′/R. As anticipated, in the fric-
tionless equilibrium workers do not invest in fixed capital, renouncing to
operate as a residual productive sector. By contrast, the null multiplier ρ
guarantees that investment iz from entrepreneur z is strictly positive.
The market clearing condition for investment goods implies:
q =
A′
R
=
A′βuc[c′z]
uc[cz]
=
p
Gz[zi]
(3.38)
I
(
q(+)|p(−)
)
= I
(
q(−)|w(−), R(−), p(+), A(+), A′(+)
)
(3.39)
In turn, the market clearing condition for financial lending implies:
R =
vc[cl]
βvc[c′l]
=
uc[cz]
βuc[c′z]
(3.40)
B′
(
R(+)|w(+)
)
= B′
(
R(−)|w(+), qs(−), qm(+), p(−), A(−), A′(+)
)
(3.41)
where credit supply is very simplified with respect to (3.23) since
workers-lenders do not invest in fixed capital.
Labor market supply simplifies for the same reason, so that the clear-
ing condition for the labor market implies:
w =
h
vc[cl]
= p(1− θ)AKθh−θ (3.42)
h
(
w(+)|Rs(+), Rm(−)
)
= h
(
w(−)|p(+), A(+)
)
(3.43)
Moreover, from conditions (3.24), (3.31) and (3.33) we obtain:
p =
w
(1− θ)AKθh−θ = Fz[zc] = qGz[zi] (3.44)
and the corresponding market clearing condition for intermediate goods:
Z
(
p(+)|w(−), A(+)
)
= Z
(
p(−)|q(+)
)
(3.45)
Although we have not adopted specific forms for utility and produc-
tion functions, from clearing conditions above we can explain output and
employment fluctuations through variations of exogenous variables. The
natural exogenous candidates in this framework are the technology pa-
rameters A and A′. In the next section, we will also introduce an exoge-
nous parameter for financial frictions.
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Negative shock in A. Let’s start from considering a negative shock in
current productivity. Other variables being equal, decreasing current
productivity induces entrepreneur z to reduce the demand of labor and
the production of intermediate goods. Lower income during the first
stage of production also induce the entrepreneurs z to find alternative
sources of funds, by reducing the demand of investment goods and by
increasing the demand of external financing. This behavior have a posi-
tive impact on the price p of intermediate goods and on the interest rate
R, while negatively affecting the price q of investment goods and the
wage rate w. Although these changes result in further adjustments of
demand and supply curves, standard parametrizations can easily justify
a scenario where the output of all the three sectors, I , Z and C fall down,
as well as the aggregate output Y . By contrast, creditB′ to be repaid may
result higher than before the productivity shock, with workers accepting
to reduce their consumption in period 1 in change of a higher payoff in
period 2. In this way, the negative effects of lower current productivity
in period 1 not only affect the representative entrepreneur z but they are
shared by all agents. In return, entrepreneurs z undertake to return a
greater share of their future production to lenders. However, despite the
invariance ofA′, even future output and consumption (recall Y ′ = C ′) re-
sult lower than before the shock, because of the lower investments made
in period 1.
Negative shock in A′. A negative shock in future productivity gener-
ates a reduction in the investment demand, since we are assuming that
the wealth effect in (3.25) is not so relevant to offset the lower incentives
to buy investment goods. In turn, lower investments in period 1, to-
gether with lower production in period 2, generate relative abundance of
resources in the first stage, thus reducing demand for external financing
and the amountB′ to be repaid in the next period, as shown in (3.41). The
negative impact on q andR results in further adjustments of demand and
supply curves. In particular, since q decreases, we can reasonably expect
from (3.45) a reduction in demand for intermediate goods, which in turn
generates a reduction in labor demand. If these effects prevail, the wage
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ratew and the price p of intermediate goods tend to decrease, thus induc-
ing an increase in current production of consumption goods C, through
(3.31). On the demand side, higher C can be justified by producers of
type z investing less and demanding for more consumption in period 1.
Similarly, workers-lenders l may increase the resources available for con-
sumption by providing lower credit to entrepreneurs. Therefore, the fall
in aggregate output Y descending by lower A′ could be mainly due to
the lower demand of investment goods in period 1, while current pro-
duction of consumption goods may partially offset the slowdown. How-
ever, forces acting in the opposite direction on consumption may also
prevail. If the reduction in R is less than proportional to the reduction
in B′, workers provide a lower amount of new external funds B′/R to
entrepreneurs in period 1. If this is the case, workers have larger re-
sources available in period 1 and reduce their labor supply, as shown by
equation (3.43) when Rs(+) prevails on R
m
(−). This may induce an increase
in the wage rate w and also, through (3.45), in price p. Through (3.31),
this actually implies a decline in the current production of consumption
goods C, thus amplifying the fall in aggregate output. Finally, lower A′
and lower investments definitely lead to lower output and consumption
in period 2.
3.4 Collateral constraint model
The model described in section 3.3 has the typical implications of a neo-
classical business cycle model. However, the introduction of financial
frictions in the model itself lead to different equilibria. As described
in Quadrini (2011), models with financial frictions are typically charac-
terized by two main features: (a) market incompleteness, such that some
assets cannot be traded or cannot exceed certain limits; and (b) hetero-
geneity, such that agents in the economy are not identical in their prefer-
ences and technologies and they are also divided in surplus (lenders) and
deficit (borrowers) units. Heterogeneity has been already introduced by
considering that there are four types of agents, one of which is a bor-
rower (entrepreneur z) and one of which is a lender (workers l). There-
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fore, to incorporate financial frictions in our previous analysis, we just
have to introduce endogenous market incompleteness, for example by
including in the model a limited enforcement problem. This is the main
idea of models with collateral constraints as the one studied in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). Agency problems affect the lender’s ability to enforce
the contractual obligations and, in particular, the repayment of the in-
tertemporal debt B′.6 Then we need to impose the following collateral
constraint on the representative entrepreneur z producing intermediate
goods:
B′ ≤ ξq′K ′z = ξq′(K + iz) (3.46)
where q′ is the theoretical price of fixed capital in period 2 and ξ < 1
captures potential losses incurred with the reallocation of capital.
Indeed, in the event of default, the lender can only recover a fraction
ξ of the capital and resell it at price q′. This price is theoretical because
period 2 is the last period in the model and, then, the actual price of
capital should be zero. However, following Quadrini (2011), we simply
assume that the fraction ξ of capital is reallocated to the residual sector l,
which prices it according to its marginal productivity:
q′ = A′HK [il] (3.47)
In the frictionless case, we obtained that il = 0, since workers do not
operate as a residual productive sector and they do not invest in fixed
capital. This result, derived from equation (3.37), depends on the abil-
ity of the representative entrepreneur z to purchase the optimum level
iz of investment goods. However, this could be not the case when the
collateral constraint (3.46) is binding. Since only a fraction ξ of capital
can be reallocated and HK [il] < 1, condition (3.47) formalizes that capi-
tal has lower value for workers-lenders than for the entrepreneur z. This
is the reason why entrepreneurs cannot borrow to the desired levels. An
6Quadrini (2011) also points out that the limited enforceability of debt contracts may be
not a major problem if all firms can save enough resources over time and borrowing con-
straints become irrelevant. However, in this section we are assuming to live in a different
world with respect to the one depicted in Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the financial
structure of individual firms is not irrelevant for their values and their performances.
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important consequence of (3.46) is that the lower is the net worth of bor-
rowers and the lower is the financing that can be raised externally.
In accordance with the new assumptions, we add restriction (3.46)
to conditions (3.5) and (3.6) in the maximization problem of the en-
trepreneur z. Accordingly, first order conditions (3.25) and (3.26) are
substituted by the following conditions:
q =
βuc[c
′
z]
uc[cz]
·A′+ ρ+ µξq
′
uc[cz]
=
βA′uc[A′(K + iz)−B′] + ρ+ µξq′
uc[pAKθh1−θ − wh+ B′R −B − qiz]
(3.48)
R =
uc[cz]
βuc[c′z] + µ
=
uc[pAK
θh1−θ − wh+ B′R −B − qiz]
βuc[A′(K + iz)−B′] + µ (3.49)
where µ and ρ are the Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with
the collateral constraint and the non-negativity constraint on investment.
Let’s consider the equilibrium configuration where investment iz is
strictly positive but the constraint (3.46) is binding, i.e. iz > 0 and
B′ = ξq′(K + iz). This implies ρ = 0 and µ > 0. Entrepreneur z cannot
adjust its demand of credit to the frictionless optimum point. Indeed, ac-
cording to (3.49), µ > 0 implies that at the equilibrium point the marginal
benefit from borrowing is still higher than the marginal costR. When the
collateral constraint (3.46) is binding, the budget constraint (3.5) can be
rearranged as:(
q − ξq
′
R
)
iz =
ξq′
R
K + pAKθh1−θ − wh−B − cz (3.50)
This expression formalizes the basic mechanism of the model. Each
unit of new capital goods can be used as collateral to raise ξq′/R units
of external financing. Therefore, the left hand side of (3.50) represents
the actual payment for new capital goods in period 1. This amount is
financed in two ways. On the one hand, the entrepreneur raises ξq′K/R
units of external financing by using capital K already in hand as collat-
eral. On the other hand, he uses the residual income of the first stage of
production after debt repayment and consumption.
We can now impose the binding constraint (3.46) into conditions
(3.48) and (3.49). Solving (3.49) for µ and substituting into (3.48) we de-
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rive:
q − ξq
′
R
=
β(A′ − ξq′) · uc[(A′ − ξq′)(K + iz)]
uc
[
pAKθh1−θ − wh−B + ξq′KR − iz
(
q − ξq′R
)] (3.51)
Following the same approach than in section 3.3, we obtain the fol-
lowing configurations for the demand curves of entrepreneur z produc-
ing intermediate goods:
hd = h
(
w(−)|p(+), A(+)
)
(3.52)
idz = i
(
q(−)|w(−), R(−), q′(+), p(+), A(+), A′(+), ξ(+)
)
(3.53)
B′d = B′
(
R(−)|w(−), q(−), q′(+), p(+), A(+), A′(+), ξ(+)
)
(3.54)
By contrast to the frictionless case, investment demand of en-
trepreneur z is affected by changes in q′ and ξ. Indeed, both increases
in ξ and q′ relax the collateral constraint (3.46), expanding the amount of
resources available for investments in period 1.
In addition, equations (3.47)-(3.49) together with (3.19)-(3.20) lead to
the following price for investment goods:
q =
A′HK [il]
R
=
A′
R
− µA
′(1− ξHK [il])
uc[cz]
(3.55)
Conditions HK [il] ≤ 1, µ > 0, ξ < 1 and uc[cz] > 0 must be respected.
Therefore, (3.55) necessarily requires HK [il] < 1 and q < A′/R. This im-
plies il > 0, so that workers operate as a residual productive sector, dif-
ferently from the frictionless case. Consequently, aggregate demand for
investment goods depends on both (3.19) and (3.51) and market clearing
conditions imply:
I
(
q(+)|p(−)
)
= iz
(
q(−)|w(−), R(−), q′(+), p(+), A(+), A′(+), ξ(+)
)
+il
(
q(−)|w(+), Rs(−), Rm(+), A′(+)
)
(3.56)
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B′
(
R(+)|w(+), qs(+), qm(−), A′(−)
)
= B′
(
R(−)|w(−), q(−), q′(+), p(+), A(+), A′(+), ξ(+)
)
(3.57)
h
(
w(+)|qs(−), qm(+), Rs(+), Rm(−), A′(+)
)
= h
(
w(−)|p(+), A(+)
)
(3.58)
Z
(
p(+)|w(−), A(+)
)
= Z
(
p(−)|q(+)
)
(3.59)
Now output fluctuations can be explained through changes in A, A′
and ξ.
Negative shock in A. Other variables being equal, a negative shock
in current productivity reduces labor and investment demand and in-
creases the supply of intermediate goods. These changes are now ampli-
fied by indirect effects that are induced by variations in price q of cap-
ital in the presence of financial frictions. Indeed, the lower aggregate
demand of investment goods lowers q, thus increasing investments il
of the residual sector, according to equation (3.19). As a consequence,
equation (3.47) implies a reduction even in price q′ . The corresponding
tightening of the collateral constraint (3.46) reduces the ability to bor-
row of entrepreneur z and further hampers its investments. Further ad-
justments of demand and supply curves are not sufficient to offset this
amplification mechanism of a shock in productivity. The output of all
the three sectors, I , Z and C falls down, as well as the aggregate out-
put Y (= C + I). Similarly, credit B′ to be repaid in period 2 decreases
together with future production Y ′(= C ′).
Negative shock in A′. A negative shock in anticipated future produc-
tivity generates lower incentives to buy investment goods for both sec-
tors z and l, inducing a decrease in aggregate demand of investment
goods and in their price q. At the same time, interest rate R decreases
since entrepreneurs z have lower incentives to borrow money and work-
ers l have higher incentives to lend money. The final effect on investment
demand il of the residual sector is indeterminate since the negative im-
pact of the variation inA′may be counterbalanced by the positive impact
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of the decrease in q. However, decreases in q and R imply for sure a de-
crease in q′ too. Indeed, we can easily derive from equations (3.19)-(3.20)
and (3.47) that in equilibrium qR = q′. The reduction in q′ causes a tight-
ening of the collateral constraint, so that the amplification mechanism
takes place even in case of a negative news shock on future productivity.
Since credit decreases and the cost of investment goods declines, workers
have lower incentives to work in period 1, leading to an increase inw and
a consequent lower supply of intermediate goods in sector z. Demand
of intermediate goods also decrease as a consequence of the reduction in
q and of the lower supply of investment goods. Therefore, production
Z of intermediate goods decreases, while the sign of the change in p is
indeterminate. If p is higher than before the shock, not only investments
but also current consumption falls down. Finally, lower future produc-
tivity, together with lower investments, definitely leads to a decrease in
production and consumption in period 2, amplified by the presence of
financial frictions.
Negative shock in ξ. We finally arrive to describe the business cycle
effects of shocks that directly arise into the financial sector. In our frame-
work, these shocks can be represented by exogenous changes in the pa-
rameter ξ. The effect of a reduction in ξ is similar to that of a reduction in
q′ induced by negative shocks in productivity. In this case, however, the
negative impact on the ability of entrepreneur z to borrow money from
lenders l is more direct. By tightening the collateral constraint, the shock
is reflected in a lower demand of credit B′ and investment goods iz . The
corresponding reduction in price q affects positively the residual demand
of investments il in the residual sector, thus exerting downward pres-
sures on price q′, according to equation (3.47). In turn, the reduction q′
interacts with the exogenous change in ξ, so that the effects of the original
financial shock are further amplified by the price mechanism described
above. The reduction in price q of investment goods also induces lower
demand of intermediate goods from the representative entrepreneur i
producing investment goods. However, price p of intermediate goods
will be not necessarily lower than before the shock. Lower levels of q and
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R may potentially induce an expansion of resources available to workers
in period 1, thus reducing their labor supply in the same period, consis-
tently with condition (3.58). Therefore, rising wages w cut down the sup-
ply of intermediate goods, through (3.59), and create upward pressures
on price p, notwithstanding the lower demand from entrepreneur i. This
would finally imply, through (3.31), a lower production of consumption
goods. In this way, we derived the important result that, even without
additional shocks in real productivity, financial shocks can be sufficient
to generate an output reduction in all the representative sectors of our
economy and, consequently, the fall down of aggregate production in
both period 1 (Y ) and period 2 (Y ′).
3.5 Collateral model with working capital
In section 3.4 we proved that a financial shock can affect aggregate out-
put even if there is no current or anticipated change in real productiv-
ity. In our setting, when financial conditions worsen, current output
is affected through a demand channel of transmission and, in particu-
lar, through a lower demand of investment goods. However, financial
shocks may also generate output fluctuations trough an alternative sup-
ply channel, involving working capital. By working capital we generally
mean the amount of financial resources that have not been locked in fixed
assets and that can be devoted to current operating expenditures. As no-
ticed in Quadrini (2011), there are a few existing papers7 that consider
an explicit role for the interactions between working capital needs and
the existence of a binding collateral constraint. However, availability of
working capital is strictly necessary to deal with the mismatch between
expenditures to be sustained at the beginning of a production stage and
the subsequent realization of revenues. In this section we just analyze
the consequences of lower resources available to finance liquidity needs.
For simplicity, in the formal model, we can assume that entrepreneur
z producing intermediate goods uses working capital to hire labour from
7See, for example, Jermann and Quadrini (2006), Christiano et al (2007) and Mendoza
and Quadrini (2010).
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workers l.8 In addition, the collateral constraint is not relative to in-
tertemporal credit B′ but only to intra-period loans that are necessary
to pay wages before the realization of revenues. We assume, in particu-
lar, that entrepreneurs must borrow only a share α of the total payments
wh to be made. Since intra-period loans are repaid at the end of the same
period 1, they do not require interest payments. However, the working
capital constraint imposes to entrepreneur z the following condition:
αwh ≤ ξq′K (3.60)
which substitutes condition (3.46). Investment goods iz purchased in pe-
riod 1 will be at firms’ disposal only in period 2. Therefore, only K (and
not K ′z) is available as collateral during the first stage of production. In
the optimization problem of the representative entrepreneur z, first order
conditions (3.25)-(3.26) remain exactly the same than in the frictionless
case, while (3.24) becomes:
w =
uc[cz] · p(1− θ)AKθh−θ
uc[cz] + µα
(3.61)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral con-
straint. Therefore, as already shown in condition (3.37), workers l do
not invest in fixed capital (il = 0), while the investment of entrepreneur
z is strictly positive (iz > 0). However, (3.61) modifies the optimality
condition for the demand of labor with respect to the frictionless case.
Indeed, provided that the collateral constraint is binding, µα is strictly
positive. Therefore, at the equilibrium point, the marginal benefit from
hiring more labor is still higher than its marginal cost w. Nonetheless,
entrepreneur z is constrained by available collateral and cannot increase
further its labor demand.
Negative shock in ξ. In this new setting, a negative shock in the finan-
cial sector tightens the working capital constraint and has an immedi-
ate impact on labor demand. The production Z of intermediate goods
8However, we could also consider an alternative model where working capital is used
for buying materials (intermediate inputs) in the production process or even for maintain-
ing a sufficient amount of resources that are needed to sustain all the operating expendi-
tures within the period.
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falls down together with labor demand. In addition, the lower residual
income of period 1 pushes entrepreneur z to invest less and to demand
more intertemporal creditB′ in order to limit the decrease in current con-
sumption. This also exerts downward pressures on price q of investment
goods and upward pressures on the interest rate R. In turn, lower sup-
ply of intermediate goods increases their price p inducing representative
entrepreneurs i and c to reduce the production of investment and con-
sumption goods. Therefore, according to these supply-side arguments,
weak working capital positions are likely to result in lower employment
and lower aggregate output Y , while exerting upward pressures on price
levels of intermediate goods. Finally, as a consequence of lower labor de-
mand, workers reduce their supply of intertemporal credit. At the new
equilibrium, interest rates are higher than before the shock, wages are
lower and the production falls down in all the representative sectors. To
sum up, we have shown that financial markets can have large and persis-
tent effects on output fluctuations through this working capital channel,
which affects the economy on the supply side.
3.6 What happens in creditless recoveries
In sections 3.4 and 3.5 we outlined a general equilibrium model in which
output fluctuations can be severely affected by the financial markets. The
role of bank credit is more than evident in this context, since private
credit to the non financial sectors is typically one of the main sources
of external financing. Although workers and lenders are represented
by a single representative agent in the model, in reality banks repre-
sent the main channel through which savings are made available to en-
trepreneurs.
Disruptions in the credit market can be easily reconnected to the mod-
els with financial frictions presented in the previous sections. Indeed,
the negative shock in ξ can be interpreted as a credit shock that reduces
the firms’ capability to borrow money from banks. In the formal mo-
del, ξ represents the fraction of capital that can be recovered by lenders
in the event of default. However, the same parameter ξ can be adopted
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as a proxy for various factors that may actually constrain credit. As-
set price declines (either current or anticipated) are one main reason for
tightening credit conditions, since they exert a downward pressure on
the value of collateral. However, debt overhang and the lack of invest-
ment opportunities may also induce the private sector to deleverage and
the commercial banks to restrict credit supply. Banks may be also subject
to stricter regulations and enhanced capital requirements, which affect
their ability to lend. All these shocks affecting the borrowing capability
of entrepreneurs can be represented through negative changes in ξ , with
the consequences analyzed in previous sections.
In this framework, aggregate output will tend to move in the same
direction of ξ. Indeed, as far as ξ does not grow back to the original
level, we may expect output to remain depressed. However, as noticed
in chapter 2, episodes of creditless recoveries reveal that this is not al-
ways true and that recovery in aggregate output can take place despite
persisting lower levels of ξ. Therefore, it is of prime interest to under-
stand which mechanisms could come into play to justify the occurrence
of these puzzling phenomena. In the simplified two-period model the
recession and the subsequent recovery phase cannot be analyzed simul-
taneously. However, we can reason as if the model could be iterated.
Some exogenous parameter must change within the model to generate
the recovery, as well as the negative shock in ξ generated the recession.
If ξ does not return to the original level, some alternative change must
necessarily compensate this shock to justify the recovery.
Let’s start from considering the working capital channel of section
3.5. If financial shocks affect the economy through this supply channel,
the binding collateral constraint is represented by condition (3.60). In this
case, when ξ remains low, a viable opportunity of recovery lies in a pro-
portional decrease of parameter α, i.e. the share of current expenditures9
that entrepreneurs sustain by recurring to intra-period loans. Several
factors can make possible a decline in α. First of all, α decreases when
the representative entrepreneur z finds resources that are alternative to
9Hereinafter, we consider that working capital is used for all kinds of current expendi-
tures, and not only labor costs as in the simplified model of section 3.5.
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intra-period credit in order to finance day-by-day operations. One pos-
sibility is to increase the amount of equity and long-term debt that is not
dedicated to fixed assets. In section 3.7 this component will be defined
as permanent (or Net) working capital. Another possibility is to increase
the use of trade credit. Indeed, trade credit eases the collateral constraint
on intra-period credit even if all companies are simultaneously collecting
both accounts payables and receivables. The only thing that matters, in
fact, is that a smaller amount of current expenditures must be provided
in advance by the banks to the representative entrepreneur z. Secondly,
α may also decrease because entrepreneurs improve their working capi-
tal management. In practice, companies enhance the frequency of release
of their current assets in the production process and, consequently, re-
duce their need of external funding. So doing, entrepreneurs are able to
support increasing amounts of operating expenses (wh in the model) de-
spite a stable injection of working capital. This concepts will be further
developed in the next sections, when analyzing data at the firm level.
Alternatively, we have to consider the investment channel of section
3.4. If financial shocks affect the economy through the demand of invest-
ment goods, the binding collateral constraint is represented by condition
(3.46). In this case, when ξ remains low, a viable opportunity of recov-
ery lies in retained earnings. Firms retain a greater share of profits and
do not distribute dividends among the shareholders. In our model, this
can be accounted for by an increase in β, so that entrepreneur z post-
pones consumption and leaves more resources available for investment
growth. However, we could also think of alternative (and more com-
plicated) models where recapitalizations and retained earnings move re-
sources from agent l to agent z and, consequently, circumvent the collat-
eral constraint (3.46). In addition, moving to an open economy context,
even exchange rate devaluation and trade balance correction may play an im-
portant role on creditless recoveries. Indeed, increasing net exports can
sustain aggregate demand despite investments remaining subdued. This
is just what seems to occur in Sudden Stop episodes and creditless recov-
eries originally identified in Calvo et al (2006a,b).
It is interesting to note how the different collateral constraint models
75
can be usefully connected to the different concepts of creditless recover-
ies presented in 2. Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense [Calvo et al
(2006a,b)] can be explained with respect to the collateral constraint on
working capital of section 3.5. By contrast, creditless recoveries in the
Biggs sense [Biggs et al (2009, 2010)] refer to the collateral constraint on
intertemporal credit of section 3.4.
3.7 An accounting approach at the firm level
We have outlined a general equilibrium model and the different results
that can emerge in the presence of financial frictions and financial shocks.
In this section, we open a more detailed focus on what can actually hap-
pen at the enterprise level, consistently with models described above,
to justify the occurrence of creditless recoveries. Therefore, we want to
provide an insight into the channels through which financial shocks may
affect the operations of a company, as well as channels through which the
recovery can take place. As shown in chapter 2, a creditless recovery at
the macro level can manifest itself in two ways. On the one hand, it can
be the consequence of a composition effect, i.e. a redistribution in output
growth which favors low-leveraged companies to the detriment of high-
leveraged ones. Low-leveraged companies can be firms operating in in-
dustries that are technologically less dependent on external finance for
capital expenditures, in the sense of Rajan and Zingales (1998), or in in-
dustries with technologically lower liquidity needs, in the sense of Rad-
datz (2006).10 However, low indebtedness may also be induced by spe-
cific characteristics that are not technology-driven. For example, firms
can be more independent from the credit channel thanks to advanced
technologies adopted at the enterprise level or to an efficient financial
management. Similarly, even the firm size and the years of activity can
influence the degree of indebtedness.
10As mentioned in chapter 2, some studies on creditless recoveries have focused on redis-
tributional effects that are just due to industry characteristics. Indeed, technology-driven
characteristics are assumed to be exogenous with respect to the bank credit availability.
Consequently, they are particularly useful to identify the role of credit markets for output
dynamics avoiding problems of reverse causality.
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On the other hand, a creditless recovery can be largely explained by
deleveraging at the firm level, i.e. changes directly affecting the balance
sheet items of each individual enterprise. This behavior effect is not
driven by a better performance of low-leveraged firms during the re-
coveries, but by the ability of companies to return to pre-crisis levels of
output while maintaining the levels of bank debt at lower values. In fact,
this is what we might define a genuine creditless recovery at the firm
level. Therefore, an accounting approach to analyse micro (individual)
data can help us to reveal important details that could not be detected on
macro (aggregate) data. In particular, we want to focus on the solutions
that a company can adopt to make up for negative shocks in credit sup-
ply and get back on a path of positive growth. From financial statements,
in particular, we can obtain accounts and ratios that are useful to iden-
tify which different mechanisms play an essential role in the occurrence
of creditless recoveries.
Section 3.8 will be dedicated to the analysis of firm level data of Eu-
ropean countries during the global financial crisis. First, however, we
want to develop a specific framework that is very useful to explain how
working capital components can interact with output fluctuations at the
enterprise level. For the continuity of business activity, current assets
need to be financed along with the investments in fixed assets. The latter
tend to be made in large increments, they tend to constitute irreversible
actions and largely contribute to the long-run production of the com-
pany. The former are strictly necessary to sustain recurring expenditures
for maintenance costs, procurement of raw materials, payment of wages
and other day-by-day necessities. Working capital is therefore essential
for current operations of businesses. Since investments in working cap-
ital are more easily reversed, they are also more susceptible of short-run
fluctuations. For this reason, in the next paragraphs we broaden our per-
spective on this issue by paying particular attention to the components
and the sources of working capital.
First of all, we need to discuss the different possible definitions of
working capital, according to standard concepts taken from the litera-
ture on working capital management. In financial statement analysis,
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net working capital is typically defined as the excess of current assets
over current liabilities, thus measuring the ability of a firm to meet its
financial obligations in the short run. However, for our purposes, it is
the financing perspective that matters for firms rather than the account-
ing definition. From this perspective, working capital refers to the gross
amount of financing resources that are dedicated to current assets on the
firm’s balance sheet, i.e. cash money, accounts receivable and also inven-
tories (which are comprehensive of both intermediate goods, work-in-
progress and finished goods). Current assets also include all the other
items that are relatively easy to be converted in cash and used for the
standard productive cycle. On the contrary, fixed assets refer to long-
term assets that support a firm’s activities and are usually divided in
tangible assets (e.g. property, plant and equipment) and intangible as-
sets (e.g. R&D). We define Gross Working Capital as the capital invested in
the total current assets of a firm, i.e. capital that is not dedicated to fixed
assets. This definition identifies all the activities that can be used in daily
production operations, independently from the sources used to finance
them. On the contrary, Permanent Working Capital (or Net Working Capital)
is the excess of current assets over current liabilities, thus measuring the
part of Gross Working Capital that is financed by fixed capital, such as
equity and long-term debt. The level of Permanent Working Capital de-
pends on the nature of the company, but also on independent decisions
of the entrepreneurs. Indeed, positive amounts of Permanent Working
Capital are justified by a precautionary behavior, since they lower the
risks incurred by firms of being unable to meet short-term obligations.
Decreasing the permanent component of working capital may reduce fi-
nancing costs but it also increases the risk of illiquidity. Consistently with
previous definitions, we can also define Temporary Working Capital as the
total amount of current liabilities, i.e. the non-permanent component of
gross working capital. This is the amount of intra-period resources avail-
able to the daily operational activities.
According to the definitions adopted above, current assets and Gross
Working Capital are two sides of the same coin. Indeed, they are arith-
metically identical but conceptually distinct. Gross Working Capital is
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the amount of funds that finance current assets. In many economic pa-
pers the term working capital is simply identified with all the operating
expenditures for the purchase of production inputs such as intermediate
goods or working hours. This view, indeed, is inaccurate with respect
to the argument that we are going to develop. In our setting, the an-
nual costs incurred for production inputs will be indicated as operating
expenses and do not coincide with gross working capital. For example,
the use of inventories increases the operating expenses, while reducing
the gross working capital. Indeed, inventories used for the production
process and inventories accumulated in the balance sheet are two com-
pletely different things. Therefore, in our analysis, it is important to keep
the two measures of working capital and operating expenses well sepa-
rated from each other.
Secondly, we need to explain the reasons why working capital ex-
ists and which factors affect its optimal amount. In a theoretical world
where some ideal conditions are satisfied, it would be possible to give
continuity to the production activity despite owning an infinitesimally
small amount of current assets.11 Therefore, in such a perfect economy,
the optimal amount of working capital would be close to zero. In re-
ality, however, these ideal conditions do not occur. Sub-optimal pro-
duction technologies, markets and distribution systems justify the ne-
cessity to maintain adequate amounts of short-term assets to be financed
through working capital. Current assets can be seen as funds that are
temporarily frozen within the company, since they are not immediately
spent or spendable, but they are likely to be available for operating ex-
penses within a short time.
As also noticed in chapter 2, the output of a company and its work-
ing capital typically go hand in hand. As a company grows, it typically
11This could happen in an ideal and hypothetical situation where: (a) uncertainty on
the future availability of raw materials and on their price is null; (b) the conversion of
production inputs in finished products requires an infinitely small time; (c) firms do not
have to finance any operating expenses in advance of production; (d) goods can be sold
and converted instantaneously into cash required to buy new inputs; (e) there are no risks
of unexpected costs justifying the maintenance of liquidity for precautionary reasons; (f)
there are no potential opportunities suggesting the maintenance of liquidity for speculative
reasons; (g) the financing needs of the companies are not cyclical or seasonal.
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needs increasing current assets readily available to sustain new operat-
ing expenses and to maintain the higher level of activity. High levels of
earning capacity, in turn, generate cash from operations and increase the
available working capital. Against this background, we can represent the
current value of production at the firm level by recurring to the following
breakdown:
Y ≡ Y
OPEX
· OPEX
CA
· CA
TWK
· TWK (3.62)
where Y is total output, OPEX indicates the Operating Expenses, CA
stands for Current Assets and TWK is the Temporary Working Capital,
expressed through Current Liabilities. Both CA and TWK are obtained
as simple averages of the balances at the beginning of the year and at the
end of the year. The ratios on the right hand side of this identity can be
interpreted as follows:
• OR = YOPEX is the Operating Ratio, which represents the opera-
tional efficiency of a company. The higher this ratio, the greater
the output in proportion to each monetary unit spent in operating
costs.
• GWKTR = OPEXCA is the Gross Working Capital Turnover Ratio,
which measures how many times in a year the gross working capi-
tal is released to fuel the production process. Indeed, if we identify
an operating cycle as the period of time that is necessary to activate
all the gross working capital held within a company, thenGWCTR
can be interpreted as the number of operating cycles that the firm
activates in a single year. Higher values of GWKTR reveal either
increasing demand for the goods produced by the firm or greater
efficiency in the use of available current assets.
• PFC = CATWK is the Permanent Financing Contribution, which in-
dicates how much the Permanent Working Capital contributes to
the Gross Working Capital. The higher this ratio, the greater the
share of current assets which is not financed by Temporary Work-
ing Capital (i.e. current liabilities).
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Accordingly, production growth at the firm level gy can be approxi-
mated by the growth of its subcomponents:
gy ≡ (1 + gor)(1 + ggwktr)(1 + gpfc)(1 + gtwk)− 1
' gor + ggwktr + gpfc + gtwk (3.63)
Decomposing output growth as just described allows us to identify
and to measure the importance of the different channels that can deter-
mine fluctuations in the total production of a company. The scheme in
figure 16 can help the reader to better comprehend the mechanisms be-
hind these channels.
Under this scheme, fluctuations in the current production levels of
a company can be explained through changes in accounts and ratios
within the financial statement. Note that, in this context, we are not say-
ing anything about causal relationships. A reduction in the current assets
of a company may be forced by lower supply of financial resources, lim-
iting its production capacity. However, the opposite can also occur, so
that lower demand pushes the company to reduce its activities and to re-
quire fewer financial resources. The description of the relevant channels,
indexed from letter (A) to letter (E) in figure 16, are briefly summarized
in the following paragraphs.
(A) First of all, production growth can be made possible by an in-
crease in the Temporary Working Capital (TWK) available to the com-
pany, i.e. its current liabilities. These sources of funding are inclusive of:
accounts payables (i.e. trade credit), intra-period bank credit and other
net liabilities available within the short run. Bank overdrafts are typi-
cally a major source of financing for a company. Therefore, an impaired
financial sector may substantially increase the cost of raising liquidity
that firms have to bear. Theoretically, the effects of a decrease in bank
credit may also be mitigated by greater inflows of alternative funds, such
as trade credit. Extending payment periods with major suppliers, for ex-
ample, is a possible tool to finance working capital needs.
(B) Secondly, production growth is also made possible by an increase
in Permanent Working Capital (PWK), which is the amount of long-
term financing sources that are dedicated to finance current assets. The
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Figure 16: Scheme of operating cycles at the firm level
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main part of these resources is made of shareholders’ funds and long-
term bank debt. Firms with direct access to the financial markets can also
rely on corporate bonds. Therefore, an increase of PWK may take place
thanks to the increase of these funds. Higher shareholders’ funds, in par-
ticular, may be the result of both recapitalizations and retained earnings.
In particular, when external financing is not available (or too expensive),
companies have to rely to a greater extent on internal finance. There-
fore, cash flows generated are not redistributed through dividends to
the shareholders, but they are immediately retained to finance the next
operating cycles. Self-financing is not only a discretionary choice of the
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management, since it also depends on the actual amount of earnings that
can be retained and, consequently, on the level of external demand.
(C) However, PWK may also increase without an enlargement of
long-term resources. Indeed, firms may simply enhance the PWK lev-
els by moving long-term resources from the financing of fixed assets (i.e.
capital expenditures) to the financing of current assets. In this case, the
company sustains current production at the expenses of future produc-
tion. Indeed, while current assets are mainly used for present activity,
investments in fixed capital serve mainly for long-term production ca-
pacity. The management of a company may devote a greater share of
available funding to current assets in order to curb a fall in present pro-
duction or to foster the recovery, while taking away resources for future
growth. Calvo et al (2006a,b), for example, see this option as a possible
explanation for the occurrence of creditless recoveries, as also explained
in chapter 2. However, as seen in the previous section, this behavior may
still have a relevant impact on current production, by generating nega-
tive externalities for firms that produce investment goods.
(D) For a given level of current assets, present production may also
grow thanks to an increase in the Gross Working Capital Turnover Ra-
tio (GWKTR). Indeed, the production can increase without any change
in current assets held by the company, provided that the management is
able to increase the frequency of release of the current assets themselves
in the production process. In fact, the GWKTR ratio is influenced by
several factors. First of all, the efficiency of the company in terms of work-
ing capital management, through actions that involve cash discount and
cash collection policies, trade credit policies (i.e. times to collect accounts
receivable and to repay accounts payables), and inventory policies (i.e.
the ability to minimize stocks of intermediate goods and finished goods,
while ensuring their availability in any instant of time).12 Second, in-
creasingGWKTR could also mean increasing aggressiveness of the work-
ing capital policy. Indeed, working capital management implies a trade-
off between profitability and liquidity. Excessive working capital, i.e.
12Just-in-time inventory techniques are one possible example of policies that may con-
tribute to an increase of the GWKTR ratio.
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low GWKTR, leads to unnecessary accumulation of current assets and
reduce potential profits. At the same time, scarce working capital may
result in insufficient liquidity and in a reduction of the productive activ-
ity. Firms accept this risk when reducing current assets for a given level
of operating expenses. Third, GWKTR also depends on the current de-
mand for goods produced and services provided by the firm. The higher
the demand, the higher the frequency of the operating cycles. Indeed, if
finished products are quickly sold, then they immediately bring new liq-
uidity to the next operating cycle. By contrast, when demand collapses,
the production shuts down and current assets remain frozen. Therefore,
as observed so far, demand fluctuations are reflected in changes of both
the PWK, through retained earnings, and the GWKTR, through higher
frequency of operating cycles.
(E) The annual output of a firm may also grow thanks to the increase
of the Operating Ratio (OR). Indeed, if production increases for a same
amount of Operating Expenses, then the contribution of additional fund-
ing is not strictly necessary for the growth of business activity. The
marginal productivity of inputs may increase thanks to the improved
efficiency of the workforce and also thanks to technological progress,
which may also derive from investments in fixed assets, both tangible
(new plants and equipment) and intangible (R&D and marketing).
This scheme helps us to create a bridge with the models adopted in
the previous sections and clarifies which alternatives may allow an in-
crease in production despite continuous decline in bank lending. In the
next section we just adopt this setting and make use of empirical data at
the firm level to better assess which channels have actually accompanied
the 2009 recession and the subsequent recovery.
3.8 Empirical analysis on firm-level data
We base our firm-level analyses on the same AMADEUS dataset intro-
duced in chapter 2. As a starting point, we aggregate all firms of the
sample and look at the annual growth rates of the various accounts and
ratios individuated in the previous section. All the growth rates are com-
84
puted at prices and exchange rates of the previous year. Output at the
firm level is proxied by Operating Revenues (Turnover). For each year in
the period 2005-2011, we consider only firms whose data are also avail-
able in the preceding year, so that growth rates on aggregate data are not
affected by variations in the sample of firms. The whole sample is an un-
balanced panel, which consists of 12,810,348 firms in 39 European coun-
tries.13 Alternatively, we also repeated our analyses on a balanced panel
of firms whose data are available in all the years considered. While the
main conclusions are broadly the same, observations reduce to 7,013,407
firms and some countries are particularly underrepresented. For this rea-
son, in the next paragraphs we prefer to present the results obtained in
the unbalanced sample.
As we can see in table 4, in the pre-crisis period 2005-2008 the positive
growth in real total Turnover is made possible by corresponding move-
ments in Temporary Working Capital. Indeed, in normal periods, the
availability of current liabilities to finance day-by-day operations grows
together with the production levels. By contrast, the Permanent Financ-
ing Contribution and the Operating Ratio are only slightly positive in
2005-2007 and turn negative in the pre-crisis year 2008. These ratios are
the first to be negatively affected by the global financial crisis, anticipat-
ing the drop in real production. The lower Permanent Financing Con-
tribution in 2008 reflects lower amounts of permanent capital dedicated
to current assets with respect to the increase in TWK. This is not yet
to be attributed to lower availability of long-term credit (still growing
by 7.5 percent in 2008), but to insufficient growth in shareholders’ funds
and other permanent capital with respect to growth in fixed assets (still
increasing by 6.8 percent in the same year). In particular, shareholders’
funds increase by less than 4 percent in 2008 because of lower net in-
comes that can be retained by corporations. The lower OR, instead, re-
veals a lower operational efficiency at the beginning of the crisis period.
Nevertheless, the most relevant components to observe during the crisis
are the Gross Working Capital Turnover Ratio and the Temporary Work-
13Some observations that have unusual influence on aggregate accounts are treated as
outliers and excluded from the sample. See also the Appendix A.
85
Table 4: Accounting decomposition of output growth
WHOLE SAMPLE (obs. = 12,810,348)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 5.3 4.6 0.7 -0.3 0.3
2006 7.4 6.1 1.0 -0.1 0.2
2007 5.7 7.7 0.7 -2.7 0.1
2008 3.4 5.9 -1.2 0.1 -1.4
2009 -11.5 -0.7 0.3 -10.8 -0.4
2010 5.8 -2.0 1.9 4.7 1.2
2011 5.5 3.7 0.3 1.9 -0.5
WESTERN AREA (obs. = 8,253,182)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 5.5 4.6 0.6 -0.1 0.3
2006 7.2 6.1 0.8 0.0 0.3
2007 5.4 7.4 0.5 -2.5 0.1
2008 3.4 5.4 -1.0 0.6 -1.5
2009 -10.8 -1.7 0.3 -9.1 -0.5
2010 6.3 -2.2 2.1 5.1 1.3
2011 5.1 3.7 0.4 1.4 -0.4
CENTRAL-EASTERN AREA (obs. = 4,557,082)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 3.6 4.3 2.4 -2.9 -0.1
2006 9.1 7.9 2.8 -1.7 0.1
2007 8.0 11.6 1.7 -5.1 0.2
2008 1.8 7.3 -0.4 -3.8 -1.0
2009 -14.6 5.8 -0.6 -18.1 -0.9
2010 4.0 -0.4 0.9 3.5 0.0
2011 6.2 3.3 0.3 2.6 -0.1
Y : Operating Revenues (Turnover); TWK: Temporary Working Capital; PFC: Permanent Fi-
nancing Contribution;GWKTR: Gross Working Capital Turnover Ratio;OR: Operating Ratio.
The Western Area includes Northern Europe, Western Europe and South-Western Europe. The
Central-Eastern Area includes Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe and Other former Soviet States
(see the Appendix A for countries within each group)
ing Capital. In the pre-crisis years, GWKTR undergoes only a slight
deterioration, as businesses hold an increasing amount of current assets
for a same level of operating costs. However, in the midst of the crisis
GWKTR collapses (-10.8 percent in 2009) and the growth rate of TWK
decreases by 6.6 percentage points in one year (from 5.9 percent in 2008
to -0.7 percent in 2009). To sum up, while in normal years production
growth is accompanied by a proportional growth of Temporary Working
Capital, during the recession year 2009 the TWK growth vanishes and
the GWKTR collapses together with aggregate output.
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Evidences from this analysis should be taken as stylized facts useful
for modeling the impact of financial frictions on the economy and the
occurrence of creditless recoveries. However, they are not sufficient by
themselves to explore cause-effect relationships. In this case, for exam-
ple, it is not clear whether the recession starts from a liquidity crunch in
the sense of Calvo et al (2006a,b) or an exogenous shock on aggregate
demand. If the original problem is a liquidity crunch, evidences can be
explained through the working capital constraint of section 3.5. The col-
lapse of TWK growth generates downward pressures on aggregate de-
mand andGWKTR is negatively affected as a consequence. Conversely,
if the original shock on aggregate demand is independent from the avail-
ability of credit, the first component to fall down is just GWKTR, while
TWK growth halts for the excess of unused current assets. In chap-
ter 4 we will see how a difference-in-differences approach can be used
to identify the causal links between credit growth and output perfor-
mance. However, the analysis of this section is extremely useful in itself
to deepen our knowledge of changes that occurred at the firm level dur-
ing (and after) the global financial crisis and to understand how they can
be reconnected to the models shown above.
Table 4 also shows how the real output can start to recover after the re-
cession. As we can see, in 2010 the annual change of TWK is even more
negative (-2 percent) than in the trough year 2009. Therefore, the recov-
ery is driven neither by a reprise in intra-period bank credit (still decreas-
ing by about 7 percent in 2010) nor by alternative current liabilities, such
as trade credit, whose growth is positive but still lower than 1 percent.
Indeed, the output recovery takes place mainly thanks to a bounce-back
effect in GWKTR (+4.7 percent). Therefore, a higher frequency of op-
erating cycles is sufficient to support growth notwithstanding the lower
amounts of current liabilities. Indeed, large amounts of unused current
assets are available after the recession. Even PFC and OR give a posi-
tive boost to productive activity in 2010, growing respectively by 1.9 and
1.2 percent. On the one hand, the Permanent Financing Contribution in-
creases because fixed assets remain flat (+0.6 percent in 2010) and more
undistributed profits can be dedicated to current assets, restraining the
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decline of Gross Working Capital. Indeed, while non-current liabilities
decrease by 1.6 percent in 2010, shareholders’ funds increase by slightly
less than 5 percent. On the other hand, the positive growth of the Oper-
ating Ratio is likely to be due to an attempt of the companies to mark an
improvement in terms of efficiency. Only in 2011, i.e. the second recov-
ery year, TWK also returns to a positive growth and gradually replaces
GWKTR as the main contributor of output expansion. Lower contribu-
tion of GWKTR to output growth reveals that, after the early recovery
years, the amount of unused current assets progressively decreases and
higher gross working capital returns to be needed.
As in section 2.6, small and poorer countries weigh comparatively
little in terms of total output once we aggregate data within the whole
sample. Therefore, it is useful to make a distinction among different
macroregions. In table 4 we present two sub-groups, the Western Area
and the Central-Eastern Area, which consist respectively of 8,253,182 and
4,557,082 observations.14 Actually, results referring to the Western Area
are almost identical to those relating to the whole sample, since firms in
this group of countries have by far the largest weight in total turnover.
By contrast, the Central-Eastern Area presents some peculiar character-
istics with respect to the whole sample. First of all, in the pre-crisis pe-
riod 2005-2008 the growth in TWK is more robust than in western coun-
tries, with both short-term financial debts and trade debt increasing by
more than 10 percent in 2007. Firms in CEE start from higher levels of
GWKTR (2.7 in 2005 compared to 2.1 in Western Europe), which is likely
to indicate a more aggressive and risky working capital policy. In 2005-
2008, output growth is accompanied by a continuous deterioration in
GWKTR and a more than proportional growth in current assets. Cur-
rent assets are not only affected by the increase of Temporary Working
Capital but also by positive changes in Permanent Working Capital. In-
deed, thanks to the rapid increase of long-term financial debts, PWK
grows more than proportionally to TWK until 2007.
14The total number of observations in the two sub-samples is lower than the number
of observations in the whole sample because outliers are separately identified within each
sub-sample.
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Interestingly, current assets in CEE continue to show a positive
growth (+5.2 percent) even in the recession year 2009, since the TWK
growth is still positive (+5.8 percent) and PFC undergoes an only partial
deterioration. Accordingly, the collapse of total turnover in CEE is almost
entirely due to the large drop in GWKTR, i.e. the increasing amount
of unused current assets. The TWK turns slightly negative only in the
first recovery year, 2010, when the output reprise is mainly driven by
GWKTR (+3.5 percent) and by the positive contribution of permanent
working capital. Indeed, notwithstanding a very weak growth in share-
holders’ funds and non-current liabilities, fixed assets remain flat in 2010
(+0.7 permanent) so that more permanent resources can be dedicated to
day-by-day operations. This is also confirmed in 2011, when the annual
change in fixed assets becomes slightly negative (-0.1 percent). However,
as in Western Europe, by 2011 TWK gradually returns to be the main
contributor of output expansion.
Finally, we also find interesting to make a distinction among credit-
less and credit-with recoveries within the two sub-samples. In section
2.4, we individuated a list of 19 countries where the recovery can be
treated as creditless. However, in tables 5-6 we want to isolate those
countries where the recovery has been more markedly creditless. To do
this, we explore a continuous measure of credit weakness by considering
the cumulative growth of real private credit by country during the recov-
ery period 2010-2011. Credit to the private sector by country is obtained
as indicated in chapter 2. The creditless sample is constituted by the five
countries where private credit growth has been more negative: Norway,
United Kingdom, Iceland, Netherlands and Denmark for the Western
Area; Montenegro, Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia, for the Cen-
tral Eastern Area. Symmetrically, the credit-with sample is constituted
by those five countries where private credit growth has been more pos-
itive in 2010-2011: Italy, Sweden, Finland, France, Switzerland for the
Western Area; Turkey, Serbia, Czech Republic, Cyprus and Slovakia for
the Central Eastern Area.
As for the Western Area (table 5), the credit-with sample is charac-
terized by weaker output growth in 2008 and a larger drop in 2009, but
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Table 5: Credit recovery and decomposition of output growth in WE
WESTERN AREA: CREDIT-WITH SAMPLE (obs. = 4,683,729)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 3.9 3.9 0.8 -1.0 0.3
2006 7.3 5.7 0.9 0.1 0.4
2007 4.7 5.5 0.3 -1.3 0.3
2008 0.3 2.4 0.3 -1.2 -1.2
2009 -11.9 -2.2 1.0 -10.0 -0.9
2010 7.1 -0.1 1.2 5.1 0.8
2011 5.3 4.2 0.0 1.4 -0.4
WESTERN AREA: CREDITLESS SAMPLE (obs. = 1,222,055)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 5.7 3.7 1.5 0.2 0.2
2006 6.0 4.4 1.4 0.0 0.2
2007 5.6 7.6 1.0 -2.8 0.1
2008 4.8 5.6 -0.3 1.4 -1.8
2009 -7.9 0.5 -0.3 -8.6 0.5
2010 2.9 -3.2 2.0 2.6 1.6
2011 4.6 2.4 0.8 1.5 -0.2
Y : Operating Revenues (Turnover); TWK: Temporary Working Capital; PFC: Permanent Fi-
nancing Contribution;GWKTR: Gross Working Capital Turnover Ratio;OR: Operating Ratio.
The creditless sample of the Western Area includes: Norway, United Kingdom, Iceland, Nether-
lands and Denmark. By contrast, the credit-with sample includes: Italy, Sweden, Finland, France
and Switzerland.
also faster recovery in 2010. In both credit-with and creditless countries
the Gross Working Capital Turnover Ratio is the main contributor to the
large fall in total turnover in the midst of the crisis. However, while in
the creditless sample the Temporary Working Capital remains flat in 2009
(+0.5 percent), in the credit-with sample it drops by more than 2 percent
in the same year. This may provide a possible justification for the faster
reprise of bank credit in credit-with countries during the early recovery
years. Indeed, it may simply reveal a stronger synchronization of the
working capital cycle with respect to the production cycle. The faster the
fall in TWK together with total output, the faster its subsequent reprise.
However, available data for the Western Area also reveal additional
differences. The weaker bank credit in creditless countries mainly refers
to long-term financing rather than to intra-period loans. Indeed, in cred-
itless countries non-current liabilities decrease by 5.8 percent in 2010 and
4.8 percent in 2011, while their growth rates always remain positive in
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the credit-with sample. In part, the decreases in non-current liabilities
are accompanied by lower growth in fixed assets (decreasing by about 2
percent in 2010 and remaining almost flat in 2011). However, large part
of the lower long-term credit is replaced by shareholders’ funds, which
grow more in creditless countries than in credit-with countries. These
differences aside, the behavior of firms in the two sub-samples is quite
similar. In both, output recovery takes place with the relevant contribu-
tion ofGWKTR, but also thanks to the positive growth ofOR and PFC.
Firms try to improve their operating efficiency and to dedicate more per-
manent resources to day-by-day operations. However, while credit-with
countries can rely on long-term external financing, creditless countries
mainly rely on internal financing. To sum up, in the Western Area the
creditless countries are characterized by slower output recovery, greater
slowdown in fixed assets and higher reliance on shareholders’ funds.
As for the Central-Eastern Area (table 6), differences between credit-
with and creditless countries are much more pronounced. Table 6 shows
that creditless countries are characterized by a markedly more abrupt
collapse in total turnover in 2009, accompanied by a proportional drop in
GWKTR. In these countries TWK growth is still positive (+6.9 percent)
in 2009, notwithstanding the increasing amount of unused current as-
sets. On the contrary, annual changes of shareholders’ funds are negative
since 2008, thus implying a negative development of Permanent Work-
ing Capital and of PFC. However, current assets grow slightly less than
5 percent in 2009 so that output fluctuations can be entirely attributed
to GWKTR. In the following recovery years, TWK positively affects
the output reprise in credit-with countries, while remaining flat in the
credit-less countries. In fact, in the credit-with sample, TWK contributes
more than GWKTR to turnover growth already in 2010. By contrast, in
the creditless sample turnover growth is mainly driven by the reprise in
GWKTR.
However, it is also remarkable that in creditless countries TWK does
not collapse, notwithstanding short-term financing debts decreasing by
more than 5 percent and trade debt decreasing by more than 1 percent
in both the recovery years, 2010 and 2011. Therefore, TWK in creditless
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Table 6: Credit recovery and decomposition of output growth in CEE
CENTRAL-EASTERN AREA: CREDIT-WITH SAMPLE (obs. = 491,798)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 5.7 6.4 -0.3 -0.5 0.2
2006 8.4 6.6 3.3 -1.1 -0.5
2007 7.6 8.5 2.6 -2.5 -0.9
2008 2.5 5.9 1.2 -3.4 -1.0
2009 -13.4 0.5 0.8 -14.1 -0.5
2010 8.4 3.9 1.1 2.9 0.3
2011 6.7 5.7 0.8 0.1 0.2
CENTRAL-EASTERN AREA: CREDITLESS SAMPLE (obs. = 782,732)
Year Y TWK PFC GWKTR OR
2005 -1.1 -0.6 4.2 -5.0 0.6
2006 7.2 10.1 1.3 -3.8 0.0
2007 5.4 9.9 0.4 -4.9 0.5
2008 -1.3 5.9 -1.2 -3.4 -2.3
2009 -25.7 6.9 -2.1 -29.2 0.3
2010 4.5 0.3 -0.6 4.1 0.7
2011 7.8 1.4 2.1 3.8 0.4
Y : Operating Revenues (Turnover); TWK: Temporary Working Capital; PFC: Permanent Fi-
nancing Contribution;GWKTR: Gross Working Capital Turnover Ratio;OR: Operating Ratio.
The creditless sample of the Central-Eastern Area includes: Montenegro, Lithuania, Ukraine, Es-
tonia and Latvia. By contrast, the credit-with sample includes: Turkey, Serbia, Czech Republic,
Cyprus and Slovakia.
countries remains flat thanks to alternative current liabilities, such as ac-
crued expenses and deferred income, taxes payable, issued promissory
notes, liabilities towards affiliated companies, staff members and social
security institutes. Hence, in countries where bank credit remains weak,
recovery is made possible not only by unused current assets, but also by
alternative current liabilities other than accounts payable. It should be
noted that, in creditless countries, even non-current liabilities decrease
in 2010 and 2011, respectively by 4.9 and 3.3 percent. Despite this, in
2011 the significant reduction in fixed assets (-4.5 percent) is sufficient to
release new permanent resources for current activities, as revealed by the
positive development of PFC (+2.1 percent).
Differently from creditless countries in the Western area, those in the
Central-Eastern Area do not rely on higher shareholders’ funds, i.e. re-
tained earnings and recapitalizations, to deal with lower external financ-
ing. Instead, there are two alternative reasons why current assets do not
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collapse in the Central-Eastern Area. First, lower intra-period loans are
substituted by alternative current liabilities. Second, lower intertemporal
loans are compensated by lower capital expenditures.
The determinants for the occurrence of creditless recoveries are not
necessarily the same across different countries and they can also depend
on the nature of the crisis episode. Therefore, approaches like the one
described in this chapter can play a very important role in exploring the
mechanisms that stay behind different episodes of creditless recoveries.
3.9 Concluding remarks
The theoretical model introduced in this chapter and the analysis made
on AMADEUS firm-level data give us some important clues on the inter-
actions between firms’ balance sheet items and output fluctuations dur-
ing both recession and recovery periods. In particular, several channels
have been identified through which creditless recoveries may be possible
at the enterprise level. It is interesting to point out that, in our setting,
the notion of production capacity is not referred only to fixed assets, as
typically assumed in most economic papers. Instead, production capac-
ity also refers to the gross working capital which is potentially available
to finance the operating cycles within a certain period.
Accordingly, in a recession period, the underutilization of production
capacity implies that a certain amount of current assets remains frozen
within the companies (or it has a very slow turnover) and does not con-
tribute to the economic activity. At the beginning of the subsequent re-
covery years, firms can increase output levels by using their spare capac-
ity, i.e. current assets that already exist within their balance sheets. This
early stage of the recovery does not require additional external financ-
ing. However, as production approaches the initial levels, the amount of
unused current assets progressively decreases. Therefore, we also iden-
tified specific additional mechanisms that can sustain (or allow a more
intensive use of) gross working capital, notwithstanding banking credit
remaining constrained.
High levels of unused current assets are generally due to a decline
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in aggregate demand. However, this evidence does not prevent to sup-
pose that the original trigger of the crisis is a shock in credit supply. In-
deed, the drop in demand that affects most of the companies may be
in turn generated by a slowdown of credit that limits the possibility of
households and firms to buy investment goods, intermediate goods and
durable consumption goods. The descriptive analysis made so far on
firm-level data is not sufficient, by itself, to explore cause-effect relation-
ships. Therefore, specific econometric analyses should get a more de-
tailed view of cause-effect relations and also weigh the various channels
identified above as possible determinants of creditless recoveries. Chap-
ter 4 will give a taste of such an empirical work. However, we point out
that future empirical research on financial crises and creditless recover-
ies could also usefully rely on accounts and ratios analyzed within this
chapter.
Finally, the model presented here is sufficiently flexible to let us ex-
tend it to a wider set of economic problems. Calvo et al (2012), for exam-
ple, developed similar arguments to explain the importance of a collat-
eral constraint for the occurrence of jobless recoveries. We guess that fur-
ther investigation of the possible contact points of such models may give
very interesting results. Moreover, in a future research agenda it would
be useful to make more explicit our model and to find numerical values
for the parameters through appropriate calibration methodologies. In-
deed, measurements from a calibration approach would definitely give
further content to the theory behind creditless recoveries.
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Chapter 4
The Credit-Output
Relationship During the
Recovery from Recession
4.1 Preamble
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 has generated renewed in-
terest in the role of credit in shaping economic recoveries. Given that
many credit markets froze during the crisis and credit recovered slug-
gishly in its aftermath, the natural question arises of how prolonged
tight credit conditions affect economic recovery. The existing literature
on credit and economic recoveries is dominated by the study of credit-
less recoveries. In their seminal contributions, Calvo et al (2006a,b) coined
the term Phoenix Miracles to describe a phenomenon whereby after sys-
temic crises economic activity recovers without an accompanying re-
covery in the credit stock. The phenomenon has been mainly docu-
mented in emerging economies, but seems to play a role in industrial
countries as well.1 Calvo and Loo-Kung (2010) argue that the subprime
crisis shares several characteristics of Phoenix Miracles. Reinhart and Ro-
goff (2009) have also drawn a parallel between the recent financial crisis
1See for example Claessens et al (2009).
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and episodes of systemic crises in emerging markets, which are typically
characterized by creditless recoveries.2
Several explanations of this phenomenon have been proposed in the
literature. Calvo et al (2006a,b) argue that a sudden underutilization of ca-
pacity created by a crisis episode can rationalize a fast creditless recovery.
Indeed, it appears that investment recovers much more slowly than GDP
after systemic crises. This implies that GDP recovers mainly through the
absorption of unused capacity. As investment is assumed to be a credit-
intensive activity, lack of investment during recovery may explain why
the recovery appears creditless. However, it is still unclear whether the
failure of investment to recover in tandem with GDP is due to demand
factors (low investment demand results in low demand for credit) or sup-
ply factors (prolonged credit market disruptions constrain firms’ access
to external finance). Claessens et al (2009) mention two additional expla-
nations. First, creditless recoveries may be explained by a substitution
between bank credit and other sources of financing such as trade credit
or internal finance. This substitution may lead to the observation of cred-
itless recoveries when credit is measured as bank credit as is usually the
case in the literature. Second, creditless recoveries may be associated
with a process of reallocation from more to less credit-intensive sectors.
Finally, there is a more radical view that claims that creditless recov-
eries a` la Calvo are unlikely to exist. According to Biggs et al (2009, 2010),
claims about the existence of creditless recoveries are based on the use of
an inappropriate measure of credit, namely the stock of credit, instead of
the more relevant flow of credit. The authors argue that some recoveries
may appear creditless when one compares developments in the stock of
credit to developments in GDP, a flow variable. They argue instead that
developments in GDP are a function of new borrowing, or the flow of
credit. They find that during recoveries previously identified as cred-
itless the rebound in economic activity is highly correlated with the re-
bound in the flow of credit, even if it is poorly correlated with the growth
in its stock. An implication of their paper is that for economic activity
2For more details on the existing literature on creditless recoveries and a comparison
with the last global financial crisis, see also chapter 2.
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to recover after a financial crisis, it is not necessary for the credit stock
to increase but only for the flow of credit to recover. According to this
view, a creditless recovery is a recovery during which the flow of credit
fails to recover in tandem with GDP. In our view, the analysis by Biggs
et al (2009, 2010) does not contradict the results by Calvo et al (2006a,b),
but rather offers a different, possibly complementary, approach to study
the role of credit conditions in shaping economic recoveries. Biggs et al
(2009, 2010) underline the role of credit flows for financing new net in-
vestments and thus GDP growth. However, following crises, GDP re-
covers at least partly by using previously idle capacity, without the need
for new investments. Recoveries during which the stock or the flow of
credit fails to recover may be two distinct phenomena.
The hypothesis that lower credit supply may have a significant im-
pact on real sector performance builds on the significance of bank credit
to the sectors likely to be bank dependent. In this chapter, we test em-
pirically the hypothesis that creditless recoveries imply redistributional
effects among industries with different dependence on external finance
as a result of impaired financial intermediation. The identification strat-
egy relies on the notion that, in the presence of market imperfections, dif-
ferent sources of funds (bank credit, the issuance of tradable bonds, and
equity) are not perfect substitutes. If creditless recoveries stem from dis-
ruptions in the supply of bank credit, the more the recovery is creditless
the more firms that are reliant on bank credit should perform relatively
worse.
To test whether this hypothesis fits data, we extend the seminal work
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to the phenomenon of recoveries. In the ini-
tial study by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the specification focuses on an-
alyzing the effect of financial development, and consequently on testing
whether the sectors most dependent on external finance present higher
rates of growth in countries with a higher level of financial develop-
ment.3 The innovation is to introduce the interaction between a coun-
try characteristic (financial development) and an industry characteristic
(external financial dependence), thus avoiding some problems of identi-
3See also Levine (2005) for a general review of methods used in the literature.
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fication present in the cross-country regressions typical of the literature
on economic growth. Moreover, as commented by Claessens and Laeven
(2005), the specification is less subject to the criticisms of omitted variable
bias or model specification than are traditional approaches that relate fi-
nancial sector development directly to economic growth. Following a
similar approach than in Rajan and Zingales (1998), our identification of
the impact of creditless recoveries on output is based on the interaction
between the sectoral dependence on external finance and the rate of con-
traction of private credit at the country level during recovery episodes.
The most closely related paper is a recent contribution by Abiad et al
(2011).4 Using aggregate and sectoral data, the authors find that average
growth during creditless recoveries, defined as recoveries during which
the growth rate of real bank credit is zero or negative, is about a third
lower than during normal recoveries. In addition, sectors that are more
dependent on external finance are found to grow relatively less during
creditless recoveries. The authors conclude that creditless recoveries re-
flect impaired financial intermediation. Despite the common theme of
creditless recoveries, this chapter differs from Abiad et al (2011) in sev-
eral dimensions. First and foremost, our point of view on creditless re-
coveries is different. In line with the view of Calvo et al (2006a), we find
that the puzzling phenomenon is the one in which the economy travels
along a V-shaped curve, with a sharp fall in output followed by a rapid
recovery, and at the same time credit does not recover. By contrast, we
find less puzzling that economies recover more slowly when credit fails
to recover. Furthermore, we focus on recoveries from recessions, whereas
Abiad et al (2011) focus on recoveries from episodes of negative output
gaps. Finally, whereas Abiad et al (2011) investigate the negative impact
of prolonged tight credit conditions on growth during recovery, we focus
on exploring the channels that might explain the ability of the economy
to recover quickly without credit. In particular, we focus on the ability
of firms to substitute trade credit for bank credit. Trade credit can help
firms to continue financing short-run working capital in the face of tight
4Kannan (2012) as well analyzes the sectoral dynamics during recoveries following fi-
nancial crises.
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credit conditions. Our empirical specifications reflect this conceptual dif-
ference.
The chapter is structured as follows. In part I (section 4.2, coauthored
with Fabrizio Coricelli and Isabelle Roland), we focus on industry-level
data available until 2003, thus preceding the last global financial crisis.
The main objective is to analyze the real redistributional effects of reces-
sions and recoveries among industries with specific characteristics, espe-
cially when bank credit fails to recover. Among other things, this part
offers an interesting empirical distinction between the two types of cred-
itless recoveries above mentioned, in the Calvo sense and in the Biggs
sense. Part II (section 4.3) changes the perspective of the analysis, by
focusing on firm-level data available for the European countries within
the period 2003-2011. The dataset used in this study captures the global
financial crisis and the early recovery years, thus allowing us to exam-
ine the heterogeneity existing across countries within the same single
episode of generalized crisis for the world economy. In particular, coun-
tries are differentiated according to the dynamics of bank credit during
recovery years. Moreover, while industry-level data in part I refer to
manufacturing sectors only, firm-level data in part II include all sectors of
the economy. In particular, services are users of goods produced by man-
ufacturing sectors. This makes it possible to focus on a broader variety of
companies with respect to the type of goods and services they produce
and, then, to test the extent to which bank credit may limit firms’ growth
by reducing the demand for goods they produce rather than constraining
their production capacity.
4.2 Part I
4.2.1 Introduction
Part I focuses on industry-level data by country between 1963 and 2003,
thus excluding the last global financial crisis. The choice of this period
is largely due to the availability of data. However, it also reflects a need
to keep separate the recent financial crisis compared to other recession
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episodes in the sample, since many countries experienced double-dip
recessions and had not yet fully recovered to pre-recession levels by 2011.
The basic model of reference for analyzing the effect of creditless re-
coveries on economic growth takes as its starting point the specification
adopted in Rajan and Zingales (1998), henceforth RZ. Industry-level data
allow us to use the RZ methodology to identify the role of credit mar-
kets for output dynamics and thus avoid problems of endogeneity and
reverse causality in the credit-output relationship. The differential per-
formance of production growth across industries with different exoge-
nous characteristics is the main channel through which the real impact
of credit is identified. Differently from RZ, we are not looking here at
long-rung growth. However, as showed in several subsequent studies,
it is acceptable to adopt the same difference-in-differences approach em-
ployed by RZ to focus on the real effects of creditless recoveries. The
recourse to the interaction between an indicator of credit weakness of the
recovery and variables representing sectoral characteristics permits us to
verify whether the sectors that share some peculiar feature grow slower
in countries where the recovery is more markedly creditless.
Among other things, in part I we distinguish between episodes dur-
ing which value added recovers without an increase in the credit stock
(creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense) and episodes during which
value added recovers without an increase in credit flows (creditless re-
coveries in the Biggs sense). Both types of creditless recoveries are not
rare phenomena and typically follow larger drop in GDP per capita, al-
though this feature is more clearly evident when considering creditless
recoveries a` la Calvo. In addition, we find that creditless recoveries in the
Calvo sense are primarily an emerging market phenomenon, while cred-
itless recoveries in the Biggs sense are almost as frequent in developed
countries as in emerging markets.
Second, we find that industries that are more dependent on external
finance recover more slowly when recoveries are classified as creditless,
although this result is noticeable in emerging markets only. This indi-
cates that in developed countries certain mechanisms enable the exter-
nal dependent industries to grow despite weakness in bank credit. These
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mechanisms may include an improved and easier substitutability among
alternative sources of financing, such as the issuance of tradable bonds
and equity, or the utilization of idle capacity. However, channels through
which financial frictions may affect growth do not necessarily (or not
only) involve industries’ financial dependence, as a simple application
of the RZ model would suggest. Alternative characteristics may be more
important than dependence on external financing in affecting the reallo-
cation among different sectors during creditless recoveries. Indeed, we
are focusing here on the impact of impaired financial intermediation on
the short-run output dynamics, rather than the impact of financial de-
velopment on the long-run growth. Therefore, we also proceed to thor-
oughly test the relevance of other indicators of exposure to credit, such
as tangibility of assets and structural characteristics of production (capi-
tal/labor intensity).
Finally, we explore one potential mechanism that may enable the
economy to recover without bank credit, namely the substitution of trade
credit for bank credit. Although further analyses at the firm level are
needed to better discern the effects associated with trade credit during
creditless recoveries, we find evidence that industries more dependent
on trade credit tend to recover more quickly. At the industry level, in-
deed, a lower dependence on bank credit relative to trade credit allows a
better output performance of firms during the peak-to-recovery episode,
especially when the recovery is creditless (substitution effect). At the coun-
try level, by contrast, a lower dependence on bank credit relative to trade
credit appears to have a negative impact on growth during recoveries.
This suggests the existence of a propagation of financial distress through
trade credit chains during crisis episodes (contagion effect).
Part I is complementary to Coricelli and Roland (2010), who analyze
the finance-growth nexus during episodes of recession. Coricelli and
Roland (2010) suggest that there exists a complex web of relationships
between bank credit, trade credit, financial development and economic
activity; and that these relationships may differ depending on whether
the economy is going through an episode of growth, contraction or re-
covery. In other words, they highlight the importance of potential asym-
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metry in the role of financial markets during different phases of economic
activity. While Coricelli and Roland (2010) focus on episodes of contrac-
tion, this chapter focuses on recoveries, and in particular on creditless
recoveries.
Part I is structured as follows. In section 4.2.2, we briefly describe
the sample and the reasons why we choose to focus on industry-level
data. In section 4.2.3, we investigate the frequency and characteristics of
creditless recoveries in our sample. Importantly, we distinguish between
the two types of creditless recoveries above mentioned, the Calvo-type
and the Biggs-type. In section 4.2.4, we investigate whether industries
that are more dependent on external finance are more or less affected
by creditless recoveries. We also introduce more additional character-
istics at the industry level than the RZ approach and, simultaneously,
we explore whether the two types of creditless recoveries we identified
in section 4.2.3 have a differential impact on growth during recoveries.
In section 4.2.5, we ask whether industries that are more dependent on
bank credit as opposed to trade credit perform relatively worse during
creditless recoveries. In section 4.2.6 we discuss on the robustness of our
regression analyses. Section 4.2.7 concludes and discusses avenues for
further research.
4.2.2 Data sources and sample
As opposed to most of the existing literature, our analysis uses industry-
level data for several reasons. First, the use of data at the sector level al-
lows us to overcome well-known endogeneity problems typical of anal-
yses that rely on aggregate data. Indeed, private credit growth may pre-
dict GDP growth just because the economic performance affects credit
demand. To circumvent this problem, we borrow the RZ methodology,
which builds on industry-level data. Second, GDP may be a misleading
indicator of economic activity during recoveries because it often captures
large fiscal interventions. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to use
industry-level value added data to study the relationship between credit
and recovery. Third, the behavior of bank credit and its impact on the
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economy may crucially depend on the behavior of alternative sources of
financing, such as trade credit. Indeed, as we mentioned earlier, it may
happen that a creditless recovery takes place because firms switch to al-
ternative sources of external finance when credit conditions are tight for
a prolonged period of time. While we use the rate of contraction of pri-
vate credit at the country level as a measure of credit weakness throughout
the analysis, we also use data on the dependence of industries on bank
credit relative to trade credit in order to address this point.5
We use value added data from the UNIDO database.6 Our main
sample covers a total of 28 manufacturing industries (3-digit ISIC Rev.2
level) between 1963 and 2003. Data are deflated using Consumer Price
Indexes (CPI) at the country level from the World Bank and the IMF IFS
database.7 Instead of working with annual data, we conduct our analysis
on episodes of recession and subsequent recovery. Following Calvo, Cori-
celli, and Ottonello (2012), henceforth CCO, we begin by locating these
episodes within two samples of countries, defined as emerging markets
and developed countries.
For emerging economies, Calvo et al (2006a) refer to countries that
are sufficiently integrated in the world capital market.8 Individual and
consecutive years with negative change in real GDP since 1980 are clas-
sified as recession episodes at the country level. CCO make use of these
same episodes but recur to data on GDP per capita to individuate the
beginning and the end of the crisis, as well as its culminating year.9 The
5Data on the dependence of industries on bank credit relative to trade credit are taken
from Raddatz (2010).
6United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Industrial Statistics Database at
the 3-Digit Level of ISIC Code, Revision 2 (2006).
7When CPI data are missing, we also recur to the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) in order
to integrate our time series.
8In particular, Calvo et al (2006a) select 32 countries that were tracked by JP Morgan
to build its Global Emerging Markets Index: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hun-
gary, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
9CCO excludes two types of episodes: those related to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and those in which GDP per capita did not fully recover its pre-crisis peak before an-
other recession episode takes place. Long run phenomena, i.e. crises with a duration more
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pre-crisis peak is identified with the year displaying the maximum level
of GDP per capita preceding the first GDP contraction in the recession
episode, while the full output-recovery point is the year in which GDP per
capita comes back to the pre-crisis peak. The trough coincides with the
minimum point within the peak-to-recovery period. Finally, we trace the
recession and recovery periods by splitting the crisis years in the peak-to-
trough period and the trough-to-recovery period.
For developed countries, instead, CCO consider episodes starting
from the post-WWII period with respect to a relative small sample of
countries.10 In this case, CCO base the identification of peaks, troughs
and recovery dates on quarterly data. Then, after getting observations on
GDP per capita from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database (WDI), we take care of repeating the same exercise on yearly
data.
For our analysis we rearrange the country classification relying on
the FTSE Global Equity Indexes.11 This classification is preferred to the
one adopted in CCO since it is based on a comprehensive set of variables
that is presumably relevant for our analysis, such as the total stock mar-
ket capitalization, the breadth and depth of market, the restrictions on
foreign investment, the efficiency of market infrastructure. In addition,
it is extended to several additional countries which are included in the
UNIDO dataset, although not considered in CCO. This arrangement al-
lows us to compare the results obtained within two different samples: a
limited sample, which covers the countries included in CCO, and a more
extended sample, which covers all countries included in both the UNIDO
database and the FTSE classification.
As shown in table 7, the limited sample consists of 73 episodes di-
vided into 34 countries. All the countries classified as developed in CCO
than 2 standard deviation from the mean (15 years) are also excluded from the sample. We
additionally have to exclude episodes finishing after 2003 because of data availability at
the sectoral level.
10Based on NBER and ECRI information, CCO identify recession episodes in eleven
countries: Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and United States.
11In the FTSE classification (September 2013 update), 26 countries are classified as Devel-
oped, 10 are Advanced Emerging, 12 are Secondary Emerging and 26 are Frontier.
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Table 7: Limited Sample (CCO) of recession episodes
Developed Countries
Country Peak Trough Recovery Output Country Peak Trough Recovery OutputDecline Decline
AUS 1974 1975 1976 0.00% ESP 1992 1993 1994 1.34%
AUS 1982 1983 1985 3.53% FRA 1974 1975 1976 1.79%
AUS 1990 1992 1993 2.38% FRA 1992 1993 1994 1.10%
AUT 1974 1975 1976 0.10% GBR 1973 1975 1976 2.19%
AUT 1980 1981 1982 0.40% GBR 1979 1981 1983 3.55%
AUT 1992 1993 1994 0.30% GBR 1990 1991 1993 1.60%
CAN 1981 1982 1984 4.02% ITA 1974 1975 1976 2.67%
CAN 1989 1992 1995 5.00% ITA 1992 1993 1994 0.91%
CHE 1974 1976 1980 8.02% KOR 1997 1998 1999 7.52%
CHE 1981 1982 1984 1.88% SWE 1976 1977 1979 1.95%
CHE 1990 1993 1998 4.26% SWE 1989 1993 1995 6.08%
DEU 1974 1975 1976 0.50% USA 1973 1975 1976 2.58%
DEU 1981 1982 1983 0.30% USA 1979 1980 1981 1.20%
DEU 1992 1993 1994 1.65% USA 1981 1982 1983 2.84%
ESP 1978 1979 1980 0.84% USA 1990 1991 1992 1.40%
ESP 1980 1981 1983 0.93% USA 2000 2001 2002 0.05%
Emerging Markets
Country Peak Trough Recovery Output Country Peak Trough Recovery OutputDecline Decline
ARG 1987 1990 1992 15.72% MEX 1985 1988 1991 6.48%
ARG 1994 1995 1996 4.06% MEX 1994 1995 1997 7.59%
BGR 1995 1997 2000 9.52% MYS 1984 1986 1988 5.46%
BRA 1980 1983 1987 13.32% MYS 1997 1998 2002 9.64%
BRA 1987 1988 1989 1.96% PAN 1986 1989 1993 19.02%
BRA 1991 1992 1993 2.04% PER 1997 1999 2002 2.97%
CHL 1981 1983 1987 16.43% PHL 1990 1993 1996 5.13%
CHL 1998 1999 2000 2.02% PHL 1997 1998 2000 2.73%
CIV 1991 1994 1997 8.86% RUS 1997 1998 1999 5.04%
DOM 1989 1991 1993 8.35% SLV 1980 1986 1994 19.99%
DZA 1992 1994 1999 7.09% THA 1996 1998 2003 13.68%
ECU 1986 1987 1988 2.70% TUN 1981 1982 1984 3.07%
ECU 1998 2000 2003 7.47% TUN 1985 1986 1990 4.50%
LBN 1988 1989 1994 42.62% TUR 1993 1994 1996 6.16%
LBN 1998 2000 2001 2.90% TUR 1998 1999 2000 4.82%
MAR 1980 1981 1982 5.08% TUR 2000 2001 2003 7.06%
MAR 1982 1983 1985 2.91% URY 1981 1984 1992 21.50%
MAR 1986 1987 1988 4.60% URY 1994 1995 1996 2.16%
MAR 1991 1993 1994 8.21% VEN 1988 1989 1992 10.90%
MAR 1994 1995 1996 8.03% VEN 1995 1996 1997 2.25%
MAR 1996 1997 1998 3.64%
are still classified as developed according to the FTSE categorization that
we adopt. South Korea is the only additional country that comes out
from the group of emerging countries for being included among devel-
oped countries. By contrast, the extended sample offers the possibility
to work on a dataset of 421 episodes divided into 143 countries. The
limited sample has the advantage to be comparable with a dataset al-
ready used in previous work, while the larger number of observations in
the extended sample should lead to increased precision when estimating
unknown parameters.
Analyzing the extended sample (table 8), we obtain that the aver-
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Table 8: Peak-to-recovery episodes in the extended sample
Country Level Sector Level
GDP Duration VA Wages Empl. GFCF
Recession phase: -2.8% 1.32 -4.7% -3.2% -3.1% -10.4%
Recovery phase: 5.3% 1.55 3.8% 1.0% 0.0% 1.2%
Note: The average Duration of each phase is reported in years. For all other variables,
average percentage changes are reported respectively for the peak-to-trough and the
trough-to-recovery periods
age decline in GDP per capita at the country level during the recession
episodes is 2.8 percent, though there is significant cross-country varia-
tion (the standard deviation is 3.2 percent). The average duration of the
episodes in our sample is 2.88 years with a standard deviation of 1.33
years. The average duration of the recovery phase (1.55 years) tends
to be slightly longer than average duration of the recession phase (1.32
years). Looking at sectoral data from the UNIDO dataset, during the re-
cession periods the median decline is 4.7 percent for real value added, 3.2
percent for real wages and salaries, 3.1 percent for the number of employees.
During the subsequent recovery period, the median growth rates are re-
spectively 3.8, 1.0, 0.0 percent.12 Finally, the real growth rate of gross fixed
capital formation for the median sector is strongly negative (-10.4 percent)
during the recession phase and recovers only partially (+1.2 percent) dur-
ing the recovery phase.
4.2.3 How common are creditless recoveries?
As mentioned above, we make a distinction between recoveries during
which the stock of credit fails to increase and those during which the
flow of credit fails to increase. We first investigate the evolution of the
stock of credit during episodes of recovery (∆Stock) by looking at the
change in real credit per capita from output peak to full recovery point.
Real credit per capita is obtained multiplying the Domestic credit to private
sector by banks in percentage of GDP and the GDP per capita in constant
12Interestingly, sectoral data seem to confirm the finding in Calvo et al (2012) of the job-
less nature of recoveries from financial crises.
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LCU (local currency units). Both these measures are collected within the
WDI dataset of the World Bank. We interpret a negative difference as
indicating the presence of a creditless recovery at the country level in the
Calvo sense, namely a recovery in GDP per capita to pre-downturn level
that is not accompanied by a corresponding pick up in credit per capita.
In our extended sample, credit per capita increases in about 62 per-
cent of the recoveries at the country level. During these with-credit re-
coveries, credit per capita increases by an average of 21.3 percent from
output peak to full recovery point. In the remaining 38 percent of the
recoveries, that we define creditless, real credit per capita decreases on
average by 14.5 percent. The average decline in GDP per capita is 2.2
percent during recessions that precede with-credit recoveries and 3.8 per-
cent during those preceding creditless recoveries. The average duration
of peak-to-recovery episodes is also higher in case of creditless recoveries
(3.16 years) than in case of with-credit recoveries (2.74 years).
Secondly, we investigate the evolution of the flows of credit during
episodes of recovery by looking at the difference between the growth rate
of real credit per capita in the recovery year and in the peak year of each
episode (∆Flow). We define a creditless recovery in the Biggs sense as an
episode of recovery for which this difference is negative. In our sample,
the growth rate of credit per capita increases in about 45.6 percent of
the country-level episodes. During with-credit recoveries a` la Biggs, the
growth rate of credit per capita increases by an average of 12 percentage
points from output peak to full recovery point. In the remaining 54.4
percent of the episodes, defined as creditless a` la Biggs, the growth rate
of real credit per capita decreases on average by 14.8 percentage points.
Then, creditless recoveries cannot be ruled out even when one focuses
on the flow of credit rather than the stock as proposed by Biggs et al
(2009, 2010). The average decline in GDP per capita is 2.6 percent during
recessions that precede with-credit recoveries a` la Biggs and 2.9 percent
during those preceding creditless recoveries. Even under this definition,
the average duration of peak-to-recovery episodes is still higher in case
of creditless recoveries (2.99 years) than in case of with-credit recoveries
(2.75 years), though the difference is less pronounced.
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In summary, there is evidence of the presence of creditless recoveries
both in the sense of Calvo and Biggs. Furthermore, creditless recoveries
are not a rare phenomenon. In addition, our descriptive statistics show
that a failure of credit to recover typically follows larger drops in GDP
per capita. Indeed, creditless recoveries may be explained, at least in
part, with a bounce-back effect. This is also in line with the view ex-
pressed in Calvo et al (2006a) that
“Phoenix Miracle-type recoveries are highly suggestive of sud-
den underutilization of capacity. This is so, because after large
drops in output, it would be difficult to rationalize speedy post-
collapse recovery, unless idle resources are part of the equation”.
However, this feature is more clearly evident when considering creditless
recoveries a` la Calvo. A failure of credit flows to recover, i.e. in the Biggs
sense, may signal shocks in intertemporal credit supply, which is more
important for investment in fixed capital and long-run growth. However,
when credit stocks also fail to recover, then shocks are more likely to be
extended to intra-period credit, which also affects current spending and
induces more severe recessions.
Using the FTSE classification,we can also analyze differences among
Developed Countries (DC) and Emerging Markets (EM).13 The phenomenon
of creditless recoveries has been mainly documented in emerging
economies. However, according to Claessens et al (2009) it also seems
to play a role in industrial countries. Tables 9 and 10 show descrip-
tive statistics on the occurrence of creditless recoveries, respectively in
the Calvo and Biggs sense. Data in our extended sample are grouped
by country cluster. Table 9 shows that the decline in GDP per capita
is consistently higher during recessions that precede creditless recover-
ies in the Calvo sense rather than during recoveries with credit. This
is true across all country categories. However, consistent with Calvo’s
finding that creditless recoveries are primarily an emerging market phe-
nomenon, creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense are less frequent in
13Emerging Markets include groups classified as Advanced Emerging, Secondary Emerging
and Frontier in the FTSE classification.
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Table 9: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense by income group
Creditless Recoveries Recoveries With-Credit Proportion
of Creditless
RecoveriesOutput
Decline ∆Stock
Output
Decline ∆Stock
DC: 2.6% -10.5% 2.0% 18.5% 35.8%
EM: 5.0% -18.6% 2.5% 24.9% 40.6%
Note: Output Decline = Average decline in GDP per capita during the recession period;
∆Stock = Change in credit per capita between pre-crisis peak and full-recovery year
Table 10: Creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense by income group
Creditless Recoveries Recoveries With-Credit Proportion
of Creditless
RecoveriesOutput
Decline ∆Flow
Output
Decline ∆Flow
DC: 2.4% -14.4 p.p. 1.9% 10.5 p.p. 53.1%
EM: 3.4% -15.4 p.p. 3.4% 13.8 p.p. 55.9%
Note: Output Decline = Average decline in GDP per capita during the recession period;
∆Flow = Change in the growth rate of credit per capita between pre-crisis peak and
full-recovery year (expressed in percentage points).
developed countries. Furthermore, in developed economies, GDP per
capita falls by less both during the recession phase and during the whole
peak-to-recovery period.
In contrast, when we look at creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense
(table 10), we can see that they are almost as frequent in developed coun-
tries as in emerging markets. Even differences in output decline dur-
ing the recession phase and differences in credit recovery are less pro-
nounced between the two groups, suggesting that creditless recoveries a`
la Biggs are not primarily an emerging market phenomenon.
4.2.4 Creditless recoveries and dependence on external fi-
nance
In this section, we explore the link between creditless recoveries and
growth by asking whether industries that are relatively more dependent
on external finance have a worse relative performance when recoveries
are classified as creditless. For our regressions we use a difference-in-
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differences approach to identify causal links between credit growth and
industries’ output performance. If disruptions of financial intermedia-
tion are at the roots of creditless recoveries, their effect may be felt dis-
proportionately more by those sectors that rely more heavily on external
finance.
The measure of dependence on external finance that we use is the one
obtained at the sectoral level in RZ. This is defined as capital expendi-
tures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures,
i.e. the flow of investments financed outside of retained earnings. Even
the working assumption is the same adopted in RZ. According to this
assumption, there are technological reasons why some sectors depend
more than others on external finance, regardless of the country. External
dependence is determined by technological factors, such as production
time, project scale, gestation period, capital intensity, and the importance
of R&D investment.14 RZ identify the external financial dependence at
the sectoral level within a benchmark country with developed capital
markets, the United States, in which firms are assumed not to face fric-
tions in their access to financing. If a sector in the benchmark country
has certain inherent characteristics, those same characteristics will re-
main valid in all the other countries of the sample analyzed. While the
absolute value of the index may vary across countries and time, for the
methodology to work it is sufficient that the industry ranking remains
broadly the same.15
Based upon this premise, we estimate the following model.
Growths,e = α · Interactions,e +
∑
s
βs · ds +
∑
e
βe · de + εs,e (4.1)
where s denotes the industry sector and e identifies the recession-to-
recovery episode, that stretches from the pre-crisis peak to the full-
14The same assumption has been later employed in several research works, such as Braun
and Larrain (2005), Kroszner et al (2007), Dell’Ariccia et al (2008) and Abiad et al (2011). In
contrast, Furstenberg and Kalckreuth (2006) question it, while Fisman and Love (2007) tried
to introduce a measure of growth opportunities at the sectoral level as alternative proxy of
external finance dependence. However, this is not the focus of our paper and we mostly
follow the prevailing literature.
15Rajan and Zingales (1998), for example, support this assumption with data from
Canada.
110
recovery year for each occurrence at the country level. The d’s denote
dummy variables. The variable ds stands for the sector dummy and it
is likely to incorporate technological characteristics that may affect the
growth of different industries in times of crisis. The dummy de identifies
the single episodes detected at the country level and thus incorporates
all those specific features that may characterize each crisis event. Among
the others, it certainly incorporates the different GDP growth rates of the
country between the pre-crisis peak and the full-recovery year of each
episode.
Growths,e is the real growth in sectoral output (O) over the peak-
to-recovery period in sector s during episode e. In alternative to
output we could also consider value added (V A) or other relevant
sectoral variables, such as employment (E), total wages and salaries
(W ) or gross fixed capital formation (GFCF ). Finally, Interactions,e
is obtained multiplying CreditlessMeasuree by SectorCharacteristics.
CreditlessMeasuree is the measure that we adopt to evaluate whether a
recovery is creditless or not. It can be a dummy or a continuous variable.
SectorCharacteristics is the dependence on external finance measured
by RZ or an alternative variable that incorporates some peculiar charac-
teristic of the sector such as tangibility, capital intensity or the relative use
of trade credit. This variable is assumed to be constant across countries
and years, since it only depends on technological characteristics of each
sector. Both CreditlessMeasure and SectorCharacteristic are omitted
from the regressions, when not interacted, since they are already incor-
porated in the fixed effects by recession episode and by sector.16 Finally,
standard errors in all the regressions are clustered by recession episode
so that t-statistics result to be robust to correlation between errors within
each episode.
Table 11 shows the results when referring to creditless recoveries in
the Calvo sense. We consider as CreditlessMeasure a dummy variable
that is equal to one when the change in real credit per capita from output
16Reported results are obtained after identifying influential observations and removing
extreme outliers from the regressions. All relevant conclusions are confirmed when we do
not exclude outliers.
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Table 11: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense (dummy variable) and
Dependence on External Finance
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.0857 0.0229 -0.3271 -0.1115 -0.0034 -0.3586**
[-0.826] [0.539] [-1.148] [-1.509] [-0.049] [-2.212]
N 1251 786 465 3002 2029 973
r2 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.18
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.0354 0.0341 -0.1535 -0.1061* 0.0178 -0.4196***
[-0.700] [0.776] [-1.211] [-1.713] [0.285] [-3.255]
N 1176 767 409 2901 2012 889
r2 0.31 0.25 0.40 0.19 0.21 0.19
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set
of dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients
not reported). CreditlessMeasure = 1 when the change in real credit per capita from
output peak to full recovery point is negative. SectorCharacteristic = Dependence
on external finance from RZ(1998)
peak to full recovery point (∆stock) results to be negative. Dependence
on external finance is adopted as the relevant SectorCharacteristic vari-
able. We expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative. In-
deed, worsening credit conditions should not have as large an impact for
industries that primarily finance their investments with internal funds as
for industries that rely more heavily on external funds. A negative coeffi-
cient would confirm that internal and external funds are not perfect sub-
stitutes and would provide us an important proof that financial markets
are imperfect.
Actually, the coefficient on Interaction results to be negative both
in the full sample (indicated as Full) and in the emerging markets sub-
sample (EM). These results are confirmed by considering growth in both
value added and output as relevant variable. The negative coefficients
for the emerging markets result significantly different from zero in the
extended sample, which contains a larger number of observations. By
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Table 12: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense and Dependence on Ex-
ternal Finance
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.4214*** 0.1682 -0.5617*** -0.22 0.0878 -0.5743***
[-2.793] [1.001] [-3.210] [-1.451] [0.654] [-3.429]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.18
Diff. -2.98% 0.61% -4.65% -1.28% 0.42% -4.05%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.1803** 0.1164 -0.2148** -0.0942 0.1046 -0.3307**
[-2.099] [1.212] [-2.401] [-0.835] [0.951] [-2.278]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.35 0.25 0.42 0.19 0.21 0.19
Diff. -1.34% 0.53% -2.27% -0.55% 0.50% -2.33%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between real credit per capita in the
recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Dependence on external
finance from RZ(1998)
contrast, in the developed countries subsample (DC) the coefficient on
Interaction is positive and close to zero. Therefore, the negative coeffi-
cient on Interaction is entirely due to the subsample of emerging mar-
kets, probably reflecting the consequences of a lower financial develop-
ment, the scarcity of alternative sources of funding and more pervasive
financial frictions.
Recall that our objective here is to understand whether some real-
location takes place among different industries when the stock of bank
credit at the end of a recovery phase is lower than at the beginning of the
crisis. The results in table 11 seem to tell us that sectors that are more
dependent on external finance a` la RZ suffer the most during recover-
ies in emerging markets classified as creditless. These conclusions are
confirmed and strengthened in table 12, where we consider a continuous
measure of credit performance instead of the dummy variable to distin-
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guish creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense. CreditlessMeasure here is
the difference between real per capita credit in the recovery year and the
peak year. The sign is reversed, so that decreases in real per capita credit
(i.e. the creditless cases) are represented by positive values. Accordingly,
we can refer to this continuous measure as CreditWeakness of the peak-
to-recovery episode. When we refer to the emerging markets subsample
the coefficient on Interaction is negative as expected. Moreover, in this
case the coefficient is significantly different from zero not only when we
consider the extended sample but also in the limited sample extrapolated
from CCO.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this effect, we can measure the dif-
ferential in real growth rate across industries within the different kinds
of recovery episode. This differential effect measures how much faster an
industry at the 75th percentile level of SectorCharacteristic grows with
respect to an industry at the 25th percentile level when we have a reces-
sion episode at the 75th percentile of the CreditlessMeasure rather than
one at the 25th percentile. As for the SectorCharacteristic variable, the
75th percentile (industries that are highly dependent on external finance)
stands between Textiles and Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products,
while the 25th percentile (low dependence industries) stands between
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Petroleum Refineries. Let us apply
the calculation within the EM subsample. At the 75th percentile of the
CreditlessMeasure distribution (the creditless case) the annual growth
rate of real credit per capita from peak to recovery is almost zero, while
at the 25th percentile (the with-credit case), the real credit per capita
increases by 22.3 percentage points. According to our estimations, the
differential in the growth rate amounts to about -4 percentage points in
terms of total real output and -2.3 in terms of real value added. Therefore,
our results suggest that the redistributive effects of creditless recoveries
are not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful.
The same conclusions cannot be drawn when we consider cred-
itless recoveries in the Biggs sense. In table 13 the dummy for
CreditlessMeasure is set equal to one when the difference between the
growth rate of real credit per capita in the full-recovery year and in the
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Table 13: Creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense (dummy variable) and
Dependence on External Finance
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 0.0227 0.0557 -0.0279 0.0417 0.021 0.0805
[0.213] [1.461] [-0.092] [0.607] [0.395] [0.447]
N 1251 786 465 3002 2029 973
r2 0.23 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.18
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 0.0177 0.0677 -0.1339 -0.0089 0.0327 -0.1139
[0.336] [1.624] [-1.118] [-0.165] [0.671] [-0.852]
N 1176 767 409 2901 2012 889
r2 0.31 0.25 0.40 0.19 0.21 0.18
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = 1 when the annual change of real credit per capita is
lower in the recovery year than in peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Dependence on
external finance from RZ(1998)
pre-crisis peak year is negative. As we can see from the table, the coef-
ficient on Interaction is never significant although it still tends to turn
negative in the case of emerging markets.
However, table 14 shows that when we refer to the EM subsample the
coefficient on Interaction is still negative and significant once we con-
sider a continuous measure of credit performance to identify creditless
recoveries in the Biggs sense. Here, CreditlessMeasure is the difference
between annual growth rate of real credit per capita in the recovery year
and the peak year. As in the Calvo case (table 12), the sign is reversed
so that decreases in the growth rate of credit (i.e. the creditless cases a`
la Biggs) are represented by positive values. When considering the real
growth rate in value added as the dependent variable, the coefficients
on the interaction term are negative and significant at the 1 percent level
in the extended sample (5 percent in the limited sample), while they are
negative but not significant when considering total output. In the case
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Table 14: Creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense and Dependence on Ex-
ternal Finance
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.3308 0.3007 -0.5733 -0.1036 0.0692 -0.4908
[-0.970] [1.479] [-1.292] [-0.757] [0.894] [-1.645]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17
Diff. -1.69% 0.98% -7.26% -0.47% 0.28% -3.35%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.3079 0.2493 -0.5545** -0.2010 0.0643 -0.8425***
[-1.518] [1.633] [-2.437] [-1.027] [0.667] [-3.197]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.21 0.19
Diff. -1.58% 0.91% -7.36% -0.90% 0.27% -5.53%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between annual change of real credit
per capita in the recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Depen-
dence on external finance from RZ(1998)
of value added, the differential in the growth rate is even higher than in
the Calvo-type recoveries, amounting to -5.5 percentage points in the ex-
tended sample. In summary, not only creditless recoveries a` la Biggs can
occur, but they also have relevant redistributive effects among industries.
Indeed, this is not inconsistent with the theory. In fact, the RZ measure
of dependence on external finance refers to the fraction of capital expen-
ditures that is not financed with cash flow from operations and the type
of bank lending that finances capital expenditures is typically intertem-
poral rather than intra-period credit. Therefore, one should actually ex-
pect that the trend of credit flows has a more important role than the
trend of credit stocks when relying on the external finance dependence
as SectorCharacteristic variable.
These conclusions are also strengthened once we consider the real
growth of GFCF from peak to recovery as dependent variable (not re-
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ported). In the case of creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense, the coef-
ficient on Interaction for the EM subsample becomes negative (-1.696)
and significant at the 5 percent level. This confirms that for this kind of
creditless recoveries the growth reallocation may be due, at least in part,
to the difficulties in ensuring a stable and continuous growth of fixed
capital.
However, the dependence on external financing is not the only rele-
vant sector characteristic for vulnerability to financial frictions. Indeed,
other mechanisms may induce a reallocation of growth among different
sectors during creditless recoveries. These include the different accessi-
bility that individual industries may have to bank loans when financial
frictions strongly affect the recovery, but also technological characteris-
tics that make it possible to intensify the use of inputs already available
(e.g. fixed capital) at the expense of productive inputs that require greater
reliance on intra-period financing (e.g. labor). Then, other variables can
be introduced, such as Tangibility and CapitalIntensity, which may re-
sult even more economically meaningful for growth reallocation when
the recoveries are creditless. Tables below show the results obtained
using these measures as SectorCharacteristic variables instead of the
external dependence. Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense and in
the Biggs sense are always identified through the continuous version of
CreditlessMeasure.
According to Braun (2002), Tangibility is the ability of assets to serve
the role of securing access to external finance under an incomplete con-
tractual setting. The level of Tangibility for each sector is proxied by the
ratio of net property, plant and equipment over total assets. The higher
the level of Tangibility, the lower the degree of exposure of a given sec-
tor to the agency issue. If sectors with lower Tangibility perform rel-
atively worse when recoveries are creditless, this would indicate that a
process of reallocation takes place from sectors that have difficult access
to bank credit to sectors that have easy access to bank credit (i.e. high
Tangibility). This would be a clear consequence of financial frictions
affecting this type of crisis events. Table 15 shows that when consider-
ing emerging markets and creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense, the
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Table 15: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense and Tangibility
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 0.4022 -0.2585 0.3831 0.1114 -0.2624 0.4943
[0.628] [-0.608] [0.473] [0.289] [-1.021] [0.727]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17
Diff. 1.68% -0.56% 1.88% 0.38% -0.75% 2.06%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 0.3532 -0.2838 0.5833** 0.4043 -0.1364 1.1699*
[1.658] [-0.776] [2.372] [1.409] [-1.230] [1.724]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.21 0.19
Diff. 1.56% -0.76% 3.64% 1.39% -0.39% 4.88%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between real credit per capita in the
recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Tangibility
coefficient on the interaction term is positive as expected. However, co-
efficients are significantly different from zero (at the 5 or 10 percent level)
only for value added.
Table 16 shows that the coefficient on Interaction is more significant
when considering creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense. Indeed, the rel-
evance of the interaction term within the EM subsample is still higher in
table 16 than in table 15 both from a statistical and an economical point of
view. Interestingly, the differential in the growth rate is even higher con-
sidering Tangibility rather than ExternalDependence, amounting now
to about 12 percentage points (more than 17 in the limited sample).
Again, this result is not surprising. Indeed, the dependence on exter-
nal financing a` la RZ only refers to fixed capital expenditures and thus
excludes working capital. While capital expenditures are essential for
growth opportunities in the medium term, it is presumable that work-
ing capital plays a more important role in the short term. Therefore, the
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Table 16: Creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense and Tangibility
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 1.6430* 0.8471 1.8591 0.4827 0.0533 1.7818**
[1.900] [1.234] [1.519] [1.455] [0.270] [2.321]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17
Diff. 4.98% 1.64% 13.95% 1.30% 0.13% 7.21%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 1.6191*** 0.2601 2.2322*** 0.6021 -0.1843 3.1085**
[3.223] [0.387] [4.491] [1.099] [-0.949] [2.501]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.36 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.21 0.20
Diff. 4.91% 0.56% 17.55% 1.60% -0.46% 12.09%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between annual change of real credit
per capita in the recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Tangibility
measure of external dependence adopted in RZ might not necessarily be
the best exogenous characteristic to consider when we look at recover-
ies from recession episodes, although it has been the most commonly
used variable in the literature on long-run growth. Tangibility, on the
contrary, is likely to capture industries’ accessibility to inter-period and
intra-period bank credit, thus affecting the ability of industries to finance
both fixed and operating capital in periods of higher and sustained fi-
nancial frictions.
Industries also vary in terms of the intensity with which they
use alternative productive resources. In tables 17 and 18 we adopt
CapitalIntensity of each industry, i.e. the intensity with which physi-
cal capital is used for the production, as the SectorCharacteristic vari-
able. Even for this variable, we still recur to measures provided in
Braun (2002). The sign of the coefficient for the interaction term should
be positive as before. This expectation is attributable to two argu-
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Table 17: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense and Capital Intensity
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 2.5252** 0.4608 3.1897** 1.024 0.0232 2.0909*
[2.592] [0.274] [2.162] [1.503] [0.029] [1.885]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17
Diff. 1.72% 0.16% 2.55% 0.57% 0.01% 1.42%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 0.4375 -0.0678 1.2680 1.3559 0.0812 3.1367
[0.532] [-0.042] [1.037] [1.212] [0.201] [0.963]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.35 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.21 0.19
Diff. 0.31% -0.03% 1.29% 0.76% 0.04% 2.13%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between real credit per capita in the
recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Capital Intensity
ments that should reinforce one another. First of all, Tangibility and
CapitalIntensity are positively correlated (correlation is higher than 0.8)
and the ranking of the industries with respect to these characteristics
does not differ too much. Sectors that use more intensively physical
capital are also characterized by higher tangibility of assets and, then,
lower financing constraints. Secondly, when credit supply is scarce, high
physical-capital-intensive industries are likely to take advantage of the
already existing physical capital to support the production, while reduc-
ing the cost of financing for alternative inputs that typically require major
utilization of working capital, such as labor force and the relative wages.
Table 17 shows the results obtained when considering creditless re-
coveries in the Calvo sense. The coefficient on Interaction is positive as
expected, especially for emerging markets. However, results are signif-
icantly different from zero only when considering real growth in total
output rather than value added. Therefore, in this case redistributive ef-
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fects are more relevant for the level of production than for the return on
labor and capital.17
The introduction of CapitalIntensity as the SectorCharacteristic
gives additional insights, which permit to further deepen our analysis.
As stated above, industries that use more intensively physical capital
may take advantage of the existing fixed capital to support their produc-
tion during creditless recoveries. This would allow them to save on al-
ternative resources, which may require a higher intake of external fund-
ing, at least in the short term. If this is true, we should expect that em-
ployment remains relatively weaker in these industries than in the low
capital-intensive ones. This is actually what we obtain from our regres-
sions, as shown in table 18.
Table 18 replicates regressions in table 17, but now the dependent
variables are respectively employment, real wages and real GFCF. More-
over, we include here an additional control variable, ro P tR, which is
the real growth of sectoral output from the pre-crisis peak to the full re-
covery year. We expect the coefficient on ro P tR to be strictly positive
since all the dependent variables considered here are likely to move in
the same direction than total production. Actually, the coefficient is posi-
tive and strongly significant for both the DC and EM subsamples and for
all the dependent variables. For employment and real wages, it also al-
ways results lower than one, revealing that the use of labor force tends to
be less volatile than the level of production. In practice, employment and
real wages grow less than production in sectors where output growth is
positive, but they also drop less than production in sectors where it fails
to recover.
Once we control for ro P tR, a significant coefficient on Interaction
reflects an additional consequence of creditless recoveries on employ-
ment and real wages. As we can see from the results obtained within the
extended sample, the coefficient on Interaction is negative and strongly
significant. This confirms our initial hypothesis that, during creditless
17Although we do not report the results here, the coefficient on Interaction continues to
be positive and significant even when considering creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense,
but the differential effect is lower than in case of Tangibility.
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Table 18: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense and Capital Intensity: Al-
ternative dependent variables
Limited sample (CCO)
Dep.Var. Employment Real Wages Real GFCF
Sample DC EM DC EM DC EM
Interaction -0.0946 -2.0011*** -0.2486 -1.3337* 3.4657 -3.6617
[-0.083] [-3.239] [-0.217] [-1.844] [1.426] [-0.218]
ro PtR 0.5242*** 0.3448*** 0.5579*** 0.3063** 0.4862*** 0.9342**
[8.698] [3.163] [10.176] [2.762] [3.752] [2.321]
N 787 434 733 433 629 228
r2 0.71 0.60 0.75 0.59 0.25 0.64
Extended sample
Dep.Var. Employment Real Wages Real GFCF
Sample DC EM DC EM DC EM
Interaction 0.1548 -1.8699*** -0.0302 -1.1705*** -1.4332 -52.1202
[0.253] [-5.338] [-0.069] [-3.075] [-0.458] [-1.408]
ro PtR 0.4195*** 0.5616*** 0.5382*** 0.5193*** 0.9063** 1.6625***
[26.508] [5.128] [46.443] [6.717] [2.504] [3.385]
N 1973 923 1906 923 1690 650
r2 0.81 0.64 0.86 0.74 0.22 0.16
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between real credit per capita in the
recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Capital Intensity
recoveries, high capital-intensive industries tend to contain the reprise
in employment and real wages proportionally more than low capital-
intensive industries. Instead, when real GFCF is adopted as dependent
variable, the coefficients are still negative, especially for the EM subsam-
ple, but they are not significantly different from zero, reflecting highly
heterogeneous behavior during recoveries with respect to investments.
4.2.5 Recovery and relative dependence on bank credit
versus trade credit
The natural question arises whether firms are able to substitute other
forms of external finance for bank credit when credit conditions remain
122
Table 19: Recovery and relative dependence on bank credit
Calvo-type Recoveries Biggs-type Recoveries
Creditless With-Credit Creditless With-Credit
Raddatz indicator
by SECTOR
≥ 0.89 -2.1% 3.2% 0.4% 2.3%
< 0.89 1.6% 6.6% 4.3% 5.3%
Raddatz indicator
by COUNTRY
≥ 1.00 1.4% 5.2% 2.4% 5.1%
< 1.00 -1.6% 1.1% -0.6% 0.6%
For each sub-group, the cells report the median increase of real output by sector from
peak year to full recovery year.
strained for a prolonged period following downturns. In the presence
of market imperfections, other sources of external finance such as bond
and equity issuance are not perfect substitutes for bank loans. In addi-
tion, conditions are most likely to be strained in bond and equity mar-
kets following downturns as agency problems worsen in those markets
too. Trade credit may be a better viable alternative to bank credit and
other forms of market-based external finance. Therefore, we investigate
whether industries that rely more on bank credit relative to trade credit
experience lower rates of recovery.
We use data from Raddatz (2010) on the ratio of short-term debt to
payables at the country and industry level as an indicator of dependence
on bank intermediaries relative to trade credit as sources of short-term
financing. A low value for this ratio (henceforth the Raddatz Indicator)
indicates that a larger part of short term financing is obtained from trade
credit. The median ratio of bank credit to trade credit at the industry
(country) level in our extended sample is 0.89 (1.00).
Table 19 summarizes the median rate of real output growth by sector
depending on whether the Raddatz indicator at the industry or country
level is above or below the sample median. Creditless recoveries are kept
separate from recoveries with credit. Calvo-type recoveries are creditless
when ∆stock is negative (as in table 9), while Biggs-type recoveries are
creditless when ∆flows is negative (as in table 10). Again, growth rates
refer to the whole peak-to-recovery period.
In general, industries that are more dependent on bank credit as op-
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posed to trade credit seem to grow more slowly. This is the case follow-
ing any type of crisis considered here. The picture looks strikingly differ-
ent at the country level. In general, industries in countries that are more
dependent on bank credit as opposed to trade credit seem to grow more
quickly. Again, this is true across all types of crises considered here.18 At
the industry level, a higher dependence on bank credit relative to trade
credit renders firms more vulnerable to credit market disruptions during
the crisis. Therefore, industries that rely relatively more on alternative
sources of external financing, such as trade credit, may fare better during
the peak-to-recovery period. We call this effect the substitution effect.
At the country level, by contrast, a higher relative dependence on
bank credit appears to have a positive impact on growth during these
episodes. This highlights a contagion effect of trade credit, i.e. the prop-
agation of financial distress and bankruptcy through trade credit chains
during crisis episodes.19 This is also consistent with the theoretical mo-
del in Coricelli and Roland (2010), in which a higher dependence on bank
credit relative to trade credit increases the likelihood of production-chain
equilibrium. When credit markets are underdeveloped and enterprise
activity is financed by trade credit, shocks may induce a break-up of
credit and production chains, leading to sudden and sharp economic
contractions. The relative development of a banking sector can reduce
the probability of such collapses and hence plays a crucial role in soften-
ing output declines and spurring recovery.
Since trade credit may play a role in explaining the creditless charac-
ter of certain recovery episodes, we could expect the substitution effect to
be larger during creditless recoveries. Tables 20 and 21 show the results
obtained in our previous regressions when introducing the Raddatz Indi-
cator at the industry level as SectorCharacteristic variable. We should
expect negative values for the interaction term. Indeed, the higher the
importance of intermediaries versus suppliers, the lower the possibility
to recover when financial frictions restrain bank lending. Industries that
18The results are similar if we consider the product of the Raddatz Indicators at the coun-
try and industry level.
19See e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Calvo and Coricelli (1996).
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Table 20: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense: The role of trade credit
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.0640 -0.0131 -0.0966 -0.0356 0.0299 -0.0988
[-0.887] [-0.111] [-1.065] [-0.736] [0.488] [-0.788]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17
Diff. -0.64% -0.07% -1.13% -0.29% 0.20% -0.98%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction 0.0358 0.0604 0.0114 -0.0783 -0.0079 -0.1066
[0.519] [0.730] [0.134] [-0.831] [-0.284] [-0.408]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.35 0.25 0.42 0.19 0.21 0.19
Diff. 0.38% 0.39% 0.17% -0.64% -0.05% -1.06%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between real credit per capita in the
recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Short-Term Debt to Trade
Credit
rely relatively more on bank credit are therefore at a stronger disadvan-
tage during creditless recoveries.
The results show that coefficients on Interaction are not significantly
different from zero when considering creditless recoveries in the Calvo
sense (table 20) while negative and significant results are obtained when
considering creditless recoveries a` la Biggs (table 21).
This result is not easy to interpret, because trade credit is especially
important for short-term financing and then we could expect significant
values even in case of creditless recoveries a` la Calvo. In addition, signif-
icant values in the limited sample are obtained for developed countries
when we look at total output as the dependent variable, but only for
emerging markets when we consider value added. Although the sign
tends to be negative as expected, these conflicting results lead us to post-
pone definitive conclusions on the stronger effects associated with trade
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Table 21: Creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense: The role of trade credit
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.2066 -0.3090*** -0.1769 -0.1388* -0.0987 -0.2443
[-1.563] [-3.131] [-0.951] [-1.785] [-1.318] [-1.452]
N 1234 786 448 2959 2003 956
r2 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17
Diff. -1.49% -1.42% -3.16% -0.89% -0.57% -2.36%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.2825** -0.0918 -0.3575** -0.2702* -0.1239 -0.6887*
[-2.196] [-0.818] [-2.158] [-1.803] [-1.073] [-1.907]
N 1160 767 393 2859 1986 873
r2 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.21 0.19
Diff. -2.04% -0.47% -6.70% -1.71% -0.74% -6.39%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between annual change of real credit
per capita in the recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Short-Term
Debt to Trade Credit
credit during creditless recoveries.
In part II of this chapter (section 4.3) we will possibly reinforce our
final judgment with an analysis carried out on data at the firm level.
4.2.6 Further considerations on control and instrumental
variables
We tried to include additional control variables to our regressions in or-
der to check whether the estimated coefficients are biased by the omis-
sion of some significant variable which summarize additional structural
features of sectors in each country and which is possibly correlated with
our interaction term.
One possible control variable is the average growth of the dependent
variable in sector s during the three years preceding the peak of each
episode e, hereinafter indicated as Precr grs,e. Indeed, we should ex-
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Table 22: Creditless recoveries in the Calvo sense and Dependence on Ex-
ternal Finance: Alternative
Dep:Output Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.3909** 0.1683 -0.5239*** -0.1900 0.0889 -0.5379***
[-2.506] [1.001] [-3.032] [-1.249] [0.662] [-3.361]
Precr gr -0.3734 -0.0075 -0.5364 -0.4707*** -0.0407 -0.7294***
[-1.402] [-0.056] [-1.253] [-2.825] [-0.365] [-3.018]
N 1178 786 392 2852 2002 850
r2 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.18
Diff. -2.78% 0.61% -5.52% -1.10% 0.43% -3.33%
Dep:VA Limited sample (CCO) Extended sample
Sample Full DC EM Full DC EM
Interaction -0.1761** 0.1180 -0.2038** -0.0600 0.1129 -0.3286**
[-2.055] [1.206] [-2.259] [-0.515] [1.019] [-2.089]
Precr gr -0.3041* -0.1389 -0.3380 -0.2110 -0.0434** -0.7445***
[-1.908] [-0.817] [-1.647] [-1.516] [-2.222] [-4.226]
N 1106 767 339 2746 1984 762
r2 0.35 0.25 0.42 0.18 0.21 0.20
Diff. -1.31% 0.54% -2.15% -0.35% 0.55% -2.15%
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Cluster-robust t statistics in brackets, after clustering by recession episode. The set of
dummies includes fixed effects by industry and by recession episode (coefficients not
reported). CreditlessMeasure = difference (-) between real credit per capita in the
recovery year and the peak year. SectorCharacteristic = Dependence on external
finance from RZ(1998)
pect that in the peak-to-recovery period the relevant variable tends to
increase relatively less in sectors whose growth was higher during the
pre-crisis period. This may indicate that sectors showing a larger and
more sustained trend during the pre-recession period are subject to some
significant correction as a consequence of the crisis. If high Precr gr re-
veals capacity utilization well above the long-term equilibrium, then a
negative sign of the coefficient may just signal the tendency to a natural
adjustment during the peak-to-recovery episode. Among other things,
this variable may actually help to distinguish industries that are more
pro-cyclical in the demand of their goods from industries that are less
volatile.
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For the sake of simplicity, we only report table 22 which replicates
the regressions in table 12 with the addition of our new control variable.
The coefficient on Precr gr results to be negative as expected, while the
coefficient on Interaction remains substantially unchanged with respect
to baseline regressions. Although not reported here, this evidence is con-
firmed for all the other regressions. The inclusion of the new variable
does not alter the results discussed above.
For completeness, instead of Precr gr, we also tried to use an alterna-
tive control variable, i.e. V olatilitys,c. This variable is nothing more than
the standard deviation of the annual rate of real growth of each depen-
dent variable, measured by sector s within each country c. This proxy
is obtained by our own computations on the UNIDO dataset. Once in-
troduced the V olatility variable in additional regressions, the relative
coefficient results to be not significantly different from zero and, again,
we do not obtain relevant changes with respect to the interaction term.
Finally, a major concern associated with the OLS estimates is the pos-
sibility that CreditWeakness, the continuous measure of credit recovery,
is endogenous to the dependent variable. For example, relative higher
growth of sectors that typically demand more bank credit for their ac-
tivity could induce a stronger recovery in credit. The cause-effect rela-
tionship would be reversed compared to the one we want to analyze.
To address this issue, we also tried to use an instrumental variables (IV)
estimation strategy to identify the exogenous effect of CreditWeakness
interacted with SectorCharacteristic on the dependent variable. One
possible candidate as an instrumental variable could be a measure that
captures credit market outcomes prior to the recession episode, as is typ-
ically done in the literature to predict financial crises.20 Specifically, we
use the interaction between SectorCharacteristics and Credit at Peake
as an instrument for the Interaction variable, where Credit at Peake is
the cyclical component of real credit per capita at the output peak of each
specific episode e.
The coefficient on Interaction in our IV estimations tends to have the
same sign than in OLS regressions and very often it is also higher in ab-
20See e.g. Calvo et al (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Gourinchas et al (2001).
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solute values. Unfortunately, estimates generally result not significant.
On the one hand, we suspect that the reason for insignificant coefficients
is largely due to the loss of efficiency that is attached to the IV estima-
tor and to the use of an instrument for Interaction which results to be
very weak. On the other hand, we also have to consider that the endo-
geneity bias is reduced for the OLS estimator when the potentially en-
dogenous regressor (CreditWeakness in our case) is interacted with an
exogenous covariate (SectorCharacteristic). Indeed, recent econometri-
cal works demonstrated that the OLS estimator of the interaction term
is still consistent and asymptotically normal, and standard inference can
be applied, under reasonable conditions regarding higher-order depen-
dencies in the data.21 It should be noted, however, that this consistency
is restricted to the coefficient on the interaction term only and not to the
full marginal effect of the endogenous regressor. Since the main empir-
ical result in our specification only depends on the interaction variable,
we can assign significant relevance to the OLS inference without having
to resort to instrumental variables techniques. In other words, we have
the remarkable fact that since the economic variable of interest is the in-
teraction term, we do not necessarily have to resort to IV estimators, es-
pecially when it is particularly difficult to find suitable instruments in
terms of strength and exogeneity.
4.2.7 Concluding remarks
The “Great Recession” that started in 2007 has generated renewed inter-
est in the role of credit in shaping economic recoveries, in particular the
question of how prolonged credit market disruptions may affect the pace
of economic growth in the aftermath of the crisis. The existing literature
on credit and economic recoveries is dominated by the study of creditless
recoveries, a phenomenon whereby economic activity recovers in the ab-
sence of credit growth. In part I of this chapter, we investigated the role
of credit in shaping economic recoveries and tried to shed some light on
the phenomenon of creditless recoveries using industry-level data for a
21See, in particular, Bun and Harrison (2014).
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large sample of peak-to-recovery episodes.
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, we identify two types of
creditless recoveries, namely episodes during which GDP per capita re-
covers without an increase in the credit stock (creditless recoveries in the
Calvo sense) and episodes during which GDP per capita recovers with-
out an increase in credit flows (creditless recoveries in the Biggs sense).
Both types of creditless recoveries are not rare events. However, our re-
sults highlight an important difference between those two types of cred-
itless recoveries. Creditless recoveries a` la Calvo are associated with rela-
tively larger drops in GDP per capita during the recession phase. This
is consistent with arguments on the existence of a bounce-back effect
among the determinants of creditless recoveries.
Second, we find that industries that are more dependent on external
finance have a worse relative performance when recoveries are classi-
fied as creditless, but this result only applies to emerging markets. This
suggests that in developed countries certain mechanisms enable the ex-
ternal dependent industries to grow despite the creditless character of
recovery. These mechanisms may include an improved and easier sub-
stitutability among alternative sources of financing (such as the issuance
of tradable bonds and equity). In addition, redistributive effects among
industries are at work especially during creditless recoveries in the Biggs
sense. This can be explained by the fact that the dependence on external
financing refers to investments in fixed capital, which typically involve
intertemporal rather than intra-period credit.
However, the dependence on external financing is not the only sector
characteristic that induces a reallocation of growth among different sec-
tors during creditless recoveries. The different accessibility to bank loans
(Tangibility) is also at work. The more credit supply is constrained dur-
ing the recovery, the higher is the reallocation toward sectors that posses
collateral associated with tangible assets, defined as intrinsic collateral in
Calvo (2011). Moreover, we highlight a relatively better performance of
industries that can intensify the use of physical capital already available
rather than productive inputs requiring additional funding, such as la-
bor. In particular, we find that in these industries the reprise in employ-
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ment and real wages remains proportionally weaker than the reprise in
output during creditless recoveries. This result, which seems to confirm
a partial redistribution of productive inputs from labor to capital, is ab-
solutely relevant, since it constitutes a potential connection between our
analysis of creditless recoveries and the existing literature on jobless and
wageless recoveries. Interestingly, in this case, it is precisely the defini-
tion of creditless recovery a` la Calvo to have a greater relevance.
Finally, we find that industries that are relatively more dependent on
trade credit as opposed to bank credit recover more quickly. At the in-
dustry level, a higher dependence on bank credit relative to trade credit
renders firms more vulnerable during the peak-to-recovery episode (sub-
stitution effect). At the country level, by contrast, a higher relative depen-
dence on bank credit appears to have a positive impact on growth during
recoveries (contagion effect). This suggests the existence of a propagation
of financial distress and bankruptcy through trade credit chains during
crisis episodes. According to our estimations, the availability of alterna-
tive sources of financing such as trade credit could favor some industries
at the expense of others especially when the recovery is creditless. In this
case, the reallocation process would depend neither on the dependence
on external finance nor on the accessibility to bank credit, but rather on
the accessibility to an alternative source of financing. However, further
analyses at the firm level are needed to better discern the effects associ-
ated with trade credit during creditless recoveries. Among other things,
in part II (section 4.3) of this chapter we just try to shed further light on
this.
There is a large scope for further research into the role of credit in
shaping economic recoveries. In particular, our work highlights two
important issues that may warrant further investigation. First, addi-
tional work is needed to empirically distinguish the mechanisms that
enable economic activity to recover in the absence of credit growth. Sec-
ond, supplementary research could try to shed some further light on the
distinction between creditless recoveries in the Calvo and Biggs sense.
These two types of creditless recoveries seem to be two separate phe-
nomena, with a differential impact on growth.
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4.3 Part II
4.3.1 Introduction
In part II we analyze data available at the enterprise level for the Eu-
ropean countries with particular reference to the period from 2003 to
2011, so capturing the recent global financial crisis and the early recovery
years, but excluding the double-dip recessions that hit several economies
after 2011. Since real GDP of several European countries had not yet fully
recovered to pre-recession levels by 2011, it is not possible to mark the
last year of each recovery episode by identifying the full-recovery point
as in part I of this chapter. Thus, in part II we do not work on peak-to-
recovery growth rates but rather on year after year observations, after
differentiating among three periods: pre-recession, recession (from peak
to trough) and recovery (after the trough).
As in part I of this chapter, the objective is to analyze the real redistri-
butional effects of recessions and recoveries among firms and industries
with specific characteristics. But unlike the previous analysis, we focus
here on the heterogeneity existing across countries within a same single
period of generalized crisis. In particular, the regressions we introduce
aim to differentiate country-level episodes according to the weakness of
bank credit during recovery years. Firm level data extracted from the
AMADEUS dataset allow in-depth analysis of the behavior of individual
companies in countries that are experiencing different degrees of finan-
cial frictions.
As already noted in part I, dependence on external finance is not the
only characteristic that induce a reallocation of growth among different
sectors as a result of impaired financial intermediation.22 In this context,
indeed, we are not so much interested in the long-term impact of finan-
cial development on real growth but rather in the short-term impact of
financial shocks on output fluctuations. In the short run, firms’ reliance
on credit can be of two types. On the one hand, it can be due to some
technological characteristics that make some industries more vulnerable
22See also the model presented in chapter 3.
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in their productive capacity when credit is not available (supply channel
of transmission). On the other hand, reliance on credit can be due to
the lower demand of goods that are typically purchased with the help
of external financing, such as investment or intermediate goods (demand
channel of transmission). In the first case, companies performing worse
are those more dependent on credit to finance investments in fixed cap-
ital or their current spending on productive inputs. By contrast, in the
second case, companies performing worse are those selling a dispropor-
tionate share of their output for gross fixed capital formation uses or in-
termediate consumption uses. For this reason, it is particularly appealing
to understand how far credit can induce output fluctuations through the
demand channel rather than the supply channel. The AMADEUS dataset
is particularly useful to this end. Indeed, while the UNIDO database
contains data only for industries in the manufacturing sector, a wider
range of sectors is covered in the AMADEUS dataset. This allows the
researcher to usefully focus on a broader and more heterogeneous spec-
trum of companies with respect to the type of goods and services they
produce. Indeed, it is just looking at the relative production line position
of each company that we can test the extent to which bank credit lim-
its firms’ growth by reducing the demand for goods they produce rather
than constraining their production capacity.
Finally, we want to use firm-level data in order to further analyze
whether industries that are relatively more dependent on trade credit
as opposed to bank credit recover relatively faster when credit market
disruptions are prolonged in the aftermath of a crisis. Again, we try to
compare this potential substitution effect with the existence of a contagion
effect of opposite sign. The latter catches the fact that trade credit chains
may accelerate the propagation of financial distress and negatively affect
growth of firms which recur more extensively to this source of financing.
Part II is structured as follows. In section 4.3.2, we describe the ad-
vantages of a firm-level analysis. In section 4.3.3 we present a baseline
specification for our regressions, while in section 4.3.4 we introduce fully
specified regressions by distinguishing the different types of recovery
in accordance to the weakness of bank credit. In section 4.3.5, we deal
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with the measurement of sector characteristics that will prove useful for
our estimates, such as the dependence on external finance, the liquidity
needs and the production line position. In sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 we dis-
cuss about the results of our regression analyses. In the end, section 4.3.8
is dedicated to summary conclusions.
4.3.2 Evidence from firm-level data
Relevant data at the firm level are obtained from AMADEUS in both ad-
vanced and emerging European countries during the period 2003-2011.
Not considering the years after 2011 limits problems associated with
double-dip recessions and also with the delay of some countries in re-
leasing data for AMADEUS. Data collection and cleaning required time
and huge effort but allow us to work on a considerable number of obser-
vations within a broad spectrum of countries.23 The availability of data at
the enterprise level offers several advantages. First of all, as we shall see
in section 4.3.5, it enables us to recalculate sector characteristics, such as
external dependence, based on a more recent period than the analysis of
Rajan and Zingales (1998) (henceforth RZ) and on a subset of developed
European countries that represents a more credible benchmark than the
United States for the rest of Europe.24 Secondly, as noted in Braun and
Larrain (2005), one benefit of using firm-level as opposed to industry-
level data is that aggregate fluctuations can be thought to be less endoge-
nous to firm-specific shocks than to industry-specific ones. Indeed, it is
reasonable to assume that recessions are exogenous to each firm given its
small weight with respect to the whole economy. The same assumption
is stronger when considering industry-level fluctuations, given the small
number of sectors that can be considered. Creditless recoveries may be
actually triggered by industry-specific shocks that propagate throughout
the economy either through their effect on aggregate demand or via pro-
23See Appendix A for details on the firm-level database AMADEUS.
24While it is true that exogenous sectoral characteristics need to be estimated within
countries where financial frictions are sufficiently reduced (as shown in part I), it is also
true that many previous research works are likely to be based on U.S. benchmarks only
because no data are readily available for other countries.
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duction linkages. This creates problems in regressions if the origins of
creditless recoveries are rooted in shocks to the same group of industries
that happened to be more dependent on external finance.
The AMADEUS database has additional positive attributes. As men-
tioned above, it covers all industries of an economy and not only manu-
facturing firms. Moreover, it is not limited to public quoted companies
but instead covers a very large number of non-listed firms. Since listed
firms are generally much larger, older and have direct access to financial
markets, their dependence on external finance may be different from the
average firm. In support of our considerations, even Klapper et al (2006)
show that data extrapolated from AMADEUS actually provide a fairly
representative overview of economic activity in European countries.
4.3.3 Methodology and empirical approach: Baseline re-
gression
As in part I of this chapter, we use a difference-in-differences approach
to identify causal links between credit growth and output performance.
If creditless recoveries are determined by frictions in financial intermedi-
ation, then they should negatively affect, above all, firms that rely more
heavily, either by demand or by supply channel, on a proper function-
ing of the bank credit market. To provide a benchmark, as in Abiad et al
(2011), we start by looking at the relative performance of different sectors
during all recoveries, irrespective of credit conditions. Our benchmark
specification is the following:
Growthi,t
= α · lnSizei,t−1
+ β1 ·Recessionc,t +
m∑
j=2
βj · (Recessionc,t · SectorCharacteristicj,s)
+ γ1 ·Recoveryc,t +
m∑
j=2
γj · (Recoveryc,t · SectorCharacteristicj,s)
+ γm+1 · (Recoveryc,t ·OutputLossi) +
∑
i
δi · di + εi,t (4.2)
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where i, s, c, t denote firm, sector, country and year respectively. The
dependent variable, Growth, is the output performance of firm i at time
t proxied with the real growth rate of OperatingRevenues (Turnover).
Real figures are obtained dividing all nominal figures by the country’s
deflator.25
Regressors include fixed effects at the firm level, denoted by letter d.
Since we have data at the firm level, a significant component of turnover
growth is probably due to firm characteristics. In addition, since firm
fixed effects are nested within country and industry clusters, we do not
need to specify country-specific and industry-specific fixed effects. By
means of firm-specific fixed effects we indirectly control also for charac-
teristics that are specific to either an industry or a country, as well as for
characteristics that are specific to an industry when located in different
countries, i.e. industry-country interaction effects, as long as these are
persistent in time.
Instead, the country-year components of growth are considered
through specific episode dummies that vary depending on whether the
country at time t is experiencing a recession (Recession dummy equal to
one), a recovery (Recovery dummy equal to one) or it is going through
years of normal growth (both Recession and Recovery equal to zero). We
identify recessions by country as those years with a negative growth in
real GDP, while recoveries by country coincide with years of positive
growth following the recession. This excludes Poland from the recession
and recovery episodes because it didn’t experience any recession during
the last financial crisis. And it also excludes Greece and Croatia from
recovery episodes because their growth remained negative within the
2010-2011 period. The Recession and Recovery dummies capture a time-
country aspect, identifying the overall state of each economy at time t.
But the main variables of interest in the regression are the industry-
country-year components of growth, which will permit us to assess the
actual existence of redistributional effects during recession and recov-
ery episodes. These components are represented by interaction terms
25For all countries, GDP deflator data are from the IMF IFS (line 99), with integrations
from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO).
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obtained as the products of peculiar characteristics j of each sector s,
SectorCharacteristicj,s, and the episode dummies for year t and country
c.
As we can see, the specification that we run for our baseline regres-
sion is perfectly symmetric for recession and recovery episodes with
respect to these interaction terms. The summation symbol for the in-
teraction terms indicates that we can include (and in fact we do in-
clude) more than one sectoral characteristic j at one time. In sec-
tion 4.3.5, we describe exhaustively which variables are considered as
SectorCharacteristic and how they are measured within our sample.
The measures representing sectoral characteristics are assumed to be con-
stant across years and are included in the regressions as differences with
respect to their average values within the sample. Thus, coefficients β1
and γ1 on the episode dummies refer to companies with average values
of SectorCharacteristic. Instead, coefficients β1 and γ1 on the interac-
tion terms allow us to understand what happens during recession and
recovery years in industries that deviate positively or negatively with
respect to these average values.
By controlling for firm-specific effects and introducing the interac-
tion terms, we significantly reduce the concerns about potential relevant
omitted variables. The reason is that, in presence of fixed effects, the re-
sults could only be biased by an omitted variable that varied through
years (and through the interaction of year by firm) and, at the same
time, was correlated with our variable of interest, i.e. the interaction of
SectorCharacteristic with the episode dummies. This is clearly less plau-
sible than having omitted variables correlated with relevant measures at
the country level, as typically occurs in biased cross-country regressions.
However, as we can see from the specification reported above, we also
control for two additional variables that may constitute relevant firm-
year components of growth, i.e. OutputLossi and lnSizei,t−1.
OutputLossi is the fall in real output at the firm level during the years
of recession. In firms where production has fallen more, it is likely to ob-
serve a more significant bounce-back effect during the recovery period,
substantiated by a reprise in firms’ capacity utilization. Since output de-
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cline during the recession phase may help to explain growth in recovery
years,OutputLossi is interacted with theRecovery dummy. By introduc-
ing this additional control variable, we isolate that part of higher growth
during the recovery years that is due to the utilization of greater idle ca-
pacity. This arrangement will result useful even in section 4.3.4, where
we introduce a measure of bank credit weakness as additional regressor.
Indeed, the utilization of existing productive capacity does not re-
quire the availability of large external funding and, thus, it fosters a com-
ponent of growth that is independent from persistent weakness in credit
supply. Then, the omission of OutputLossi from our specification may
result in biased estimates.
Secondly, we also include an index for the size of firm i at time
t − 1, lnSizei,t−1, to account for convergence effects, i.e. the tendency of
smaller firms to experience higher growth in their assets and turnover.
lnSizei,t−1 is the lagged value of TotalAssets of firm i, expressed in nat-
ural logarithms. Note that lnSize is not actually captured by fixed effects
because it is not built as a time-invariant measure.
4.3.4 Methodology and empirical approach: Fully speci-
fied regression
If financial conditions play an important role on aggregate cyclical be-
havior, one expects the response to negative shocks to depend on some
peculiar firm or industry characteristics, such as the agents reliance on fi-
nancial markets. When considering dependence on external finance, we
should presumably obtain, as in part I, that industries more dependent
on external finance suffer relatively more than other industries when im-
paired credit affects the recovery. Indeed, firms in less dependent indus-
tries should be able to dampen the reduction in production thanks to the
higher availability of internal funds.
Our baseline regression in section 4.3.3 is irrespective of credit condi-
tions. In the following specification, on the contrary, we allow the coeffi-
cients on recoveries to change depending on the weakness of bank credit
in order to make a distinction between the different types of recovery.
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The new specification can be represented as follows:
Growthi,t
= α · lnSizei,t−1
+ β1 ·Recessionc,t +
m∑
j=2
βj · (Recessionc,t · SectorCharacteristicj,s)
+ γ1 ·Recoveryc,t +
m∑
j=2
γj · (Recoveryc,t · SectorCharacteristicj,s)
+ γm+1 · (Recoveryc,t ·OutputLossi)
+ λ1 · ClessRecvc,t +
m∑
j=2
λj · (ClessRecvc,t · SectorCharacteristicj,s)
+
∑
i
δi · di + εi,t (4.3)
where ClessRecv is the interaction between the Recovery dummy and a
CreditWeakness variable, which defines how much a recovery is credit-
less. To explore a continuous measure of CreditWeakness we consider
the inverse of the cumulative growth in real PrivateCredit by country
during the recovery period 2010-2011, where PrivateCredit is obtained
as indicated in chapter 2. Higher values of CreditWeakness indicate
larger decreases in private credit and constitute the signal of a recovery
more markedly creditless. This measure should provide a sufficiently ac-
curate information on the crediltess-ness of the recovery with respect to
the use of a simple dummy of creditless recovery.Abiad et al (2011), for
example, simply define a creditless recovery as one in which the growth
rate of real bank credit is zero or negative in the first three years of recov-
ery.
The coefficients of prime interest here are those on the interactions
between SectorCharacteristic variables and ClessRecv. As well as the
SectorCharacteristic variables, even CreditWeakness is expressed as
the difference with respect to its average value within the sample. Thus,
the coefficients γ refers to recovery episodes characterized by average
values of CreditWeakness. Instead, the coefficients λ allow us to under-
stand what happens during episodes that deviate positively (creditless re-
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coveries) or negatively (credit-with recoveries) with respect to these average
values.
4.3.5 Description and measurement of sector characteris-
tics
Before moving on to illustrate the results of our estimations, we use this
section to present the SectorCharacteristic variables that will prove use-
ful for our specifications and we also describe their measurement within
our dataset.
Financial dependence. As in part I of this chapter, the first sector char-
acteristic that we take into consideration is the dependence on external
finance, which allows a direct comparison with the RZ model. Then, we
need to rank industries according to an index of external financial de-
pendence, ExtDep, in order to identify which agents are more or less
financially constrained. Several authors, as well as our analysis in part I,
directly recur to the variable constructed by RZ, considering it suitable as
a reliable indicator for their estimations. Here, on the contrary, we follow
an independent methodology and make use of AMADEUS data at our
disposal to recompute a new measure of external dependence. So doing,
we obtain an indicator which covers a wider range of industries with re-
spect to RZ, which circumscribe the analysis to manufacturing sectors,
and referring to a more recent period. Indeed, the new measure is based
on observations of European firms over the pre-crisis period 2003-2007.
The choice of a sufficiently short period, which comes immediately be-
fore the crisis, serves to assure that production technology do not change
within the period analyzed. In the short run, the degree of financial de-
pendence by sector can be reasonably assumed to be constant over the
years considered.
Despite the adoption of an autonomous methodology, the working
assumption is still the same adopted in RZ and reported in part I. Only
technological reasons justify the differences in external dependence of
individual industries. RZ recur to U.S. firms since the choice of a finan-
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cially developed country to act as benchmark should avoid the prob-
lem of identification between the demand for external funds and its sup-
ply. The higher the financial development in the reference country, the
fewer are the restrictions on access to the supply of financing, which is
exactly what we want to measure. Following a similar argument, we
use countries in Northwestern Europe26 to act as benchmark within our
dataset. Excluding Southwestern Europe and Central-Eastern Europe
should help to avoid the problems of identification aforementioned.27
At the same time, the simultaneous inclusion of bank-based economies,
such as France, and market-based economies, such as the United King-
dom, is useful to capture some different aspects of financial dependence.
One clear advantage of using the AMADEUS database is the wide
coverage of countries and firms. One disadvantage is that fewer data
items are available for each firm with respect to the COMPUSTAT dataset
used by RZ. This precludes us from measuring our index of financial de-
pendence as the share of capital expenditures that is not financed from
cash flow from operations, as in its original version. Alternatively, we
proxy financial dependence by means of balance sheet data, recurring to
the Debt to Total Capital ratio. In line with other EU industry studies such
as de Guevara and Maudos (2009) and Inklaar and Koetter (2008), we ex-
clude accounts payable, i.e. trade debt, from both the numerator and the
denominator of the ratio because they do not relate to borrowing from
the financial sector. Accrual liabilities are also excluded from this defi-
nition of debt. Then, the numerator can be expressed as Interest Bearing
Debt, obtainable in AMADEUS dataset by the sum of Non Current Liabil-
ities and Current Liabilities: Loans. The denominator can be expressed as
the sum of Stockholders’ Equity and Interest Bearing Debt, obtainable as To-
tal Assets net of Current Liabilities: Creditors and Current Liabilities: Other
Current Liabilities. The higher the Debt to Total Capital ratio, the more
the company is financing its operations with debt compared to internal
funds. For each firm in Northwestern Europe with positive debt, we take
26See Appendix A for the list of countries belonging to each geographical subgroup.
27However, we have also verified that industry ranking remains broadly the same once
we include all the countries of our dataset for computing the external dependence by sector.
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the median ratio over the pre-crisis years 2003-2007. Then we regress the
values so obtained for the individual Sector dummies and we interpret
the relative coefficients as the degree of financial dependence of each in-
dustry.
Furstenberg and Kalckreuth (2006) raise the issue that young and
small firms have different dependence on external finance. Thus, in or-
der to better isolate the systematic between-industry component of the
dependence on external finance, we also control for Size Class, Age Class,
Country and Quoted Company dummies. Underlying these calculations
are 664,559 firm observations. Firms are divided into four size classes
(Micro, Small, Medium, Large) according to their turnover, total assets and
the number of employees. The partition into age classes is obtained by
dividing the sample in five quintiles by age. The variable Quoted Com-
pany takes the value of one if a company is listed on a Stock Exchange and
zero otherwise.28 Then, following this approach, we are able to identify
those factors other than technological reasons that affect the amount of
financing obtained by any single firm. OLS regressions confirm that co-
efficients on Country dummies are significantly different from each other,
notwithstanding the regression is restricted to countries in Northwestern
Europe. This can be due, in part, to a difference in financial restrictions
existing within each country and, in part, to different criteria by coun-
try that the companies should satisfy to be included in the AMADEUS
dataset. This may shape the distribution of firms with respect to charac-
teristics that affect financing needs or the access to finance. In addition,
the coefficients on dummy variables tend to be higher in the case of large
firms, as these are less restricted in their access to external finance than
others of smaller size. Larger companies are likely to have also accumu-
lated a higher level of debt just to increase their size in earlier periods.
According to our estimations the Debt to Total Capital ratio tends to be,
ceteris paribus, nearly 8 percentage points higher in large companies than
in micro firms. We also obtain that the coefficients are lower for quoted
companies than for unlisted companies by about 7.5 percentage points
and that they significantly decrease when we move from younger firms
28See Appendix A for additional information.
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Table 23: Industry Ranking by External Financing needs (ExtDep)
Accommodation 0.139 Manuf. of Chemical Products -0.029
Food and Beverage Service Activ. 0.127 Manuf. of Textiles -0.030
Real Estate Activities 0.124 Repair of Computers and Other Goods -0.031
Manuf. of Food Products 0.112 Manuf. of Machinery and Equipment -0.037
Rental and Leasing Activities 0.083 Manuf. of Basic Metals -0.038
Veterinary Activities 0.073 Wholesale Trade, excl. Motor Vehicles -0.041
Manuf. of Beverages 0.067 Office Administrative, Office Support -0.045
Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles 0.054 Manuf. of Pharmaceutical Preparations -0.050
Air Transport 0.053 Manuf. of Wearing Apparel -0.050
Retail Trade, excl. Motor Vehicles 0.053 Manuf. of Tobacco Products -0.051
Manuf. of Coke and Petroleum Pr. 0.045 Legal and Accounting Activities -0.053
Land Transport and Via Pipelines 0.036 Manuf. of Electrical Equipment -0.057
Manuf. of Wood; Products of Wood 0.032 Manuf. Of Electronic and Optical Pr. -0.058
Water Transport 0.031 Specialised Construction Activities -0.061
Printing and Recorded Media 0.015 Repair and Installation of Machinery -0.062
Construction of Buildings 0.008 Motion Picture, Sound Recording -0.069
Manuf. of Non-Metallic Mineral Pr. 0.006 Travel Agency and Related Activities -0.075
Manuf. of Furniture 0.001 Other Professional & Scientific Activ. -0.078
Manuf. of Paper and Paper Products 0.000 Telecommunications -0.086
Civil Engineering -0.001 Programming and Broadcasting Activ. -0.087
Manuf. of Motor Vehicles -0.008 Publishing Activities -0.087
Manuf. of Other Transport Equip. -0.008 Security and Investigation Activities -0.096
Manuf. of Rubber and Plastic Prod. -0.015 Architectural and Engineering Activ. -0.104
Manuf. of Fabricated Metal Products -0.020 Advertising and Market Research -0.107
Warehousing & Support Activities -0.021 Employment Activities -0.109
Other Manufacturing -0.022 Information Service Activities -0.110
Services to Buildings and Landscape -0.027 Scientific Research and Development -0.113
Manuf. of Leather and Related Prod. -0.027 Activity of Head Offices & Consult. -0.118
Postal and Courier Activities -0.029 Computer Programming & Consult. -0.143
to older enterprises. The coefficient on the fifth quintile by firm age is 18.5
percentage points lower that the coefficient on the first quintile. These re-
sults are mainly attributable to credit demand. Indeed, both older firms
and quoted companies rely less pressingly on bank lending, since the for-
mer may have accumulated a larger share of retained earnings over time
and the latter may substitute more easily bank credit with equity.
Finally, table 23 shows the coefficients estimated for the Sector dum-
mies after controlling for the additional variables aforementioned. In
this way, we just obtained an industry ranking by dependence on exter-
nal financing, that we indicate with the notation ExtDep. Coefficients
are reported as differences with respect to their average values within
the sample. The Accommodation sector presents the highest level of ex-
ternal dependence, followed by Food and Beverage Service Activities and
Real Estate Activities, while at the opposite extreme we find information
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and communication activities (such as Computer Programming and Infor-
mation Service Activities) as well as professional, scientific and technical
activities.
Liquidity needs. The RZ measure of external dependence is mainly
aimed at capturing a firm’s long-run requirements for external funds as a
source of physical capital formation. This does not exhaust our research
interest. In fact, we also want to emphasize the needs of an industry for
liquid funds as the main determinant of its vulnerability to financial con-
ditions in the short run. Similarly to Raddatz (2006), we need to rank
industries according to an index of Liquidity Needs, in order to identify
which agents are more intensely constrained by short-run external liq-
uidity dependence. Liquidity needs, as much as financial dependence,
are considered to be industry specific (depending, for example, on the
length of the production process and the mode of operation) and invari-
ant across countries. The ongoing amount of liquid funds that a firm
invests to finance its operations corresponds to the economic concept of
working capital. Firms in industries that require relatively large amounts
of working capital will typically be more dependent on the availability
of liquid funds. Again, balance sheet data from AMADEUS dataset do
not provide exact information on this item. But a proxy for the relative
importance of external liquid funds can be obtained by looking at the
ratio of Current Liabilities: Loans to Operating Revenues (Turnover), which
captures the ability of a firm to pay its current liabilities with ongoing
income. The higher the ratio, the larger is the need of external funds for
liquidity purposes.
As in the measurement of external dependence, we take the median
ratio for each firm in Northwestern Europe with positive numerator over
the pre-crisis years 2003-2007. Then we regress data per firm so ob-
tained with respect to the same dummies mentioned above. Underly-
ing these calculations are 486,652 firm observations. Coefficients on the
Sector dummies give us the desired industry ranking by liquidity needs,
which we indicate with the notationLiqNeeds. Table 24 shows the coeffi-
cients rescaled as differences with respect to their average values within
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Table 24: Industry Ranking by Liquidity needs (LiqNeeds)
Real Estate Activities 0.096 Retail Trade, excl. Motor Vehicles -0.011
Accommodation 0.065 Manuf. of Rubber and Plastic Prod. -0.012
Manuf. of Beverages 0.061 Manuf. of Wood; Products of Wood -0.013
Water Transport 0.060 Land Transport and Via Pipelines -0.014
Rental and Leasing Activities 0.060 Warehousing & Support Activities -0.014
Construction of Buildings 0.031 Manuf. of Motor Vehicles -0.014
Food and Beverage Service Activities 0.024 Manuf. of Machinery and Equipment -0.016
Manuf. of Pharmaceutical Preparat. 0.017 Manuf. of Leather and Related Prod. -0.017
Manuf. of Tobacco Products 0.016 Manuf. of Electrical Equipment -0.017
Scientific Research and Development 0.016 Veterinary Activities -0.018
Manuf. of Food Products 0.014 Printing and Recorded Media -0.018
Air Transport 0.012 Information Service Activities -0.018
Manuf. of Coke and Petroleum Pr. 0.011 Telecommunications -0.018
Motion Picture, Sound Recording 0.009 Other Professional & Scientific Activ. -0.019
Manuf. of Chemical Products 0.006 Manuf. of Fabricated Metal Products -0.020
Programming and Broadcasting Activ. 0.000 Manuf. of Furniture -0.022
Legal and Accounting Activities -0.001 Services to Buildings and Landscape -0.022
Civil Engineering -0.001 Wholesale Trade, excl. Motor Vehicles -0.022
Manuf. of Other Transport Equipment -0.001 Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles -0.025
Manuf. of Paper and Paper Products -0.005 Architectural and Engineering Activ. -0.026
Manuf. Of Electronic and Optical Pr. -0.005 Repair of Computers and Oth. Goods -0.028
Publishing Activities -0.006 Repair and Installation of Machinery -0.031
Office Administrative, Office Support -0.006 Travel Agency and Related Activities -0.034
Manuf. of Textiles -0.006 Computer Programming & Consult. -0.037
Other Manufacturing -0.007 Postal and Courier Activities -0.037
Manuf. of Wearing Apparel -0.007 Advertising and Market Research -0.038
Activity of Head Offices & Consult. -0.007 Specialised Construction Activities -0.042
Manuf. of Non-Metallic Mineral Pr. -0.010 Security and Investigation Activities -0.045
Manuf. of Basic Metals -0.011 Employment Activities -0.051
the sample. As we could expect, External Dependence and Liquidity Needs
are positively correlated, but there are industries whose position varies
greatly within the two rankings. Scientific Research and Development, Pro-
gramming and Broadcasting Activities, Motion Picture and Sound Recording
are low ranked for their needs of external funds as a source of physical
capital formation, but they are relatively high ranked when looking at
liquidity needs. Conversely, Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Veterinary
Activities, Postal and Courier Activities are ranked high for their external
dependence a` la RZ, but not for their liquidity needs.
Production line position. Financial frictions during recession and re-
covery episodes may even affect industries for reasons unrelated to their
direct dependence on external finance or their liquidity needs. Indeed,
industries produce goods with different durability and goods that target
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different final users. As both durable and investment goods are typically
more pro-cyclical, we might be confusing the effects of these character-
istics with that of dependence on external finance. In Braun and Lar-
rain (2005), for instance, industries producing durable goods are more
affected during recessions, just like industries more dependent on exter-
nal funds. In order to consider the extent to which the availability of
bank credit at the country level affects the demand for goods produced
by individual firms, and not only their production capacity, we rank
firms according to a couple of industry measures of relative production
line position. The two indexes introduced, GfcfUses and IntermUses,
just measure the percentage of commodities in sector s that enters re-
spectively into gross fixed capital formation and intermediate consump-
tion uses. So doing, we differentiate among those industries producing
mainly consumption goods or services and industries that, instead, con-
centrate their activity on the production of intermediate and investment
goods. The two indexes have been built employing Input-Output tables
contained in the OECD STAN database and submitted by Eurostat for
the EU27 aggregate in the pre-recession year 2008.29
We calculate the two measures within the EU-27 aggregate, assuming
that they represent relatively stable attributes of industries across differ-
ent countries. At the top ofGfcfUses we have industries classified in the
Construction section, as well as Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment
and industries providing IT and other information services. Although this
measure does not perfectly coincide with one of durability, the proxim-
ity between durable and investment goods industries should result quite
high so that their relative classifications may partly overlap. At the top of
IntermUses, instead, we have Manufacture of Basic Metals but also spe-
cific administrative and support service activities, such as Employment
Activities and Rental and Leasing Activities, or other professional activities,
such as Advertising and Market Research. Conversely, at the bottom of the
two indexes we have typical industries directly providing consumption
29The (i;j)-th entry of this Use Table reports the value of inputs of commodity i used
in the production of industry j in the European economy. An additional set of columns
also records the value of commodity i that enters into final uses, namely consumption,
investment, net changes in inventories, and net exports.
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goods such as Accomodation, Food Service Activities and Retail Trade.
4.3.6 Regression results
In this section we present the results of the estimation of regressions pre-
sented in section 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. As a reminder, the dependent variable
Growth is the annual growth rate of Operating Revenues (Turnover) by
firm computed in real terms over the period 2003-2011. All estimates in
this section are obtained from winsorised data, by setting all data below
the 1st percentile to the 1st percentile, and data above the 99th percentile
to the 99th percentile. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered
by firm. We start by estimating the regressions as defined in our base-
line specification. Results are reported in the two columns of table 25.
In column 1 we consider ExtDep as the relevant SectorCharacteristic
variable influencing the supply channel of transmission, while in col-
umn 2 we consider the variable LiqNeeds. The specifications reported
in both the two columns also comprehend GfcfUse and IntermUse as
SectorCharacteristic variables influencing the demand channel of trans-
mission. All these measures are introduced as differences with respect to
their average values within the sample.
The coefficient on lnSize, which accounts for convergence effects,
is negative as expected. Ceteris paribus, turnover growth tends to be
higher in smaller firms, which are likely to have higher development
margins. Once we control for this variable and for firm fixed effects,
we can then check how recession and recovery years resulting from the
global financial crisis affect growth at the firm level. Relative to the pre-
crisis period, recession years are associated with a fall of 13.5 percent-
age points in turnover growth by firm. By construction, this drop is re-
ferred to a representative and theoretical firm with average values of all
the SectorCharacteristic variables. However, the negative coefficients
on the interactionsRecession X IntermUse andRecession X GfcfUse
indicate that the decline in growth is highly heterogeneous with respect
to sectors, with a significantly larger fall in firms producing investment
and intermediate goods rather than consumption goods. This is consis-
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Table 25: Baseline OLS regressions
Dep: Growth (1) (2)
lnSize -0.4950*** -0.4949***
[-399.932] [-400.003]
Recession -0.1351*** -0.1352***
[-221.564] [-225.640]
Recession X LiqNeeds 0.0235
[1.273]
Recession X ExtDep 0.0787***
[6.307]
Recession X IntermUse -0.1165*** -0.1009***
[-47.748] [-30.515]
Recession X GfcfUse -0.1287*** -0.1160***
[-37.953] [-28.216]
Recovery -0.0747*** -0.0749***
[-108.966] [-110.711]
Recovery X OutputLoss 0.3317*** 0.3316***
[254.696] [254.764]
Recovery X LiqNeeds 0.1224***
[6.028]
Recovery X ExtDep 0.0662***
[4.714]
Recovery X IntermUse -0.0103*** -0.0029
[-3.701] [-0.769]
Recovery X GfcfUse -0.0354*** -0.0297***
[-9.428] [-6.488]
N 12,896,398 12,896,398
r2 0.14 0.14
F 40993.290 40552.156
Robust t-statistics are presented below the coefficients.
Significance (p-value): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
tent with the different procyclicality characterizing each industry. We
can estimate a differential effect for each SectorCharacteristic variable
during the recession years, i.e. the difference in turnover growth when
moving from firms in low ranked sectors (15th percentile by sector) to
firms in high ranked sectors (85th percentile by sector). The estimated
effect corresponds to a decline by about 3 percentage points with respect
to GfcfUse and more than 5 points with respect to IntermUse. Thus,
different production line positions have a meaningful redistributive ef-
fect among sectors during recession years.
Conversely, the dependence on external finance seems not to consti-
tute a major obstacle to growth during recession years. Indeed, the co-
efficients on Recession X ExtDep and Recession X LiqNeeds are both
positive. However, we will show in table 26 that this result is strongly
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influenced by the fact that we are estimating our regressions in a sin-
gle sample, without distinguishing between more developed countries
and developing countries. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that finan-
cial frictions are much greater in emerging markets than in developed
countries and, consequently, that firms suffered more in Central Eastern
Europe (CEE) than in Western Europe (WE) during the financial crisis.
Since in WE a larger share of firms belongs to sectors characterized by
high values of ExtDep and LiqNeeds,30 this translates into a positive
bias of the coefficients relating to these sector characteristics. Thus, pos-
itive coefficients could be actually due to the omission of a variable that
takes into account the different performance of developed and emerging
countries in crisis years.
Let’s move on to recovery years. The coefficient on Recovery is still
significantly negative, indicating that growth at the firm level is still
weaker than in pre-crisis years. However, the coefficient is less negative
than the coefficient on Recession as we should expect, since the recov-
ery has a positive across-the-board level effect on firms’ growth. More-
over, the positive and significant coefficient on Recovery X OutputLoss
proves the existence of a meaningful bounce-back effect. Companies that
experienced a more pronounced fall in recession years tend to have a
sharper rebound in recovery years, other factors being equal.
Even in recovery years, growth continues to be disproportionately
lower for industries that produce intermediate and investment goods.
But coefficients on the relative interaction terms are now lower in ab-
solute value than those referring to recession years. The redistribution
of growth between sectors therefore occurs especially in the recession
phase. However, since the bounce-back effect is only partial (the coeffi-
cient is 0.33) and the coefficients on the interaction terms remain nega-
tive, we can say with certainty that early years of recovery have not com-
pensated in any way for the greatest losses suffered in recession years by
the companies that produce intermediate and investment goods.
30It should be noted that this is evidence is fully consistent with RZ findings, according
to which sectors more dependent on external finance tend to grow relatively more (and
then to have a higher weight) in countries with greater financial development.
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Finally, the coefficients on the interaction terms relative to ExtDep
and LiqNeeds remain positive also with regard to the recovery phase.
However, even in this case, we prefer to postpone further comments to
the description of results in table 26, where we split the sample in WE e
CEE countries.
Table 26 just shows how the coefficients change across the two ge-
ographical sub-regions, thus allowing separate specifications for more
advanced economies and developing countries within the European con-
tinent. As we can see, the Recession dummy is associated with a much
greater fall in CEE firms. This would eventually reflect the scarcity of al-
ternative sources of funding or more pervasive agency problems in coun-
tries where financial frictions are more relevant. Again, the drop during
recession years is highly heterogeneous with respect to sectors, with a
significantly larger fall in firms producing investment and intermediate
goods rather than consumption goods. Moreover, the across-industry
difference in performance with respect to the production line position is
even more pronounced in CEE than in WE. Indeed, if we recalculate the
differential effects as for table 25, we obtain that during recession years
in CEE countries the turnover growth declines by about 10 percentage
points when moving from low ranked sectors to high ranked sectors with
respect to GfcfUse and by more than 13 percentage points with respect
to IntermUse. In WE countries, these declines respectively reduce to
about 3.5 and 4.5 percentage points.
However, the most important difference with respect to results in ta-
ble 25 is that now the dependence on external finance actually seems to
constitute an obstacle to output growth during recession years. The coef-
ficient on ExtDep interacted with the Recession dummy is negative and
significantly different from zero for WE firms, with an estimated differ-
ential effect equal to a decline of about 2 percentage points. Within the
CEE subsample, the same coefficient is negative but not significant. In-
stead, the negative coefficient onLiqNeeds interacted with theRecession
dummy is significantly different from zero in both CEE and WE, with es-
timated differential effects respectively equal to -1.1 and -1.4 percentage
points. These estimates are still lower in absolute values than those ob-
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Table 26: Baseline OLS regressions by Geographical Region
Dep: Growth CEE WE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnSize -0.5375*** -0.5374*** -0.3688*** -0.3689***
[-327.745] [-327.821] [-218.433] [-218.457]
Recession -0.3050*** -0.3034*** -0.0707*** -0.0701***
[-202.606] [-211.316] [-124.886] [-125.397]
Recession X LiqNeeds -0.2605*** -0.3110***
[-4.926] [-18.111]
Recession X ExtDep -0.0539 -0.1383***
[-1.812] [-12.018]
Recession X IntermUse -0.2529*** -0.2540*** -0.0859*** -0.0981***
[-43.701] [-32.833] [-43.625] [-35.226]
Recession X GfcfUse -0.4107*** -0.4137*** -0.1400*** -0.1488***
[-47.757] [-41.882] [-42.985] [-37.185]
Recovery -0.2214*** -0.2203*** -0.0259*** -0.0252***
[-129.594] [-134.140] [-40.637] [-39.779]
Recovery X OutputLoss 0.3976*** 0.3977*** 0.2919*** 0.2921***
[183.449] [183.512] [197.560] [197.998]
Recovery X LiqNeeds -0.2149*** -0.3008***
[-3.628] [-16.406]
Recovery X ExtDep -0.0692* -0.1840***
[-2.017] [-14.478]
Recovery X IntermUse -0.0542*** -0.0598*** -0.0219*** -0.0449***
[-7.987] [-6.622] [-9.711] [-14.144]
Recovery X GfcfUse -0.1024*** -0.1084*** -0.1203*** -0.1379***
[-10.285] [-9.485] [-34.494] [-32.004]
N 4,603,276 4,603,276 8,293,122 8,293,122
r2 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.10
F 24445.063 24389.601 17875.155 17075.617
Robust t-statistics are presented below the coefficients.
Significance (p-value): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
served for GfcfUse and IntermUse. Therefore, over recession years,
the main redistributive effects are due to the type of goods sold, i.e. the
demand channel of transmission, rather than to sector characteristics in-
fluencing the need for external financing, i.e. the supply channel of trans-
mission. These results induce us to think that in the short run the finan-
cial crisis hit especially firms selling goods and services that typically
require credit to be acquired rather than firms that need credit to buy
those goods as factor inputs.31
As for the subsequent recovery years, the coefficient on Recovery
still indicates that growth at the firm level remains weaker than in pre-
31Moreover, it would be also useful to make a further distinction among inputs for in-
vestments and intermediate goods and inputs for consumption goods.
151
crisis years. This is especially evident in CEE, where at the same time,
however, we can observe a more pronounced bounce-back effect, as re-
vealed by the higher coefficient on Recovery X OutputLoss. Even re-
covery years as well as recession years continue to be relatively worse for
industries that produce intermediate and investment goods rather than
consumption goods, other factors being equal. But the lower coefficients
on the relative interaction terms (in absolute values) confirm that the re-
distribution of growth between firms producing different goods mainly
occur in the recession phase.
Interestingly, both the coefficients relating to ExtDep and to
LiqNeeds remain fairly similar when interacted with Recession and
Recovery dummies. This indicates that the redistributive effects be-
tween industries depending on external finance to different extents do
not cease to exist in the early years of recovery, but rather remain largely
unchanged following the recession phase.
We are now particularly interested in heterogeneous behavior during
creditless and with-credit recoveries. Indeed, from the perspective of a
financial dependent firm, the availability of funding during a creditless
recovery may feel very much like that in a recession. To investigate this
issue, we finally turn to the fully specified regression of section 4.3.4. Ta-
ble 27 shows that the coefficient onClessRecv is significant in all the four
specifications and negative as expected, reflecting weaker performance
during recoveries that are more markedly creditless. Indeed, we remind
that ClessRecv is the Recovery dummy multiplied by CreditWeakness.
AndCreditWeakness, in turn, represents the percentage drop in real Pri-
vate Credit by country from trough year to 2011. The differential effect
of CreditWeakness during recovery years can be measured as the dif-
ference in turnover growth when moving from a representative country
where the recovery is with-credit (15th percentile of CreditWeakness by
country, corresponding to Finland in WE and Czech Republic in CEE) to
a representative country where the recovery is creditless (85th percentile,
corresponding to Iceland in WE and Estonia in CEE). The estimated ef-
fect corresponds to a decline by more than 4 percentage points in CEE
and nearly 7 percentage points in WE, which are highly meaningful ef-
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Table 27: Fully specified OLS regressions by Geographical Region
Dep: Growth CEE WE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnSize -0.5381*** -0.5380*** -0.3708*** -0.3709***
[-327.324] [-327.388] [-219.279] [-219.324]
Recession -0.3046*** -0.3030*** -0.0688*** -0.0682***
[-202.373] [-211.096] [-121.115] [-121.753]
Recession X LiqNeeds -0.2563*** -0.2970***
[-4.849] [-17.190]
Recession X ExtDep -0.0545 -0.1333***
[-1.835] [-11.592]
Recession X IntermUse -0.2523*** -0.2538*** -0.0844*** -0.0963***
[-43.615] [-32.803] [-42.953] [-34.635]
Recession X GfcfUse -0.4102*** -0.4135*** -0.1370*** -0.1457***
[-47.709] [-41.874] [-42.052] [-36.400]
Recovery -0.2200*** -0.2199*** -0.0455*** -0.0447***
[-128.837] [-133.975] [-65.322] [-63.956]
Recovery X OutputLoss 0.3979*** 0.3980*** 0.2922*** 0.2924***
[183.369] [183.431] [197.563] [197.946]
Recovery X LiqNeeds -0.1711** -0.2204***
[-2.892] [-11.558]
Recovery X ExtDep -0.0645 -0.1478***
[-1.886] [-10.386]
Recovery X IntermUse -0.0560*** -0.0601*** -0.0310*** -0.0511***
[-8.160] [-6.600] [-11.521] [-13.635]
Recovery X GfcfUse -0.1029*** -0.1086*** -0.1474*** -0.1631***
[-10.331] [-9.498] [-36.564] [-32.885]
ClessRecv -0.1689*** -0.1554*** -0.3960*** -0.3963***
[-11.139] [-10.401] [-65.624] [-64.191]
ClessRecv X LiqNeeds -2.6559*** 1.0723***
[-5.529] [6.652]
ClessRecv X ExtDep 0.3446 0.6168***
[1.209] [4.906]
ClessRecv X IntermUse -0.7605*** -0.5500*** -0.2895*** -0.2237***
[-11.589] [-6.729] [-10.969] [-6.272]
ClessRecv X GfcfUse -0.3445*** -0.2237* -0.5081*** -0.4552***
[-3.765] [-2.189] [-13.023] [-9.707]
N 4,603,276 4,603,276 8,293,122 8,293,122
r2 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.10
F 17553.05 17511.81 12807.02 12234.26
Robust t-statistics are presented below the coefficients.
Significance (p-value): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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fects from an economic standpoint. The lower differential effect in CEE
countries is in part attributable to the fact that the global financial crisis
and the associated financial frictions already have, in themselves, a much
more negative impact in CEE firms regardless of the evolution of bank
credit, as revealed by the coefficients on Recession and Recovery dum-
mies. In WE countries, on the other hand, bank credit growth provides
an additional signal to distinguish those economies where the financial
shocks may have had a major impact.
At the firm level, the gap in performance between credit-
less and with-credit recoveries also depends on sectoral effects.
The significant and negative coefficients on ClessRecv X GfcfUse
and ClessRecv X IntermUse (i.e. the interactions of GfcfUse and
IntermUse with the ClessRecv term) indicate that during creditless re-
coveries firms that sell investment and intermediate goods performed
relatively worse. So not only they suffered generally more than other
firms during the financial crisis, but the gap accumulated is also pro-
portionately greater in creditless countries. The interpretation of the
interactions between ClessRecv and SectorCharacteristic variables is
akin to a difference-in-differences specification. This diff-in-diffs ef-
fect measures how much an industry at the 85th percentile level of the
SectorCharacteristic variable grows with respect to an industry at the
15th percentile level when we have a recovery episode at the 85th per-
centile of CreditWeakness rather than one at the 15th percentile. Ac-
cording to our estimations, the diff-in-diffs impact of going from a CEE
country experiencing a credit-with recovery to another CEE country ex-
periencing a creditless recovery translates into a growth decline by about
9 percentage points in sectors with higher IntermUse and by about 2 per-
centage points in sectors with higher GfcfUse. For WE countries, these
declines become respectively equal to 2.3 and 2 percentage points. Again,
these numbers appear economically meaningful. Since the demand for
investment and for intermediate goods is hit harder when financing fric-
tions are more prevalent, then the differential impact is proportionally
stronger during creditless recoveries.
When moving to consider the sectoral dependence on external financ-
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ing, the coefficient on ClessRecv X ExtDep is positive, although signif-
icantly different from zero in the WE sub-region only. Here the diff-in-
diffs impact results to be equal to 1.5 percentage points. This result indi-
cates that redistributive effects across industries within creditless coun-
tries did not materialize at the expense of sectors that are more reliant
on external funds to finance their physical capital. These sectors, as re-
ported above, suffered more during both recession and recovery years
as a consequence of the global financial crisis, and it is not the negative
change in bank credit to constitute an additional and immediate obsta-
cle for their short-run growth. Instead, the negative evolution of bank
credit mainly hit sectors producing investment and intermediate goods.
These considerations do not lead to reject the hypothesis that creditless
recoveries following the recent financial crisis are the result of impaired
financial intermediation. Rather, they highlight that, in the short term,
frictions in the credit market affect the economy mainly on the demand
side rather than on the supply side.
Finally, the coefficient on ClessRecv X LiqNeeds is also strongly sig-
nificant, but the sign is reversed when moving from WE countries to
CEE countries. In WE the sign is positive but the diff-in-diffs impact is
not particularly meaningful (+0.8 percentage points) from an economical
point of view. Conversely, in CEE the sign is negative and the diff-in-
diffs impact (-3 percentage points) is quite relevant. In CEE countries,
where financial frictions are more prevalent, industries more dependent
on external finance for their working capital (i.e. those with higher liq-
uidity needs) perform relatively worse when the recovery is not accom-
panied by credit growth. This redistributive effect is additional to that
already captured by the negative coefficient on Recovery X LiqNeeds,
which acts regardless of bank credit growth.
4.3.7 Additional results by trade credit dependency
Finally, table 28 shows how the differential impact of recessions, recov-
eries and creditless recoveries varies with the firms’ reliance on trade
credit before the global financial crisis. We define Trade Credit Dependency
155
Table 28: Fully Specified OLS regressions by use of trade credit (CEE)
Dep: Growth Low TCD High TCD
(1) (2)
lnSize -0.4955*** -0.5580***
[-221.635] [-211.361]
Recession -0.2401*** -0.3086***
[-118.147] [-147.052]
Recession X LiqNeeds -0.7948*** 0.3056***
[-11.638] [3.823]
Recession X IntermUse -0.2813*** -0.1519***
[-39.384] [-17.399]
Recession X GfcfUse -0.3996*** -0.3461***
[-33.312] [-29.106]
Recovery -0.1755*** -0.1679***
[-74.674] [-65.843]
Recovery X OutputLoss 0.2112*** 0.2445***
[59.920] [52.320]
Recovery X LiqNeeds -0.5165*** -0.1328
[-6.797] [-1.458]
Recovery X IntermUse -0.1302*** 0.0612***
[-14.964] [5.755]
Recovery X GfcfUse -0.1259*** -0.0272
[-8.888] [-1.942]
ClessRecv -0.3727*** -0.1142***
[-12.624] [-6.085]
ClessRecv X LiqNeeds -1.7640* -2.7817***
[-2.256] [-4.205]
ClessRecv X IntermUse -0.7092*** -0.8501***
[-5.653] [-10.769]
ClessRecv X GfcfUse -0.2116 -0.4255***
[-1.144] [-3.897]
N 2,067,908 1,963,879
r2 0.15 0.16
F 7234.954 7288.4
Robust t-statistics are presented below the coefficients.
Significance (p-value): *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
(TCD) by firm as the ratio of trade credit to short term debt. This can be
obtained in AMADEUS dataset as the ratio between Current Liabilities:
Creditors and Current Liabilities. For each firm, we take the median ratio
over the pre-crisis years 2003-2007. On the one hand, when a predom-
inant share of short term external finance is in the form of trade credit,
firms are relatively less exposed to shocks in bank credit supply. On the
other hand, trade credit dependency may be the chain for a more rapid
transmission of financial shocks. In addition, it is still possible that firms
resulting more reliant on trade credit are just those more constrained by
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financial institutions even before the crisis.32 If this is the case, firms with
high TCD may have less room to further substitute trade credit for bank
loans.
Instead of including dummies as control variables, we split the sam-
ple in two according to whether the observations correspond to firms
with TCD above (High TCD) or below (Low TCD) the median within
the CEE subsample. We concentrate here on CEE countries because the
reliance on trade credit is supposed to have a larger impact in economies
characterized by more relevant financial frictions and lower substi-
tutability between the different forms of finance. Table 28 shows that
firms more dependent on trade credit are hit relatively harder in reces-
sion years, as the coefficient on the Recession dummy is more markedly
negative for high TCD companies (column 2). This seems to confirm the
possibility that financial shocks are transmitted more quickly through the
relative use of trade credit. At the same time, however, the coefficient on
Recession X LiqNeeds is significantly negative only for firms with low
TCD (column 1). This indicates that trade credit can be actually a valid
source of financing to support business activities in sectors characterized
by higher liquidity needs, especially when financial shocks restrict ac-
cess to other forms of financing. In practice, during the recession years,
the higher TCD has been a major obstacle only for companies that have
not high liquidity needs for technological reasons. On the contrary, in in-
dustries with high liquidity needs the higher reliance on trade credit has
mitigated the fall. Liquidity needs produce a strong differential behav-
ior between low TCD firms even during the subsequent recovery years,
as the coefficient on Recovery X LiqNeeds is still strongly negative in
column (1), differently from what can be observed for high TCD firms.
Finally, table 28 shows that the coefficient on ClessRecv is more
markedly negative for low TCD firms. The differential effect for
CreditWeakness during recovery years corresponds to an average de-
cline by nearly 10 percentage points in low TCD firms while only 3 per-
centage points in low TCD firms. When considering the credit weakness
32To examine these issues further, see also Raddatz (2010), Petersen and Rajan (1994,
1997), Zakrajsek (1997), Fisman and Love (2003).
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of the recovery, redistributive effects across sectors, i.e. the coefficients
on the interaction terms, are more pronounced for high TCD firms, just
because in low TCD firms the worse performance is generalized, regard-
less of the liquidity needs of the industry. To sum up, in countries where
the recovery is more visibly creditless, firms that are less reliant on trade
credit recover more slowly since they are more exposed to shocks in bank
credit supply. This is valid regardless of the industry they belong to. On
the contrary, firms that are more reliant on trade credit are better pre-
pared to cope with the fall of bank credit, so that only industries with
higher liquidity needs suffer to a greater extent the weakness of bank
lending.
4.3.8 Concluding remarks
As revealed in chapter 2, the recovery from the global financial crisis has
been creditless in a number of economies, and thus slower than aver-
age. In part II of this chapter (section 4.3) we have just shown that these
creditless recoveries are not simply determined by a decrease in the de-
mand for bank credit. Our estimations, indeed, show that in countries
with higher credit weakness output growth remain feeble especially in
those firms that are more vulnerable to bank finance. This suggests that
creditless recoveries are also induced by disruptions on the supply side
of the bank credit market. For example, banks facing a negative capi-
tal shock may have chosen to reduce credit supply to meet capital re-
quirements. The finding that creditless recoveries are associated with
impaired financial intermediation has important consequences from a
policy standpoint. In fact, measures designed at addressing the under-
capitalization of banks and restoring credit supply should help firms that
are more reliant on bank finance to recover faster.
Furthermore, we have analyzed two channels of transmission
through which credit weakness my affect output fluctuations in the short
term. On the one hand, an impaired credit market may lower the de-
mand of goods that are typically purchased with the help of external
financing, such as investment or intermediate goods. This damages com-
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panies that sell their output for gross fixed capital formation or interme-
diate consumption uses (demand channel of transmission). On the other
hand, the impaired credit market may also affect those companies that
are more dependent on credit to finance investments in fixed capital or
their current spending on productive inputs. When credit fails to recover,
the productive capacity of these firms is eroded to a greater extent (supply
channel of transmission). However, our estimates reveal that the supply
channel is much less relevant, especially when considering the depen-
dence on external financing a` la Rajan-Zingales rather than short-term
liquidity needs. Indeed, in the short run, the fall in investments mainly
affects firms producing investment goods rather than those postponing
the expansion of their fixed capital.
Finally, we explore the behavior of firms that are relatively more de-
pendent on trade credit as opposed to bank credit during the last crisis.
We concentrate on CEE countries because the reliance on trade credit is
supposed to have a larger impact in economies characterized by more
relevant financial frictions and lower substitutability between the differ-
ent forms of finance. We obtain that, on average, CEE firms more de-
pendent on trade credit have been hit relatively harder during recession
years of the global financial crisis. Indeed, trade credit dependency may
be the chain for a more rapid transmission of financial shocks. However,
we also find that in countries where the reprise is more visibly creditless,
firms that are more reliant on trade credit recover more quickly since they
are less exposed to shocks in bank credit supply. In addition, a higher re-
liance on trade credit also results to have mitigated the fall in industries
with high liquidity needs. When financial shocks restrict access to other
forms of financing, trade credit results to be a valid alternative resource
to support business activities in industries that require relatively large
amounts of working capital.
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Appendix A
AMADEUS firm-level data
A.1 Introduction
The corner-stone of this paper’s empirical framework is a comprehensive
cross-country firm-level panel dataset, called AMADEUS. This is a com-
mercial dataset collected via national sources by Bureau van Dijk (BvD),
an electronic publishing firm providing company information and busi-
ness intelligence. It provides a collection of accounts from companies
balance sheets and income statements across 41 countries in both West-
ern and Eastern Europe.1 Both consolidated and unconsolidated annual
accounts are available in AMADEUS, and these are pretty much com-
parable across countries. As such, it is a longitudinal database provid-
ing rich variation across countries, years, industries and firm size. The
database also provides qualitative information as number of employees,
if the firm belongs to a group, and if it is listed on a stock market. See
table 29 and table 30 for a detailed list of financial variables available in
AMADEUS.
Sample selection and data cleansing. The original BvDEP AMADEUS
software does not allow for directly managing and analyzing very large
1Amadeus actually contains information for 44 countries, but there are no available bal-
ance sheets and income statements for Albania, Belarus and Kosovo.
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Table 29: Balance Sheet variables available in AMADEUS Database
Fixed Assets Intangible assets + Tangible assets + Other fixed assets
Intangible Fixed Assets Formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, devel-
opment expenses, etc.
Tangible Fixed Assets Buildings, machinery, etc.
Other Fixed Assets All other fixed assets (incl. Financial Fixed Assets) such
as long term investments, shares and participations, etc.
Current Assets Stocks + Debtors + Other current assets
Stocks Total inventories (raw materials + in progress + finished
goods)
Debtors Trade receivables (from clients and customers only)
Other Current Assets All other current assets such as receivables from other
sources (taxes, group companies), short term investment
of money and Cash at bank and in hand
Cash Detail of the Other current assets (including Cash Equiv-
alent)
Total Assets Fixed assets + Current assets
Shareholders’ Funds Total equity (Capital + Other shareholders’ funds)
Capital Issued Share capital (Authorized capital)
Other Shareholders’ Funds All Shareholders’ funds not linked with the Issued capi-
tal such as Reserve capital, Undistributed profit, include
also Minority interests
Non-Current Liabilities Long Term Debt + Other non Current Liabilities
Long Term Debt Long term financial debts: e.g. to credit institutions
(loans and credits) and bonds
Other non Current Other long term liabilities (trade debts, group compa-
nies, pension loans, etc.) + provisions + deferred taxes
Liabilities Other long term liabilities (trade debts, group compa-
nies, pension loans, etc.) + provisions + deferred taxes
Provisions Provisions (social security, taxes, etc.)
Current Liabilities Loans + Creditors + Other current liabilities
Loans Short term financial debts (e.g. to credit institutions +
part of Long term financial debts payable within the year,
bonds, etc.)
Creditors Debts to suppliers and contractors (trade creditors)
Other Current Liabilities Pension, personnel costs, taxes, intragroup debts, ac-
counts received in advance, etc
Tot.Shareh.Funds & Liab. Shareholders’ funds + Non current liabilities +
Current liabilities
Number of Employees Total number of employees included in the company’s
payroll
Source: AMADEUS
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Table 30: P&L Account variables available in AMADEUS Database
Operating Revenue / Net sales + Other operating revenues + Stock variations.
Turnover The figures do not include VAT. Local differences may
occur regarding excises taxes and similar obligatory pay-
ments for specific market of tobacco and alcoholic bever-
age industries
Sales Net sales
Cost of Goods Sold Cost of sold goods, production, services. Costs directly
related to the production of the goods sold + deprecia-
tion of those costs
Gross Profit Operating revenue - Cost of goods sold
Other Operating Expenses All costs not directly related to the production of goods
sold such as commercial costs, administrative expenses,
etc. + depreciation of those costs
Operating Profit (Loss) EBIT. All operating revenues - all operating expenses
(Gross profit-Other operating expenses)
Financial Revenue All financial revenues such as interest, incomes from
shares, etc.
Financial Expenses All financial expenses such as interest charges, write-off
financial assets
Financial Profit / Loss Result from financial activities of the company (Financial
revenue - Financial expenses)
Profit (Loss) bef. Taxation Operating profit (EBIT) + financial profit
Taxation All taxes related to the accounting period (paid, accrued
or deferred)
Profit (Loss) after Taxation Profit before taxation - Taxation
Extr. and oth. Revenue All extraordinary revenues and other revenues belong-
ing to the ‘ordinary’ activities of the company
Extr. and oth. Expenses All extraordinary expenses and other expenses not be-
longing to the ‘ordinary’ activities of the company
Extr. and oth. Profit (Loss) All extraordinary and other result not belonging to the
‘ordinary’ activities of the company
Profit (Loss) for Period Net income for the Year. Before deduction of Minority
interests if any (Profit after taxation + Extraordinary and
other profit)
Material Costs Detail of the purchases of goods (raw materials + fin-
ished goods). No services
Cost of Employees Detail of all the employees costs of the company (includ-
ing pension costs)
Depreciation Total amount of depreciation and amortization of the as-
sets
Interest Paid Total amount of interest charges paid for shares or loans
Source: AMADEUS
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amounts of data. So we initially have to download all the data that we
could potentially work on and then, in a second step, we proceed to an
appropriate cleaning procedure. In our paper we refer to an edition up-
dated as of March 2013 and complemented with previous vintages of
AMADEUS, in order to increase the time-horizon of the dataset and to
include more firm-years observations.2
Since we are generally interested in changes over time of the relevant
variables, we must have at least two consecutive years of data for a firm
to remain in our sample. Therefore, observations are downloaded for
firms whose accounts are available for at least two consecutive years over
the period 2003-2011. This period is sufficiently large to include a whole
business cycle and the up and down of interest rates.
We also require reporting firms to have some basic accounting infor-
mation in their accounts. At least one period with non-missing infor-
mation on employment (or alternatively turnover), operating profits and
total assets is required for the initial download, as well as information
on the industry code and the country of origin. The reason for dropping
those that do not report this minimal information is that there could be
country differences in the criteria for including firms with no informa-
tion on their accounts. In addition, this criterion excludes any phantom
firms established for tax or other purposes. Moreover, we must be sure
that the database doesn’t contain at the same time consolidated accounts
of a group and unconsolidated accounts of affiliates and subsidiaries be-
longing to the same group. To avoid double-counting, we exclude all the
unconsolidated accounts of firms where the company headquarter also
presents a consolidated account. Indeed, whenever available, the con-
solidated accounts are most suitable for providing information about the
financial situation of a company with subsidiaries.
We then impose a number of restrictions on the data, taking care of
the sample selection. Following the definitions of the Eurostat’s Struc-
tural Business Statistics (SBS), we limit our analysis to industries in
the non-financial business economy, including industry, construction and
2This trick is necessary since outer years are gradually removed from the available
dataset.
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a well-defined group of services. In particular, we have to exclude finan-
cial and insurance activities (NACE Rev. 2 Section K) because of the spe-
cific nature of their financial ratios, as well as agriculture, forestry and
fishing (Section A), public sector (Section O) and basically non-market
services, such as education, health, social work, activities of households,
membership organizations and extra-territorial organizations (Sections
P-U, excl. Divisions 95). Following Klapper et al (2006), we also exclude:
a) mining (Section B), where activities are mostly country-specific; b) util-
ities (Sections D-E), where industries are generally highly regulated or
state-owned.
To sum up, our dataset will refer to 58 two-digit industry divisions
covered by NACE Rev. 2, Sections C, F to J, L to N plus Division 95.
In addition, since the cross country dimension of our analysis necessi-
tates harmonization, we remove all firms with legal forms other than
the equivalent of Public and Private Limited Liability Companies, i.e.
all other forms such as sole proprietorships (where there is only one
shareholder) and partnerships (where at least one partner is liable for the
firm’s debts). In fact, coverage in AMADEUS for these kind of firms is
poor and uneven and their inclusion would make our analysis harder to
interpret. As shown in table 31, we start with a downloaded raw sample
of 6,076,469 firms located in 41 countries over the period 2003-2011.
In a second step, we clean the raw sample by applying a variety of
predetermined rules. BvDEP already implements by itself several pro-
cedures to authenticate the quality of data contained in the database.3
Anyway, since the quality controls by BvDEP are typically only executed
on peers of companies, we carry out additional consistency checks and
cleaning of the data.4 The database contains apparent mistakes, prob-
ably due to erroneous reproduction from other databases or for other
reasons. First of all, we remove all observations with negative or non-
positive values for variables where such information clearly represents
3These procedures include among the others: indexation search strategies to guarantee
the uniqueness of individual records; data analyses on groups of company at an aggregate
level; checks on the concordance between national classifications and international stan-
dards.
4Similar approaches can be found in Kremp and Sto¨ß (2001) and Gal et al (2013).
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Table 31: Available number of observations in the AMADEUS database
Non-farm, non-financial business sector, 2003-2011
Country
Firms in
Raw
Sample
Firms in
Final
Sample
TOTAL ASSETS
Observations by class size (%) Available
obs.
Micro Small Med. Large
Austria 8,656 4,816 30.9 23.5 34.8 10.8 28,530
Belgium 201,325 188,873 85.2 12.0 2.2 0.6 1,341,888
Bosnia 14,897 12,345 56.6 33.8 8.2 1.4 76,617
Bulgaria 77,825 49,410 52.6 34.3 11.0 2.1 230,302
Croatia 91,392 87,007 84.4 12.4 2.6 0.6 542,172
Cyprus 658 622 39.1 38.2 18.7 4.0 1,736
Czech Rep. 128,397 114,136 70.0 20.9 7.3 1.8 564,909
Denmark 84,739 69,198 76.6 18.2 4.2 1.0 335,035
Estonia 65,295 60,188 87.6 10.1 2.0 0.2 375,591
Finland 130,448 112,504 82.9 13.5 2.7 0.9 642,670
France 677,894 648,807 87.0 11.8 1.0 0.3 4,093,617
Germany 129,024 99,525 41.7 29.7 21.8 6.8 626,103
Greece 21,844 21,241 40.9 47.3 9.7 2.1 156,591
Hungary 183,979 163,017 82.3 13.9 3.1 0.7 826,062
Iceland 17,252 14,002 93.6 5.0 1.1 0.4 93,070
Ireland 9,835 6,533 54.7 27.7 14.9 2.8 45,342
Italy 849,749 792,347 77.6 18.7 3.1 0.6 4,587,346
Latvia 19,520 16,843 52.4 33.4 12.3 2.0 65,405
Liechtenstein 4 . . . . . .
Lithuania 14,395 11,555 30.0 44.1 21.7 4.2 47,037
Luxembourg 6,284 4,357 62.1 21.7 12.0 4.3 17,915
Macedonia 1,409 735 46.8 35.8 13.8 3.6 1,893
Malta 1,563 1,333 80.9 9.6 7.0 2.5 7,652
Moldova 817 784 61.7 18.3 14.7 5.3 4,980
Monaco 1 . . . . . .
Montenegro 280 273 11.2 35.6 37.0 16.2 883
Netherlands 27,546 18,683 35.9 25.5 29.7 8.8 120,013
Norway 193,719 182,275 84.6 12.5 2.3 0.6 1,195,897
Poland 69,952 59,086 26.7 45.6 21.9 5.9 292,673
Portugal 256,761 241,022 81.7 15.3 2.6 0.4 1,451,458
Romania 438,722 424,950 87.3 10.2 2.1 0.4 2,670,131
Russian Fed. 712,899 629,631 34.1 50.3 12.4 3.2 2,711,974
Serbia 67,974 66,649 79.6 14.9 4.5 1.1 421,935
Slovakia 42,200 34,793 66.3 22.9 8.7 2.1 110,621
Slovenia 41,924 35,257 74.9 17.7 5.9 1.5 119,380
Spain 841,594 765,392 78.0 18.9 2.6 0.5 4,687,345
Sweden 11,426 10,367 13.5 37.0 37.4 12.1 78,952
Switzerland 318 281 10.1 30.6 32.1 27.3 1,987
Turkey 3,862 3,642 20.5 41.9 25.0 12.6 12,736
Ukraine 232,331 197,708 67.8 24.3 6.5 1.5 1,263,616
Un.Kingdom 397,759 285,537 75.5 11.9 9.3 3.3 2,032,209
Total 6,076,469 5,435,724 74.4 19.4 4.9 1.3 31,884,273
Source: AMADEUS and own calculations
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errors in the reporting activity. In this preliminary sample we also elim-
inate observations that violate basic accounting norms, comparing the
accounting AMADEUS variables to values computed using accounting
identities. Since small differences can be due to approximations, we only
remove observations whenever the AMADEUS value and the computed
value differ by more than 2 percent. The processes that lead to this pre-
liminary database affect a relatively small number of observations, but
they’re strictly necessary to remove possible data errors and firms that
will be not appropriate for our study.
We then apply outlier filtering based on some relevant financial ra-
tios, such as: (a) Balance Sheet variables divided by Operating Revenues
or by Number of Employees; (b) Profit & Loss Account variables divided
by Total Assets or by Capital. Based on these ratios, we filter out obser-
vations outside the interquintile range, minus or plus five times the in-
terquintile range itself.5 We apply this procedure separately in each cell
characterized by the same two-digit NACE industry, country, year and
size class.6 A similar procedure is also applied with respect to the annual
growth of the ratios themselves, in order to identify suspicious outliers
with implausibly large longitudinal changes. This approach should pos-
5The so called Tukey test is designed on the basis of first and third quartiles (Q0.25 and
Q0.75) and inter-quartile range (IQR = Q0.75 − Q0.25). An observation is labeled as an
outlier when it falls outside the interval [Q0.25−k ·IQR ; Q0.75 +k ·IQR], where we set
k = 5. In order to account for the skewness of the distribution, we apply a modified form
of this approach, where k is corrected for a simple measure of asymmetry, represented by
the Octile Skewness (OS):
OS =
Q0.875 +Q0.125 − 2 ·Q0.50
Q0.875 −Q0.125
(A.1)
The OS value lies between -1 and +1, with a 0 value indicating symmetric data. Although
better measures of skewness exist (like the Medcouple, introduced by Brys et al (2004)), they
are too computationally expensive for our dataset. The modified interval of critical values
is given by the following formula:
[Q0.25 − k · e−4·OS · IQR ; Q0.75 + k · e3·OS · IQR] if OS ≥ 0 (A.2)
[Q0.25 − k · e−3·OS · IQR ; Q0.75 + k · e4·OS · IQR] if OS < 0 (A.3)
6A detailed definition of size classes is at the end of this Appendix. In this context, we
bring Medium-sized and Large enterprises together in a single cell, because of their low
numerousness.
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sibly eliminate the majority of firms participating in merger or acquisi-
tions. After applying the exclusion criteria described above, we have a
smaller, comprehensive sample of firms, which enhances comparability
across a large number of European countries.
Finally, after dropping observations which do not pass our filters,
for each variable we also exclude firm-year observations when they are
isolated, i.e. when information is not available in previous or following
years. Liechtenstein and Monaco are also excluded from the final sample,
since the number of observations is particularly low. As we can see from
table 31, providing information on the number of firms and observations
for each country before and after data cleaning, the sample size of our
preliminary database is reduced by 10 percent to 5,435,724 firms. The re-
duction is particularly high for some countries, with deletions above 30
percent for Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Nether-
lands. For Total Assets we are left with non-missing data for 31,884,273
firm-year observations, i.e. on average 5.9 years of available data for each
firm. However, the total number of firm-year observations changes sig-
nificantly across variables.
It is important to point out that there are substantial cross-country dif-
ferences in the collection of company accounts in AMADEUS. In some
countries, for example, small firms are not obliged to file data. Het-
erogeneous coverage across countries and class sizes is obviously a key
issue and it will be reflected in the way the results are interpreted.
Therefore, we have to be cautious about conclusions derived from cross-
country comparisons. On the contrary, within-country differences are
not affected by this issue, unless there are systematic biases in report-
ing firms within a country. When introducing our empirical analysis on
the AMADEUS dataset, we have to take in account that results across
the pooled sample are a good starting point for descriptive statistics, but
they can partly reflect the specific characteristics of firms across the dif-
ferent subsets. Referring to macroregions, rather than individual coun-
tries, should help to reduce the problems of heterogeneous coverage.
Since the use of a of a limited number of groups makes it easier to
highlight the main messages of the descriptive analysis, we take into con-
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sideration the following clusters:
(a) European Macroregions (6 clusters):
i. Northern Europe: United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, Finland;
ii. Western Europe: France, Belgium, Netherland, Luxembourg, Ger-
many, Austria, Switzerland;
iii. South-Western Europe: Portugal, Spain, Italy;
iv. Central Europe and Baltics: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania;
v. South-Eastern Europe: Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey;
vi. Other former Soviet States: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova.
(b) Two-Digit NACE Industries (8 broad areas of activity):
i. Manufacturing: Section C;
ii. Construction: Section F;
iii. Wholesale trade: Division 46;
iv. Retail trade: Divisions 45, 47 and 95;
v. Transport and communication: Section H and J;
vi. Accommodation and food services: Section I;
vii. Real estate: Section L;
viii. Business services: Section M and N.
(c) Size Classes (4 classes defined in terms of the average number of em-
ployees or, alternatively, turnover):
i. Micro Enterprises: fewer than 10 employees or turnover lower
than EUR 2 billion;
ii. Small Enterprises: 10 to 49 employees or turnover between EUR
2 billion and EUR 10 billion;
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iii. Medium-sized Enterprises: 50 to 249 employees or turnover be-
tween EUR 10 billion and EUR 50 billion;
iv. Large Enterprises: more than 250 employees or turnover higher
than EUR 50 billion.
(d) Age Classes (5 classes based on quintiles by age in 2011):
i. Newly Born Enterprises: up to 3 years old;
ii. Young Enterprises: 4 up to 6 years old;
iii. Mid-Age Enterprises: 7 up to 10 years old;
iv. Mature Enterprises: 11 up to 15 years old;
v. Established Enterprises: 16 years and older.
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